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Abstract
The internet has brought about tremendous changes in the way we see the world, 
allowing us to communicate at the speed of light, and dramatically changing the face of 
business forever. Organizations are able to share their business strategies and sensitive or 
proprietary information across the globe in order to create a sense of cohesiveness. This 
ability to share information across the vastness of the internet also allows attackers to 
exploit these different avenues to steal intellectual property or gather information vital to 
the national security of an entire nation. As technology advances to include more devices 
accessing an organization’s network and as more business is handled via the internet, 
attackers’ opportunities increase daily. Honeypots were created in response to this cyber 
warfare. Honeypots provide a technique to gather information about attackers performing 
reconnaissance on a network or device without the voluminous logs obtained by the 
majority of intrusion detection systems. This research effort provides a methodology to 
dynamically generate context-appropriate honeynets. Administrators are able to modify 
the system to conform to the target environment and gather the information passively or 
through increasing degrees of active scanning. The information obtained during the 
process of scanning the environment aids the administrator in creating a network 
topology and understanding the flux of devices in the network. This research continues 
the effort to defend an organization’s networks against the onslaught o f attackers.
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1Chapter 1: Problem Statement
1.1 Overview
The connectivity provided by the internet has dramatically affected the 
world in which we live. With almost all business transactions, academic research, and 
personal communication utilizing and relying on this avenue, the need to defend 
ourselves against attackers has become essential. The observable rise in computer 
incidents since 1999, as seen in Figure 1, from automated and targeted attacks from 
across the globe has produced a multibillion dollar industry to identify and mitigate 
unauthorized intrusion attempts. Reducing the high number of false positives in these 
intrusion detection system (IDS) logs has led to the development o f a decoy technology 
whose only purpose is to be attacked and compromised to aid the system administrator in 
determining the method of both the penetration and execution for future attacks. 
Introduced in the 1990s as honeypots, these systems have allowed researchers and 
corporations to capture tools and identify vulnerabilities in their systems.
Since honeypots are decoy systems and they offer no production value to the 
environment, they provide the ability to monitor the network without the painstaking 
analysis that inherently comes with monitoring a production device. Forensically 
analyzing a production device means delving into the voluminous logs and programs 
necessary to conduct business. On a non-production device, attacks are able to be 
distinguished from the network noise and the source of the attack quickly pinpointed. It is 
this effectiveness and efficiency that have facilitated the evolution of honeypot systems.
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Figure 1, Cyber incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) by third parties within the U.S. [Turk, 200S]
1.2 Detailed Problem Description
Due to the variability of cyber-attacks and the capability to conceal the 
compromise in a device, new tools need to be developed and old tools need to be 
expanded to assist in the war that faces every network attached to the internet. In 1998, 
John Howard and Thomas Longstaff wrote a report for the Sandia National Laboratories 
which presented a matrix o f possible computer and network attacks [Howard & 
Longstaff, 1998], This matrix is still relevant today since the taxonomy of incidents has 
not changed only the methods used by the attacker. As shown in Figure 2, it is apparent 
that the combination of possible attacks based on the tools, vulnerabilities, actions, 
targets, and unauthorized results are exorbitant.
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Figure 2, Computer and network attacks (Howard & Longstaff, 1998]
As these attacks occur, identification of the methods and tools used by the 
attacker to compromise the system becomes a fundamental technique to understanding 
current and future events. Most current ID systems rely on signatures of known malicious 
software or tools to identify and mitigate threats. But with malware polymorphism, code 
packing, and simple semantic changes even the modem IDS can be beaten. These 
abilities to conceal both tools or malware, make it necessary to have the piece of 
suspected code ran on a live system to confirm it can be used for nefarious means and to 
determine its effects on the system.
4In the past, attackers would target large government systems to collect sensitive 
information. But the news is full of articles where small businesses and individuals are 
being attacked at an increased rate [Acohido, 2011; Freedom, 2011; Larose, 2012; 
Srivastava, 2012] and attacks on corporations are often being orchestrated utilizing social 
engineering [Clayton, 2012; Freri, 2011]. The security model for protecting a network is 
changing from guarding the perimeter with firewalls and IDSs to watching for indicators 
that the network has been compromised from within, via the social engineering route. 
Thus it is extremely important to have the infrastructure in place to monitor the internal 
network for signs o f compromise. There are three specific issues which need to be 
addressed to change the mindset in this modem cyber warfare to allow honeypots to be 
used to their fullest potential.
1.2.1 Opposition to deploying honeypots on an organization’s network
"Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant 
conditions...He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent, and thereby succeed in 
winning, may be called a heaven-born captain." - Sun Tzu, The Art of War [Tzu, 1910]
Honeypots are used in research arenas, antivirus companies, internet service 
provider (ISP) sector and federal government agencies due to their ability to collect 
statistics about types o f attacks, location of attackers, and tools used to perpetrate an 
attack. Yet some security professionals are leery about using such technology in an 
organization’s production network environment. Some of the arguments that these 
security professionals express about deploying honeypots are: exposing the company to 
unnecessary risk by luring attackers to the network, generating operational overhead that
most organizations cannot handle by producing the same information that IDSs do, and 
just knowing an organization is under attack isn’t useful [Higgins, 2006]. These 
arguments are addressed in subsequent sections of this paper.
Organizations continue to underestimate the uses and benefits o f honeypots, due 
to their lack of knowledge of them. Organizations must be willing to employ new 
technologies to discover the attempts to steal information or compromise their systems, 
because attackers are definitely not afraid of exhausting their every resource to gain 
access to the organization’s network.
1.2.2 Self-adapting Honeynet
“Hence that general... is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.”
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War [Tzu, 1910]
“All warfare is based on deception.” - Sun Tzu, The Art of War [Tzu, 1910]
Many design ideas and advancements have led to the creation o f honeyfarms 
which are deployed in elaborate architectures. Some honeyfarms have the ability to route 
attackers from low interaction honeypots (LIH) or redirectors to high interaction 
honeypots (HIH). Other architectures rapidly deploy high interaction honeypots based on 
the number of attackers. These honeyfarms rebut the argument that honeypots are “like 
putting a stick into the ground and hoping a guy running at you runs into it instead” 
[Higgins, 2006], They offer the ability to deploy large number of honeypots which 
increase the ability to snare an attacker. Yet none of these architectures enable the user to 
model the individual honeypots after an organization’s infrastructure.
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With the continual updates and patches o f our operating systems, installation of 
new applications and devices, new smart devices being released every month, 
telecommuters coming and going, and administrators better securing the work 
environment; production networks are a place o f constant change. Yet HIHs are still 
deployed after manually creating a template which takes considerable time to keep the 
honeynet consistent with the production network. Advancement has been made in the 
area of low interaction honeypots; one form of network scanning is utilized to assist in 
the generation of configuration files which allows the low interaction honeypots to adjust 
to the changing environment. But even these systems do not have an automated method 
to re-scan the network then deploy a new honeynet in response to the changes.
Kansas State University researchers were recently awarded a five year grant from 
the Air Force Office of Scientific Research to study the “Understanding and quantifying 
the impact of moving target defenses on computer networks” [Tammen, 2012]. The 
researchers will construct a working model o f a network system which chaotically 
changes its configuration to impede an attacker’s attempts to learn about the 
environment. While this idea will make it more difficult for the attackers to map out a 
organization’s network topology, the attacker will still be able to perform reconnaissance 
on the nearby devices and attempt to detect their vulnerabilities. Upon discovering a 
vulnerability, it is a matter of relocating the device and executing the code even if the 
network topology has “changed.”
As the computer networks become more diverse, with the proliferation o f smart 
phones, tablets, and a wide assortment of computers and operating systems; it is
6
necessary for the network administrators to have a honeynet system which self-adapts to 
the changing environment. Low and high interaction honeypot must be configured “on 
the fly” so the honeynet becomes indistinguishable from the production devices. 
Additionally, the honeypots must be sporadically distributed about the network in ample 
numbers to increase the probability of sensing a breach. An example self-adapting 
honeynet architecture is shown in Figure 3.
Internet
7
Figure 3, Network Diagram [Hudak, 2008]
81.2.3 Gathering more “valuable” intelligence
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War [Tzu, 1910]
With the limited time that administrators have to identify, decontaminate, and 
reimage a compromised device it is imperative that effective and efficient tools be at their 
disposal. Honeypots are such a tool by providing value to model threats and techniques 
used by attackers [Dacier, Pouget & Debar, 2004], and for finding compromised hosts 
and learning how to repair them [Jackson, Levine, Grizzard & Owen, 2004], 
Unfortunately, high interaction honeypots currently require considerable time for their 
initial setup. Virtual machines (VM) have reduced the time to re-deploy a honeypot after 
infection, but constructing the template and updating the VMs to accurately represent the 
production devices is still time consuming. To further complicate the issue, 
administrators might not have the current network topologies from which to build their 
high interaction honeypots. As users install new applications, installation of network 
devices, telecommuters return from travel, and smart phones are brought into the 
workspace; the administrator has the difficult task o f keeping the network topology up-to- 
date.
Low interaction honeypots are much easier to configure and self-adapt to a 
production environment. However, there are limitations to the amount of data able to be 
collected through a low interaction honeypot. Simple low interaction honeypots respond 
during the TCP three-way handshake to imitate a real device. Some low interaction
honeypots respond a bit more by imitating the actual service that the attacker is trying to 
engage. In order to enhance the interaction, thus gather more information about the 
attack, scripts need to be implemented or brought to a higher level [Pouget & Holz, 
2005]. During Pouget and Holz’s research, it was determined 40 times more packets were 
exchanged with high interaction honeypots’ real services than with the low interaction 
honeypots’ scripts.
Proper location, time and bait will allow a honeypot to gather information on 
more advanced attackers [Spitzner, 2004]. Since organizations need to gather valuable 
information about the attackers that are plaguing their networks and the vulnerabilities 
they are exploiting, the honeynet has to be configured to resemble their production 
networks. Attackers are using more targeted attacks on specific organizations to gather 
information that the attackers find worthwhile. Deploying replica honeypots amongst the 
real production devices will cause the attackers to search for the information that they 
desire. Administrators will be alerted to the reconnaissance and the information the 
attackers want by examining the type o f honeypot that was explored.
1.3 Problem Statement
Although the techniques and tools involved in honeypot deployment have 
continued to evolve for the past 15 years, there are still important research issues which 
need to be addressed. This research effort addresses some of the identified limitations in 
current honeypot technology. For honeypots to be useful in a corporate environment the 
honeynet must represent the production devices on the network. This forces the network
9
administrators to constantly reconfigure their honeypot systems, which takes considerable 
time and effort. The amount of time required to reconfigure the honeynet is dependent on 
the dynamic nature of the environment. In addition to creating devices that match the 
environment in which they reside, honeynets must be adaptive in the ways that the 
honeypots are concealed amongst the production devices. If the honeynet is deployed 
using an algorithmic approach, then the attacker is able to avoid the honeypots upon 
deducing the pattern. Deploying the wrong honeypots and/or neglecting to take the 
necessary steps to avoid detection will ensure that no actionable intelligence will be 
gathered.
This research investigates the effectiveness of scanning a production network in 
order to dynamically create honeypots to represent the production network, with the 
benefits of a combined low and high interaction honeynet.
10
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Chapter 2: Foundational Work and Current Approaches
2.1 Literature overview
While intrusion detection is a very broad field, 1 will include aspects of this topic 
as it relates specifically to honeypots and similar technologies. This literature review is a 
summary and analysis of articles, journal publications, conference papers, and books that 
relate to the field of honeypot systems.
2.1.1 History and Theoretical work of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
Since the sixties, people have been connecting computers together to share 
information. Most of the institutions using this network of computers were research, 
academic or government. Then in 1979, USENET allowed users to hold discussions and 
publish information through newsgroups [Hauben, 2002], USENET along with email, 
telnet, and FTP gave more access and ability for users to share or search for information. 
During the seventies and eighties many system administrators, researchers and academics 
were concerned about computer security and the threat o f people using the internet to 
compromise computer systems. In the early eighties, James Anderson wrote a paper 
regarding the ability to use audit trails and surveillance to ensure the security of clients’ 
computers [Anderson, 1980]. This was the beginning concept to intrusion detection. In 
the mid-eighties, Dorothy Denning and Paul Neumann did work on the first real-time IDS 
named the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) [Denning & Neumann, 1985; 
Denning, 1987], which used rule-based architecture to detect known malicious attacks.
This IDES design was implemented using anomalous behavior detection to identify 
possible network intruders or internal people abusing their network access [Lunt & 
Jagannathan, 1988]. IDES reported on several behaviors (time and location of login, 
connect time duration, CPU and I/O activity, and protection violations) that were 
compared with the baseline individual user profile to discover whether the behavior was 
anomalous. These workstation audit records of user behavior were recorded into an 
Oracle database. Lunt planned to further investigate ways, in future iterations, to increase 
the detection abilities which discriminate between normal and anomalous activity.
Although accounts were published in the late eighties and early nineties of attacks 
and compromises, many administrators were not persuaded to fully lock down their 
computers by implementing security policies. As browsers from Mosaic and Microsoft 
became commonplace, the internet exploded with information due to the ease and 
accessibility o f sharing and retrieving that information. New vulnerabilities introduced by 
the internet and the browsers allowed new attack vectors to be exploited with greater 
efficiency. In addition, there was always the threat o f attacks from knowledgeable users 
from a previous era. As operating systems and other programs continue to grow in 
complexity, often reaching millions of lines of code, the security vulnerabilities are 
continually being exploited by attackers through review of the source code or the use of 
tools. Since the time o f the mid-nineties the proliferation of tools and programs to attack 
computers has continued to grow, which increased the number o f individuals and 
decreased the knowledge level needed to attack computers systems.
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System administrators have the daunting task of securing their networks and 
information technology (IT) infrastructure but still allowing the users access to 
information. This has especially been a problem at academic institutions, where the 
atmosphere has been one of openness and any restrictions are thought o f as negative by 
the user community. The tradeoff of having high availability of data while ensuring the 
confidentiality/integrity of the data is the conundrum faced by every organization. Even 
programs originally installed by default on many computers to allow information sharing 
or allow users to see whether an individual was using their computer such as sendmail 
and fingerd would be used as future attack points [Kehoe, 1992], So the administrators 
not only had to keep information flowing but they also had to be aware of vulnerabilities 
in a time that update servers and security bulletins were not available or prevalent. The 
government has been funding research regarding the transfer o f information via a 
network since the mid-1960s [Leiner et al., 1997; Leiner et al., 2009], It was not until the 
1970s and 1980s that the government outlined ways to improve intrusion detection 
techniques [Anderson, 1972a; Anderson, 1972b], but it was not until the beginning to 
mid-nineties that network based technologies became widely available [Bruneau, 2003; 
Kemmerer & Vigna, 2003], This early technology was not sufficient to detect all attacks, 
as with the technology still in use today, though it did provide the system administrators 
some foresight of how to better secure their networks.
System administrators have been watching and logging information from 
attackers for over 50 years, ever since the first computers were connected over phone 
lines in 1965 [Leiner et al., 2009]. Stories of Cliff Stoll, watching attackers from
13
Germany browse through government and university computers while recording their 
every move, demonstrated that even “secure” systems were vulnerable to attack [Stoll, 
1990]. Bill Cheswick also documented attackers trying to break into AT&T’s computers 
by using the “chroot” jail in UNIX to study their tactics [Cheswick, 1990], As the internet 
progressed in the nineties and access to computers increased, the amount of network 
traffic increased exponentially. The sheer volume of the information prevented 
administrators from manually watching individual networks and shifting through log files 
for anomalies. Software and hardware based tools, like Snort [Snort, 2012], Wheel Group 
NetRanger, and internet Security Systems (ISS) RealSecure were created to reduce the 
amount of unwanted traffic into private networks and were used to report the most 
serious, novel, or significant offences to the administrators.
2.1.2 Applications of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Tools
Many tools have been developed to help administrators find signs of intrusion and 
report the incidents. There are two main categories of intrusion detection systems: 
anomaly detection and misuse detection. These systems can be implemented for a single 
host or from the perspective of a network segment (or even an entire network). The 
anomaly based device uses a baseline to characterize events happening on a computer or 
network. The characteristics used in the baseline could be packet types, login attempts, 
tasks performed by a user, or the flow o f network traffic between two computer systems. 
If any of the observed events deviate from the “norm,” then they are reported as 
suspicious and potentially dropped. This produces a high rate o f false positives but aids in 
the detection of new attacks. Misuse based IDSs have a predefined set of rules or
14
signatures that must be obeyed by the arriving packets. Any variance will prompt a 
response from the device. Contingent on the quality o f the signatures, the misuse IDS has 
the advantage of a low false positive and increased efficiency. Despite the number of 
IDSs in place throughout our networks, the detection rate o f new attacks is still relatively 
low. Distinguishing between real attacks and a rogue computer or program is quite 
difficult in today’s network environment. With millions o f packets on a large network, 
searching through the information to find new attacks and determine if a computer has 
been compromised is complex.
A comprehensive survey and classification of IDSs can be found in Joseph Sherif 
and Tommy Dearmond’s paper Intrusion Detection: Systems and Models [Sherif & 
Dearmond, 2002].
2.1.3 Honeypots
In 1997, the deception toolkit was released which emulated through PERL scripts 
many UNIX security vulnerabilities [Talabis, 2006]. This toolkit allowed administrators 
to record the attackers through a deception scenario. From this concept many programs 
have been written in various implementations to watch the moves and tactics of attackers. 
This notion of using deceptive computer systems to attract attackers has become known 
as honeypots. Even though many people have used similar techniques, the wide scale 
implementation did not happen until the nineties. Honeypots are defined as computers 
with no production value except to be compromised and record the attacker’s behavior 
and tools. Since there are no legitimate services or work being performed on a deployed 
honeypot, this creates a virtual mousetrap that can be observed, with all interaction with
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the honeypot having a strong likelihood of being malicious. Previous to this time, the cost 
to usefulness ratio did not allow for “extra” computers to be used for ID research or 
capture devices other than by academic institutions and government agencies; but as the 
price o f computers dropped dramatically in the late nineties and early 2000s, this opened 
the door for more research in this area. Virtual machines and emulating tools allow 
security conscious users to use and improve on this technology without the need for extra 
computer equipment.
Honeypots can either be active or passive, based on the way that they detect 
attackers on a network. Client-based honeypots actively seek attackers by visiting 
suspicious web servers or executing malicious malware [John, Yu, Xie, Krishnamurthy & 
Abadi, 2011]. Server-based honeypots passively wait for attackers to initiate attack. This 
paper will delve into the server-based subset o f honeypots exclusively. Since many 
honeypots are put onto a network with running services that might allow the attackers to 
gain control of the computer or new application that might contain security holes, there is 
always the concern of the honeypots being compromised and initiating more attacks. The 
growing field of honeypots has since been sub-divided into two domains: low and high 
interaction. Though some experts [Barfar & Mohammadi, 2007; Mokube & Adams, 
2007; Spitzner, 2002; Wicherski, 2006] differentiate between three types o f honeypots, 
this paper will combine low and medium interaction honeypots. The amount of 
information able to be obtained from the honeypot, the risks and costs associated with 
deploying and operating the resources are the criteria which separate the low and high 
interaction honeypots.
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Table 1, Types of honeypots [Danford, 2006]
Low Interaction 
Medium Interaction**
- Transport layer virtualization
- Application layer virtualization
High Interaction - Real, vulnerable systems
**Combined with low interaction honeypots throughout the paper
2.1.4 Low Interaction Honeypots
The most prevalent honeypot category is low interaction systems. A low 
interaction honeypot (LIH) uses a program to emulate services, open ports, or 
applications. When an attacker scans a computer for open ports the LIH allows a limited 
interaction between the attacker and the emulated service for which the port is associated. 
The amount of interaction is dictated by the scripts behind the emulated service. Due to 
the limited interaction, the administrator is able to record the traffic that is visiting the 
system without worrying about the trouble o f a compromise.
LIHs come in all shapes and sizes, the information gathered about the attack and 
attacker can also be quite varying. There are many focuses with regards to LIH such as 
web services (PHP.HoP [Oudot, Ropert & Riden, 2012], Google Hack Honeypot [GHH, 
2012], Glastopf [Glastopf Project, 2012]), malware collection (Nepenthes [Nepenthes, 
2012], Dionaea [Dionaea, 2012], Amun [Amun, 2012]), tarpitting (LaBrea [Liston, 
2012]), single-host services (Deception Toolkit [Cohen, 2012], Back Officer Friendly 
[NFR, 2012]) and multi-host services (Honeyd [Provos, 2004], Tiny Honeypot [Bakos, 
2012], Specter [Specter, 2012], KFSensor [KFSensor, 2012], Honeytrap [Honeytrap, 
2012]).
A specific LIH which is relevant to this research effort is Honeyd, which is an 
open-source framework which allows network services to be simulated from thousands of 
internet protocol (IP) addresses. Honeyd is able to respond to thousands of requests for 
unused IP addresses on a network; this sets a large net to gather as much information on 
potential attacks. Honeyd is full o f features and options which have been discussed in 
many books and in some it has at least a chapter devoted unto itself [Grimes, 2004; 
Provos & Holz, 2007; Spitzner, 2002]. Honeyd allows for scripts to be associated with a 
particular service to allow for more interaction with the attacker. Tools have been written 
which automate the process for script generation for Honeyd [Leita, Mermoud & Dacier,
2005],
One of the biggest challenges faced by the administrators of most security 
technologies, including honeypots, is that the configuration process can be quite 
challenging and time consuming [Spitzner, 2003]. Although these systems are available 
to a wide audience, they require constant modification and configuration to be a true 
representation of the current network environment, or to emulate the services or 
vulnerabilities of interest to the system administrator. Even if the administrator is putting 
forth the effort trying to mask the presence o f a honeypot within the network, the 
honeypots still require monitoring and maintenance to ensure the host has not been 
compromised and that the latest patches to both the host and honeypots system have been 
applied to decrease the likelihood of detection. Research has also been conducted to 
discern between LIH and true services [Defibaugh-Chavez, Veeraghattam, Kannappa, 
Mukkamala & Sung, 2006; Mukkamala, Yendrapalli, Basnet, Shankarapani & Sung,
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2007], Their findings explain the ability of attackers to detect these low interaction 
honeypots unless they have been significantly modified from their known default 
configurations. Some of these detection methods are even distributed as commercial 
products, such as the Send-Safe Honeypot Hunter which detects a particular type of 
honeypot aimed at identifying SPAM sources by determining whether the open proxy on 
the honeypot can send email back to the spammer [Send-Safe Honeypot Hunter, 2006]. 
In other cases, past versions o f Honeyd could be identified by sending a SYN/RST packet 
which was answered, incorrectly, by a SYN-ACK [Corey, 2004], or by sending 
fragmented SYN packets which normally would be dropped by the destination host, but 
which actually elicited a response from the Honeyd system [Oberheide & Karir, 2006]. 
To counter these anti-honeypot techniques, work has been done to camouflage Honeyd 
and defeat the Neyman-Pearson (NP) decision theory timing attacks by modifying 
Honeyd and the underlying operating system to allow for a higher-fidelity emulation of 
events [Fu et al., 2006]. Additional work has been done to create a deceptive system, 
honeyanole, which uses blacklists to avoid detection [Shiue & Kao, 2008], The 
honeyanole uses a collection phase, redirection phase, and deception phase to collect 
information on a potential attack then performs blacklisting. If a potential attack occurs 
from a blacklisted IP address then the attacker will be redirected to a deception sever with 
TTL masquerading to hide the redirection.
Ease of installation and maintainability has made LIHs very popular and used in a 
wide variety of projects. The Brazilian Honeynet Project setup LIHs in various locations 
around Brazil and centralized the data for early warning and incident response [Hoepers,
Steding-Jessen, Cordeiro & Chaves, 2005]. The Leurre.com project used LIHs in a large 
distributed platform that spanned 11 countries, to watch attack frequencies, tools, and 
origins [Dacier, Pouget & Pham, 2012; Pouget, Dacier & Pham, March 2005].
While low interaction systems are prevalent due to their ability to emulate so 
many different systems and the relatively low risk o f the underlying host system being 
compromised via the honeypot, the disadvantage of such systems is that they can 
generally not gather a great depth of information. For example, if  a Honeyd system is 
configured to have an FTP and a telnet port open, these are the only ports the honeypot 
will gather information about. In addition, the “services” listening on the honeypot are 
typically just emulations o f real services, and as such only allow limited interaction 
opportunities for an attacker. Through the use of scripts, some low interaction honeypots 
are able to gather more detailed information about a specific attack, but this is always 
limited by the extent to which the script is written to emulate realistic interaction with the 
attacker. Since these systems rely so heavily on the associated scripts for interaction 
beyond the most superficial levels, the system administrator is forced continually to 
change the scripts to match their current network configuration and associated services, 
or risk having their honeypots look significantly different than their production hosts, 
which not only limits the value o f any information obtained, but also provides an easy 
mechanism to differentiate between honeypot and production systems.
Because low interaction honeypots do not fully emulate an entire operating 
system and associated services, the use o f such honeypots generally does not allow the 
recovery of the complete methods by which the attacker would interact with a real target
20
to compromise it, cover their tracks, and either gather data from the compromised host, or 
use it as a launching point for further attacks.
2.1.5 High Interaction Honeypots
High interaction honeypots (HIH) are an actual full system with appropriate 
services and functionally with which the attacker can interact. The HIH provides a much 
more detailed look at the attacker’s tools and interaction with the target host before, 
during, and after a system compromise operating system; although it remains likely that 
non-automated attackers will realize at some point that they are interacting with a 
honeypot system. However, the ability for the attacker to interact with the system at a 
much greater depth can allow observers to retrieve attack tools and find the security 
vulnerabilities in the operating system before a large scale attack is mounted. This ability 
of the HIH to gather large amounts of interesting information has compelled users to 
deploy HIH in extensive networks and use HIH in teaching environments [Azadegan & 
McKenna, 2005; Hoepers et al., 2005; Levine, LaBella, Owen, Contis & Culver, 2003; 
Levine, Grizzard & Owen, 2004].
Tools have been developed to aid in the logging and data capture of HIH. One 
common approach is to modify the honeypot host to include a service, such as SEBEK 
[Honeynet Project, 2003] can covertly monitor activity on the honeypot system. Versions 
of Sebek are currently available for Windows, Linux, and BSD Operating Systems, and 
involve a hidden client component which is installed on the honeypot system, and a 
remote server component. The client attempts to unobtrusively record a wide range of 
activities on the honeypot system (by capturing all system call read data from within the
operating system and monitoring encrypted network activity directly from the network 
card), which it then reports over the network the Sebek server, where the data can be 
reviewed and archived. Qebek is a QEMU [QEMU, 2012] emulator-based capture tool 
which monitors beneath the virtual machine [Song, Hay & Zhuge, 2010], Qebek uses 
several modules and systems (breakpoint, interception, introspection, and output) to 
monitor the guest operating system. These tools aid in the monitoring of the HIH systems 
by recording varying information about the attacker’s methods and tactics. After the HIH 
has been compromised additional prototype tools have been tested to assist the user in 
digital evidence collection [Carbone & de Geus, 2004],
Due to the nature o f the HIH, the attacker is likely to have full access to the 
operating system and services which allows more information to be gathered about an 
attack yet also makes the HIH a liability. Attackers are able to leverage the HIH as an 
attack platform to initiate more attacks after they have successfully compromised the 
computer. But tools have been created to limit the harm done by an attacker after a 
system has been compromised. The Honeywall, Figure 4, monitors the inbound and 
outbound traffic from a honeypot, which should be minimal since the honeypot has no 
production value [Chamales, 2004], The Honeywall can alert the administrator to an 
attack, block outbound traffic from a compromised system, scrub the attacking packets to 
reduce their effectiveness, and monitor the honeypots through a Sebek sever module.
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Figure 4, Honeywall Diagram [Balas & Viecco, 2005]
The hardware constraint o f having one high interaction honeypot per computer 
limits their scalability. Virtualization has helped overcome the hardware limitations by 
being able to run multiple HIHs on one physical host, with associated cost reductions and 
scalability benefits. Beyond the savings in hardware costs, installation time can be 
considerably reduced for virtual machines versus physical systems because a template 
can be made of a virtual machine from which clones can be deployed. Additionally, when 
a compromise occurs the clone can be disabled for forensic analysis while a new clone is 
deployed from the previously uninfected state or snapshot. Even when virtualization is 
used, a high interaction honeypot requires an administrator to install a complete operating
system and all the services necessary to gather the desired information. With each change 
in the network configuration, operating system, and in services used on a workstation or 
server, the administrator is required to make changes to the honeypot so it continues to be 
representative of the environment in which it is to be deployed. Procedures and scripts 
have been developed by the Brazilian Honeynet Project to help streamline and create a 
uniform process in creating a HI honeynet [Chaves, Franco & Montes, 2005]. A freely 
distributable, bootable design was implemented to swiftly create an entire honeynet, 
including a Honeywall, utilizing QEMU technology on a single Honey-DVD [Domseif, 
Freiling, Gedicke & Holz, 2006]. Alen Capalik devised an architecture which rapidly 
deployed HIH using virtualization for intrusion detection [Capalik, 2007], The VMs run 
on top of a Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) for Linux which monitors the honeynet 
through a “sentinel” module which perform low-level introspective memory analysis. In 
another study, several virtual machine monitors (VMM) were implemented, tested and 
evaluated on their ability to detect attacks [Asrigo, Litty & Lie, 2006]. These 
architectures show that VMs can be used to detect attacks on a small number of physical 
systems. Using some of the current tools, a third generation Honeywall architecture was 
designed for data capture [Balas & Viecco, 2005]. Two paths were suggested for the data 
that was captured from an intrusion to better help the administrator and the analyst. The 
fast path provided a high level comprehension of the data but resulted in some 
degradation of detail and is stored in a relational model. The slow path allows the 
analysts to look at all the nitty, gritty details and is stored in the canonical form. Argus 
[Argus, 2012] and Snort are used to monitor network flow, pOf [Zalewski, 2012] is used
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to passively determine the OS of the intruder, Sebek is used to monitor socket activity; 
and then all this information is stored in a Hflow [Viecco, 2007] database. Pcap files are 
stored to restore all the captured data since they are in canonical form. Then an improved 
Walleye [Balas & Viecco, 2005] interface is used to display the high level data in a flow 
form. There are other systems which use VMs to rapidly deploy honeypots, and these will 
be discussed in the Hybrid section o f this paper.
Despite all the advances in HIH technology, there are still many challenges that 
must be overcome. There have been papers written about how to detect Sebek utilizing 
various methods [Corey, 2003; Corey, 2004; Domseif, Holz & Klein, 2004], For an 
attacker to detect a honeypot is valuable information. Most attacks are conducted by 
exploiting a system then leveraging that system’s place in the environment to 
compromise their next victim. If an attacker knows they are in a honeypot then they can 
use disinformation to thwart efforts to forensically analyze the compromise or use the 
information already collected by the honeypot for their own nefarious needs [Krawetz, 
2004], Since honeypots are also used for malware analysis, the detection of a honeypot 
could trigger the malware to sleep or act in a different manner than in a non-honeypot 
system which makes quick analysis more difficult. Detection techniques have also been 
researched in the area of VMs [Defibaugh-Chavez et al., 2006; Holz & Raynal, 2005; 
Mukkamala et al., 2007], Since researchers are utilizing the benefits of VMs in honeypot 
deployment, attackers are scanning for a virtual environment through their malware and 
during their network penetration to deduce if they are being watched.
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HIHs have been adapted to every field of network and computer security to 
provide security researchers with large amounts of information. Despite some of the 
challenges and legal questions, HIHs continue to be deployed in a large number of 
academic and production environments. One key issue addressed in the next section is 
how to scale and control these HIHs in a large network without wasting resources when 
aggregating the data so analysis can begin.
2.1.6 Hybrid Honeypots / Honeyfarms
Combining both low and high interaction systems into one cohesive unit has been 
achieved through the development of honeyfarms or bait and switch (B&S) systems. For 
B&S systems, the low interaction honeypots can be placed into any geographical 
locations and act as redirectors to the high interaction honeypots which are centrally 
located. The high interaction honeypots are physically centralized to facilitate 
maintenance and hardware consolidation. The routing or redirecting is done with 
programs like HoneyMole [Portuguese Honeynet Project, 2008]. HoneyMole provides 
relatively transparent communication in the form of an Ethernet bridge from a low 
interaction honeypot to a high interaction honeypot, which allows more information to be 
gathered about the attack. If an attacker probes one of the emulated low interaction 
honeypots it can cause a trigger sending the attacker to the high interaction honeypot via 
the secure communication channel. This process of combining both the low and high 
interaction honeypots allows the potential for thousands of low interaction honeypots to 
be deployed on a single host but also have a limited number of high interaction honeypots 
to gather detailed information. The identified open issues with this method include
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creating enough high interaction honeypots that appear similar to the low interaction 
devices, and keeping the latency resulting from tunneling traffic to the remote high 
interaction honeypots to a minimum.
In 1998, an IDS architecture was designed and prototyped in which agents were 
looking for network or host anomalies in a distributed network [Balasubramaniyan, 
Garcia-Femandez, Isacoff, Spafford & Zamboni, 1998], The architecture, Figure 5, 
suggested is a tiered hierarchical structure and has three main components. The outlying 
stations are the “agents” which report to the middle tier “transceivers.” The transceivers 
might have multiple agents to supervise and assimilate their findings. The “monitors” 
oversee multiple transceivers and are the ultimate decision makers based on the 
information received from one or more agents.
Figure 5, An Architecture for Intrusion Detection using Autonomous Agents 
[Balasubramaniyan et al., 1998]
Necessary characteristics o f each component and the different methods that could be used 
to facilitate the implementation were discussed. Four of these characteristics that 
traditional honeypots do not currently possess include the following:
1. It must allow dynamic-reconfiguration this is the ability to reconfigure the 
honeypot or honeynet without having to restart it.
2. It must be able to adapt to changes in system and user behavior over time.
3. It must be able to scale to monitor a large number o f hosts.
4. It must run continually with minimal human supervision.
A honeypot architecture, Figure 6, to detect internet threats and use different levels of 
interaction to gain information about these threats was recommended in a technical report 
from the University of Michigan [Bailey, Cooke, Watson, Jahanian & Provos, 2004]. 
Low interaction, high interaction and a filtering mechanism to monitor for new threats 
was proposed in the new design. The LIH would allow multiple contact points by which 
to monitor the internet for the threats and be the redirectors to allow new or older threats 
to pass to the HIH. The HIH would be the host which is infected by the threat then 
isolated and observed to gain information about the migration throughout the network 
and further infection of new hosts. The filtering mechanism allows most o f the 
uninteresting traffic to be filtered as not to use cycles from the HIH which could be used 
to obtain information about the new threats. If a threat is encountered the LIH establishes 
contact with the attacker. After a brief handshake the filter either ends the connection or 
passes the conversation to a HIH to re-establish contact and gain further intelligence on 
the attack. Other papers have been published which present different ideas on the topic of
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using LIHs to filter the attacks then using a redirecting mechanism to route the interesting 
traffic to HIHs [Hudak, 2008; Kyaw, 2008],
Figure 6, Hybrid honeypot architecture [Bailey et al., 2004]
The Collapsar honeyfarm, Figure 7, at Purdue University [Jiang & Xu, 2004; 
Jiang, Xu & Wang, 2006] was developed to engage attackers from a multitude of 
redirectors. The redirectors are servers that filter and direct traffic from a specific IP to 
the high interaction honeypot (HIH). A gateway is placed between the HIH and the 
redirectors to control the data flow and mitigate risk due to compromised devices. The 
HIH were configured using both VMware [VMware, 2012] and UML [Dike, 2006] to
High Interaction 
Honeypots
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increase the number of honeypots per device. Several experiments were conducted to test 
the benefits and tradeoffs between the two VM programs.
Figure 7, Collapsar honeyfarm architecture [Jiang et al., 2006]
There are several modules used in Collapsar to mitigate risk and facilitate the analysis of 
the attack. This system provides a centralized location to control the HIH and to 
investigate the attacks. Since real devices running UML are used for the redirectors, it is 
necessary to constantly update the host device as well as the VMs to prevent a 
compromise of the redirector. Due to the design, attackers near the redirector will notice 
the delay when comparing a real host on the same network. The second version of the 
Collapsar implementation, Figure 8, also integrated a reverse honeyfarm design which
Production Network - A '  V
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allowed the redirectors to become client honeypots to increase the amount of information 
gathered from the system.
Management Station Correlation Engine
Figure 8, Collapsar reverse honeyfarm architecture [Jiang et al., 2006]
The Potemkin honeyfarm at UCSD [Vrable, Ma, Chen & Moore, 2005] optimized 
the amount o f available honeypots on the server. This was accomplished by utilizing 
virtualization to effectively use their resources yet still benefiting from a high interaction 
honeypot system. The setup, Figure 9, utilized two main pieces o f hardware: the gateway 
and virtual honeypot server which consisted of a cluster o f 10 devices to implement a 
honeyfarm with a positive test.
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Figure 9, Potemkin virtual honeyfarm architecture [Vrable et al., 2005]
To direct traffic to the honeypots, GRE tunnels and configuring the gateway as a “last 
hop” router allows multiple IP addresses to converge at the honeyfarm. The external IP 
address is used in configuring the virtual honeypot with the same address for further 
engagement o f the attacker. Xen [Xen, 2012] was used to construct the virtual honeypot 
system which allowed fast cloning of the honeypots and IP configuration to take place in 
just over a half of a second. Small VMs and low memory constraints were used to get 
hundreds of VMs to run on one server with the possibly o f deploying over a thousand.
The outbound traffic is also configurable to protect other systems from further attack. 
Analysis on the number o f VMs necessary to deal with all the traffic including scanning 
traffic would have been in the tens of thousands range. A scan filter was necessary if a 
low inactivity timeout period was used to deal with the traffic load.
NoAH, a European Network of Affined Honeypots, was a project funded by the 
European Community which lasted 42 months, April 2005 through September 2008 
[NoAH, 2008]. The NoAH architecture, Figure 10, combined both LIH and HIH into an 
infrastructure which contained cyber-attacks and tested methods for attack detection and 
signature generation. The “NoAH core” is a distributable set of honeyfarms, both LIH 
and HIH, which can collaborate. The LIH is used as a filter to prevent uninteresting 
traffic from continuing any farther into the core. The LIH handles all communication 
with potential attackers then redirects “interesting” traffic to the HIH, which ensures the 
HIH are in a containment environment. Honeyd is used as the LIH which allows scripts 
to be written to interact with the attacker or act as proxies to specific services running on 
the HIH. The HIH are run as virtual machines on top of Argos, the containment 
environment. Argo uses QEMU to emulate the guest operating system and perform taint 
analysis on the code being attacked by the attacker [Portokalidis, Slowinska & Bos,
2006], Argos generates a signature for the attacker’s code which can be used to supply an 
IDS. Due to the emulation process and an inability to use QEMU’s acceleration mode, 
Argos runs programs 15 times slower than native execution.
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Figure 10, NoAH honeyfarm architecture [NoAH, 2008]
Xargos was developed to supplement Argos by using Xen to run the applications and 
dynamically switched to Argos to execute the code that interacts with the tainted data. 
Xargos sped up the process but still needs work to support Windows and new versions of 
Linux. Traffic is introduced into the “NoAH core” by several methods. Attackers could 
interact with the LIH directly, organizations could funnel or tunnel traffic from unused IP 
addresses to the LIH, or individuals could install “honey@home” (h@h) [Antonatos, 
Anagnostakis & Markatos, 2007] which would redirect traffic to the core. Funneling 
involves a LIH, like Honeyd, to assume the unused IP addresses and redirecting all traffic
directly to the core’s LIH. Tunneling is the organization acting as a relay agent for all the 
traffic so the traffic appears to be coming from the organizations’ network. The h@h 
software needs no configuration and is supported by Windows and Linux operating 
systems. The h@h clients are installed on a small business or personal network and use a 
SSL connection to redirect all traffic to the core. After the data has been processed, alerts 
are correlated and categorized with each sensor feeding three additional software 
components for analyzing the data statically, sensor monitoring, and geolocation.
Honeybrid was designed and constructed by Robin Berthier [Berthier, 2009]. This 
architecture is composed of three components; Honeybrid Gateway, a set of low- 
interaction honeypots and a set o f high-interaction honeypots. The main component is the 
Honeybrid Gateway which is composed of two sub systems; decision engine and the 
redirection engine. The network traffic is routed to the LIH through the decision engine 
to establish a connection and allow the gateway to detect interesting traffic. If the traffic 
is determined to be worthy of further analysis (source IP address, destination port or 
payload) then the traffic is passed to the redirection engine which transparently passes the 
traffic from the LIH to the HIH for a more detailed analysis. Honeybrid uses an original 
way to redirect interesting traffic based upon a decision engine that is capable o f handling 
large amounts of traffic.
HoneyLab was a design and proposal to deploying a distributed honeynet with the 
ability to monitor the honeypots [Chin, Markatos, Antonatos & Ioannidis, 2009], 
Researchers and security experts would be allowed to deploy Honeypot sensors using the 
HoneyLab Central resources. IP address location or range would be requested then the
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honeypot infrastructure would be allocated for the user to deploy their own honeypot 
services, instrumentation code and detection algorithms on the XenoServers.
To help detect and prevent network intrusions from both the internal and external 
environments, a Network Intrusion Collaboration System (NICS) design was put into 
operation [Prasad, Abraham, Abhinav, Gurlahosur & Srinivasa, 2011]. The NICS would 
be composed of subsystems called “System of Security Systems (SoSS)” which 
incorporated Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), Network Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (NIPS), and honeypots. This distributed design utilized Snort as the 
NIDS to detect known attacks based on signatures, IPTABLES provided by the 
GNU/Linux Debian Squeeze distribution as the NIPS firewall mechanism the prevented 
unauthorized activities and Honeyd as the honeypot system that helped with threat 
detection and assessment. Each of these intrusion systems would report information to a 
customized statistical classifier written using a shell programming language to extract 
information from the network data. This project demonstrated the ability to have a large 
system which composes smaller subsystems which centralize the data in one classifier 
system.
Additional work has been done to conceal honeypots in a distributed system using 
a Cooperative Deploy Honeynet (CDH) scheme [Wang & Chen, 2011]. The CDH uses a 
cooperative learning algorithm based on the multi-agent system [W. Wang, C. Wang & 
Shi-fu, 2006] to deploy the honeyfarm system (HFS). Wang and Chen created a method 
that quantifies the disguise capability o f distributed honeynet system. The model used 
weighted factors to disregard poor honeypots and preserve good honeypots based on their
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number of attacks. The model was then improved by proposing two algorithms, 
cooperative learning and evolution, to dynamically deploy the honeypots in a distributed 
honeynet environment.
There is much concern about the ability to detect bait and switch systems or 
honeyfarms [Corey, 2003]. Due to redirection, a network delay will be introduced into 
the process which can be noticeable to attackers that are close to their targets. Since a 
high interaction device must respond to redirected traffic, this implies that many 
honeypots must be available at all times or a mechanism must exist to create or clone 
them quickly. The ability to create a honeypot quickly is a necessity so as not to increase 
the network delay time and not arouse the attacker’s suspicions. In addition, any 
inconsistency between the low interaction frontend systems and the high interaction 
system that an attacker is redirected to may provide an indication that the victim device is 
a honeypot system.
2.1.7 Dynamic Honeypots
The notion of dynamic honeypots was first conceived by Lance Spitzner 
[Spitzner, 2003]. He had a list o f wishes that would make the “perfect honeypot.”
1. A plug-and-play solution that learns the environment
2. Able to deploy the proper number and configuration of honeypots in such 
a way to blend into the network
3. One that adapts to changes in the network by adding and removing 
honeypots based on the environment
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He presented the idea of actively scanning or passively listening to a network to 
determine the types of computers and services that should be implemented in the 
honeypots. The information gained from learning the network would be used to create a 
honeynet that represents the actual network or a smaller subset. Current problems with 
maintaining a honeynet were addressed and proposed that with the advent of a dynamic 
honeypot system that some of the problems would be alleviated.
A dynamic honeynet design, Figure 11, was proposed in 2004 that put more 
detail to the concept of Spitzner [Kuwatly, Sraj, Masri & Artail, 2004],
Figure 11, Dynamic honeypot server [Kuwatly et al., 2004]
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The dynamic honeypot server (DHS) collects information about the environment 
by utilizing passive and active scanning based on the network architecture. Once the DHS 
has gained knowledge about the environment, a HIH configuration is suggested along 
with a suitable configuration for Honeyd. The LIH receives the traffic then passes it 
along to the HIH for a higher level of interaction. Each HIH is running a Sebek client 
which logs and routes the information to the DHS where the Sebek sever centralizes the 
logs from each system. The DHS is capable of alerting the administrator via short 
message service (SMS) texts. The LIH and HIH system information and log files are 
stored in a database which is accessible to the administrator through a web interface.
An experimental dynamic honeypot design and implementation, Figure 12, was 
presented in a technical report by the University of Louisville [Hieb & Graham, 2004], 
The implementation followed Spitzner’s design by exclusively using passive listening 
programs, tcpdump [Tcpdump, 2012] and pOf, to gather information about the network 
environment. IP addresses and open ports captured by tcpdump, along with operating 
systems fingerprinted by pOf are stored in the dynamic honeypot database. The dynamic 
honeypot configuration engine creates the Honeyd configuration file based on the 
database information. Honeyd is then deployed to mimic the systems already seen in the 
network. This system does not adjust instantly to a new system being introduced onto the 
network, but waits for a predetermined time to update the database and re-start Honeyd 
with the new configuration file. During testing o f the system, the author also noticed the 
difficulty of identifying all of the open ports on the devices.
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Layer 2 bridge
Figure 12, Dynamic passive scanning honeypot implementation 
[Hieb & Graham, 2004]
Communication through the layer 2 bridge was essential to recognize the open ports. 
External probing o f all the ports with an active scanner was conducted; this allowed the 
passive scanner to gather the required information to better simulate the monitored 
network. Snort was used to capture the Honeyd traffic then generate alerts.
Active scanning was implemented in an alternate design shown in Figure 13, 
which dynamically adjusts to the environment on which system has gathered information 
[Hecker, Nance & Hay, 2006]. Nmap [Yarochkin, 2012] is utilized to scan a network to 
gain network and computer configurations. During initiation of the scan, four options 
could be selected which would determine the honeypot IP address configuration.
Figure 13, Dynamic, active scanning honeypot sever [Hecker et al., 2006]
The available flags were the following:
• -iS, same IP as scanned devices
• -iD, uses the same last octet of the IP with a different proceeding 24 bits
•  -iR, selected a predetermined range will be used for the honeypot IP addresses
• -il, interwove the honeypots IP addresses with the scanned production computers 
The MySQL [MySQL, 2012] database is queried during creation of the Honeyd 
configuration file to combine the scan results with any port emulation scripts matching 
the scanned device’s ports to enhance the resulting honeypots. Honeyd is started using 
the configuration file which creates the honeypots with the desired IP address, open ports 
and OS configurations. As with the previous dynamic honeypot system, the deployment 
process is self-initiated through the cron daemon or manually for the honeynet to remain 
current with the network. ARP packets were transmitted to find an open IP to interweave
the honeypots with the production devices. Requesting an IP from the DHCP server 
instead would ensure that an IP conflict did not occur. A graphical user interface (GUI) 
was also constructed to help the user through the process instead o f relying solely on the 
command line.
Honeypots have been developed and advancing for the past 15 years with many 
different approaches. The preceding design ideas and architectures were considered in 
formulating this research project. Implementing a system which expands and incorporates 
the two dynamic honeypots designs was necessary to accurately build honeypots which 
resemble the network environment. Integrating passive and active scanning while storing 
the information in a database were key features to map the topology and record the flux 
of the network. Utilizing the benefits of low and high interaction honeypots is vital to 
collect attack statistics and detect new attacks. This research effort attempts to create a 
comprehensive system utilizing innovative network scanning tools to build configuration 
files for prevalent honeypot technology.
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Chapter 3: System Development
3.1 Project Overview
Demonstrated by the literature search, there is a lack of a self-contained, dynamic 
honeynet system which is capable of deploying both low and high interaction honeypots. 
This honeynet system provides the user with the ability to scan a network passively or 
actively, stores the data from the scans to create a network depiction, and creates a 
Honeyd configuration file for deployment of low interaction honeypots and an extensible 
markup language (XML) file for the deployment o f high interaction honeypots.
This system was designed around a core set o f tools that aid in mapping a network 
environment. A module was built around each tool to process the resulting data gathered 
during operation of that tool and record the information into a database. Building in a 
modular fashion allows independent operation of each of the scanning modules. 
Commands, with a variety of flags, allow the user to initiate operation o f each module. 
To reduce the burden on the user to constantly supervise the individual processes, two 
management programs were created to oversee the modules and control the creation of 
the honeypot configuration files. Figure 14 shows the different modules, their roles and 
functions, and the interactions between the modules.
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honeypot_scanner loop
- Monitor pOf, tcpdump & active_scanner status
- Monitor percent change o f  captured network configuration
- Create honeypot files upon meeting percent change threshold
/ \ 
pOf_mysql «*- honeypot_scanner
pOf_mysql loop
■ Monitor network traffic
■ Gather information about network machines
• Determine machine OS
• Store information in database
tcpdump,
mysql
tcpdumpmysql loop
- Monitor network traffic
- Gather information about network machines
- Store information in database
-Store seen IP addresses in queue for active scanner
activescanner loop
• Determine noise level set by user 
■ Initiate Nmap or Xprobe2 to scan IP 
addresses from queue
/ nmap_ \
\ mysql /
- Gather information by scanning network machines
- Determine machine OS
- Determine open UDP and TCP ports
- Store information in database
nm apm ysql
- Gather information by scanning network machines
- Determine machine OS
- Determine open UDP and TCP ports
- Store information in database
Figure 14, Project module overview [Hecker & Hay, 2010]
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3.2 Management Programs
3.2.1 Objectives and Requirements
The intention o f creating a management system is to alleviate the responsibility of 
the user to monitor the scanning process and modules, and create honeypot configuration 
files when the sensed network has met an identified threshold designating a “significant 
change.” Being able to continually monitor the individual processes and redeploy if 
necessary was an essential feature o f the management system.
3.2.2 Design and Implementation
honeypotscanner
Honeypot scanner is the primary management program which oversees both 
passive scanning modules and the secondary active scanning management program, 
active scanner. Honeypot scanner gathers the initial configuration information stored in 
the database and disseminates it to all the respective modules upon their deployment. As 
Figure 14 illustrates, the passive scanning modules and active scanner are deployed as 
threads. The threads are monitored through the process identification (PID) to verify 
operation. The continual monitoring allows the re-deployment of any o f these modules 
should they die unexpectedly. Honeypot scanner also observes the results gathered from 
all the scanning modules and builds honeypot configuration files upon reaching a setpoint 
determined by the user. The initial setpoint is based on the number of devices required to 
be identified before deploying the honeypot configuration files for the first time.
Subsequently, the setpoint is based on the percent change of devices or services 
identified. So, if the initial set point required five devices to be identified and a percent 
change o f 30%, then re-deployment of the configuration files would take place after two 
additional devices or services were identified or removed from the network. 
Honeypot scanner is able to identify the removal of devices and active ports on an 
individual computer by updating the timestamp, associated with the device/ports, as the 
scanning modules gather information. If the timestamp is older than the predetermined 
number of seconds set by the user then the device or computer port is not added into the 
new iteration of honeypot configuration files. Figure 15 illustrates the decisions made by 
the honeypot scanner.
This system is structured to create a Honeyd LIH configuration file with the same 
qualities as the XML HIH file. This expands the abilities o f this system to create 
honeyfarms which allow for LIH redirectors to forward attackers to the similar HIHs. 
Programs have been discussed in Chapter 2 which tunnel traffic from LIHs to HIHs, and 
rapidly deploy VMs as HIHs. Database tables have already been created in this system to 
link a LIH with a HIH to facilitate the forwarding of an attacker. As previously stated, 
LIHs are easier to deploy and maintain in large quantities and can easily be distributed 
throughout an organization for alerting and redirection to a HIH if necessary.
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Figure 15, honeypot scanner process
During the creation o f the Honeyd configuration file, saved commands to execute 
existing port emulation scripts upon honeypot deployment are supplied. Honeyd scripts 
provide additional functionality to the LIHs. The XML file contains the information to 
configure and deploy a HIH virtual machine with similar features as the Honeyd LIH. 
Honeypot scanner also handles the collecting IP addresses through DHCP. As the 
Honeyd configuration file is being created honeypot scanner requests IP addresses from
the DHCP server. This allows the LIHs to be interwoven into the production network 
without manually assigning IP addresses or worrying about duplicate IP addresses on the 
network. Honeypot scanner continually monitors when the IP address’ lease expires and 
renews it for the LIH. If a production device is removed from the network, the LIH will 
not be redeployed and the DHCP IP address will be released.
To create a record of the network environment, the Honeyd configuration files 
and the XML files are backed up to a folder as new files are generated.
activescanner
Active scanner was developed to specially monitor the active scanning modules. 
Actively scanning a device can induce significant noise into the network. Active scanner 
controls the noise by determining which scanning module is deployed, and the type of 
scan initiated by the sub-program. The determination of the module and type of scan is 
based on the noise level set by the user. Five noise levels are available to the user: 
passive, low, medium, med-high, and high. Though the passive scanning modules are 
capturing data throughout every noise level, the user can choose to have the program 
silently collect data by choosing the “passive” noise level. Error! Reference source not 
found, depicts the active scanning noise levels available to the user, the sub-programs 
used to scan the network and the commands used to initiate the scan.
As the passive scanners capture header information from the network traffic, the 
MAC and IP addresses are stripped from the data and input into a database table. The 
IP/MAC address combinations to be actively scanned are retrieved from the database by 
active scanner and sent to the respective active scanning module
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Table 2, Active scanning noise levels
Noise level Sub­
programs
Active scanning commands
low xprobe2 xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o {file} -X {ip}
medium xprobe2 xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o {file} -X -T 1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 {ip}
medium-high nmap nmap -sT -sU -T3 -sV -0  -oX {file} -host-timeout 180 {ip}
high xprobe2 
+ nmap
xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o {file} -X -T 1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 {ip} 
nmap -sT -sU -T3 -sV -O -oX {file} —host-timeout 180 {ip}
3.3 Network Scanning (Passive and Active)
3.3.1 Objectives and Requirements
The objective was to create as complementary set of completely independent 
modules that could be used separately or cooperatively. Each module would be initiated 
through the command line and accepts flags to perform a set of operations. Each module 
would store the information in unique MySQL database table(s).
3.3.2 Design and Implementation
Four modules were created to perform the active and passive scanning for the 
program. POf jn y sq l  and tcpdump jn y sq l  passively gather information about devices from 
the network traffic. Nmap jn y sq l  and xprobe2jnysql actively scan the identified devices 
on the network. As previously explained, the passive scanning modules are constantly 
gathering data about the devices on the network. Active scanner takes the identified 
devices and initiates the respective active scanning module. Figure 16 demonstrates the 
decision process of each of the scanning modules and their associated database tables.
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Figure 16, Scanning modules decision process
To reduce redundant data, all the scanning modules (tcpdumpjnysql, pOf jnysq l, 
nmap jn y sq l  and xprobe2jnysql) query the database before inserting gathered data about 
a device or port to determine if it has been previously observed. If the data is not present, 
then it is stored into the database but if  data is present, then the timestamp on the previous 
observation is updated.
3.3.2.1 Passive Scanning Modules
Two passive scanning modules are used to gather information about the devices 
on the network. Since they gather different data about the devices, it was necessary to use 
two separate sub-programs to obtain the operating system information and which ports 
are communicating.
pOf jn ysq l
POf is passive scanning tool which uses sophisticated fingerprinting mechanisms 
to identify the operating system of a device by examining its TCP/IP packets [Zalewski, 
2012]. POf is also able to measure system uptime, distance in hops, and whether ports are 
firewalled. The command used to initiate pOf is:
pOf -i {interface} -p -I 
POf will begin listening on the interface specified after placing the interface into 
promiscuous mode. POf jn y sq l  parses the gathered information then stores it into the pOf 
database table.
Many users can exchange the same IP address over a relatively short period of 
time on a highly dynamic network plus operating systems may be upgraded; pOf queries
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the database for the IP, MAC, and OS o f an identified device to determine whether it has 
been previously stored in the database. If any of the parameters have changed or if the 
device is unknown, then the device information is stored in the table; otherwise the 
timestamp is updated.
tcpdumpmysql
Tcpdump is a packet analyzer which is used to grab packet headers to identify 
devices on the network and computer ports that are responding to requests [Tcpdump, 
2012], The following command is used to initiate tcpdump to begin gathering 
information:
tcpdump -nne -i {interface} src net {ip}
Tcpdump collects the link-level header information and does not convert the IP 
addresses or ports to names. Only packets with the source IP on a particular subnet are 
captured. This captures information about devices on the network for which a honeynet 
would like to be created. This subnet can range from a class A (1.0.0.0) to a specific 
device (1.2.3.4).
Tcpdump jn y sq l  further filters the network traffic to ensure the resulting 
honeypots closely resemble the actual production device. Tcpdump mysql gathers the 
header information from the following packets: ICMP echo reply, UDP reply, TCP SYN- 
ACK, and TCP RST-ACK. These packets are likely to be coming from responding 
ports/services. The IP and MAC addresses from the ICMP packets are stored in the 
tcpdumpJcmp database table. The source IP, MAC and port number contained in the 
TCP and UDP packets are stored in the tcpdump jjo r ts  database table.
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Tcpdump does not provide any details about the services that are communicating 
on a particular port and protocol in the packet. Nmap.org provides a file, nmap-services, 
which contains a list o f ports and protocols along with the corresponding services. The 
file can be downloaded from http://nmap.org/svn/nmap-services. After removing the 
unknown services, the information was entered into the nmap services database table via 
the nmap servicesjnysql script. Once a packet has been observed, the port number is 
queried in the nmap services database table and the service information is placed with 
the packet information in the tcpdump_ports table. Though several services may be using 
the same port or services may be using non-standard ports, this additional information 
tries to speculate which service might be using a particular port to provide better 
information to the user.
3.3.2.2 Active Scanning Modules
As with passive scanning, two modules are used for the active scanning portion. 
Each module’s sub-program utilizes different network protocols to determine the 
operating system of the identified device. Based on initial testing which is discussed 
further in Chapter 5, each sub-program is able to correctly identify a different operating 
system with better proficiency. The speed and efficiency to correctly identify devices and 
network traffic generated to gather information were the factors that required the use of 
different active scanning modules.
nmapmysql
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Nmap is a network discovery tool which allows administrators to identify open 
ports and the OS which is running on a device [Yarochkin, 2012], Nmap is highly 
configurable and allows the user to choose from a wide variety of scans. The command 
used to initiate nmap is as follows:
nmap -sS -sU -T3 -sV -O -oX {file} -host-tim eout 180 {ip}
Nmap executes a TCP connect scan and UDP scan on the IP address with the following 
options: timing template is set to 3 to scan moderately, probes the open ports to determine 
service and version information, OS detection is enabled, output the results to file 
specified in a XML format and terminates the scan if it is not able to gather information 
on a host after 180 seconds.
After nmap scans the device, nm apjnysql parses the XML file and stores the data 
into two database tables. Information about the scanned device is stored in the 
nmapmachines table while information regarding open ports is stored in the nmap_ports 
table. If nmap was not able to determine information regarding a certain area o f the 
device being scanned then “unknown” is stored in the respective field of the database 
table.
Regulating the duration between scans is accomplished by active scanner passing 
a flag with a time in seconds. N m apjnysql will query the database concerning that device 
with the IP and MAC addresses supplied in other flags before running a scan to 
determine if the device has formerly been scanned. If the query finds a match and returns 
the requested information, the time since the last scan is compared to the duration 
between scans to determine if a re-scan should be initiated.
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xprobe2_mysql
Xprobe2 is active OS fingerprinting tool which applies different methods then 
nmap to gather information about a device [Ofir, Yarochkin & Kydyraliev, 2003], 
Xprobe2 utilizes ICMP and UDP packets to determine the state o f a device and the 
operating system. Xprobe2 also has the ability to scan a device for open TCP and UDP 
ports. As discussed earlier, two separate commands are used to initiate xprobe2 
depending on the noise level. The first command is as follows:
xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o {file} -X {ip}
Xprobe2 probes the device with the IP address specified and generates primary and 
secondary OS deductions based on signature matching. The OS and route to target is 
recorded in a XML file. The second command used is the following:
xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o {file} -X -T  1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 {ip}
This command is similar to the first but probes the TCP and UDP ports which are 
indicated. Xprobe2 jn y sq l  also regulates the duration between scanning by comparing the 
time designated with the - t  flag that is passed from active scanner and the time since the 
last timestamp. X probeljnysq l gathers the information about the device and ports 
scanned then stores the data in the xprobe2 machines and xprobe2 j jo r ts  database tables.
3.4 Low Interaction Honeypot Configuration
3.4.1 Objectives and Requirements
Honeyd was chosen to be the low interaction honeypot program due to its 
prevalence, support and additional scripts to supplement the interaction with an attacker.
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Figure 17 is an example of a Honeyd configuration file generated by honeypot_scanner. 
The objective was to combine the results from the scanning modules to create a Honeyd 
configuration file that is the most accurate representation o f the production network.
3.4.2 Design and Implementation
Once the initial deployment or re-deployment threshold is reached, 
honeypot_scanner will create a configuration file with the data gathered by the scanning 
modules. Each device or open port that has been identified or updated, since the time 
between scan intervals, is added to the configuration file. Since several o f the modules 
collect the same information, a ranking was instituted to determine the OS of the low 
interaction honeypot. Active scanning tools were ranked highest due to their ability to 
gather more information in a quicker timeframe. Nmap is the most current and readily 
updated tool so it was given the highest precedence. The ranking order for determining 
which OS is placed in the configuration file is nmap xprobe2 pOf. The 
configuration file is updated with all of the known data sets for each device that was 
identified and collected by the scanning modules.
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##### Honeyd Configuration File ###### 
##### Sun Apr 16 20:04:09 2006 #####
####*###################################
create Windowsl
set Windowsl personality "Microsoft Windows 2003
Server or XF SP2”
set Windowsl default tcp action reset
set Windowsl default udp action reset
set Windowsl default icmp action open
add Windowsl tcp port 21 open
add Windowsl tcp port 23 "peri /telnet/falcetelnet.pl
add Windowsl tcp port 25 open
add Windowsl tcp port 80 open
add Windowsl tcp port 110 open
add Windowsl tcp port 143 open
add Windowsl tcp port 143 open
add Windowsl udp port 123 open
add Windowsl udp port 135 open
add Windowsl udp port 137 open
add Windowsl udp port 138 open
add Windowsl udp port 139 open
add Windowsl udp port 445 open
add Windowsl udp port 500 open
add Windowsl udp port 1900 open
add Windowsl udp port 4500 open
add Windowsl udp port 31337 open
set Windowsl ethernet "Intel Corporate”
bind 192.168.192.103 Windowsl 
ft#################*####################
Figure 17, Honeyd configuration file [Hecker et al., 2006]
The IP address for each low interaction honeypot is decided by a setting chosen 
by the user in the config database table. There are four different settings available to the 
user, and each setting has a different purpose depending on the honeynet application of 
the user:
• -iS, the same IP addresses as the scanned computers
• -iD, the same host value, but a different subnet
• -iR, assigned in a subnet selected by the user
• -il, interwoven utilizing DHCP betwixt the existing IP addresses of the scanned 
host
As the configuration file is being created, the l ih j i ih j in k  table is being populated 
simultaneously. This table allows the low interaction honeypot and high interaction 
honeypot pairs to be associated. This facilitates future modules for the purpose of 
redirecting interesting traffic from the low interaction honeypots to the high interaction 
honeypots.
3.5 High Interaction Honeypot Configuration
3.5.1 Objectives and Requirements
The XML file is generated by honeypot jscanner to allow the user to generate a 
high interaction honeypot with any type o f virtual machine application or to use as a 
formula to create a standalone high interaction honeypot. Though the devices included in 
the XML file are similar to the ones found in the Honeyd configuration file, they do not 
have to be used in conjunction with one another. Figure 18 is an example of a XML file 
generated by honeypot scanner.
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<honeypot>
<target name="Linuxl" ip="192,168.192.150" mac=''00:04:00:6D:OD:47" lih_hih_id="l">
<os_guess>
<primary> "Linux Kernel 2.4.0" </priinary>
</os_guess>
<system_information'>
<icmp_reply state="dosed"/>
<firewall state=" no/un known"/'- 
<lookup_link state="unknovvn"/>
<last_reboot seconds="unknovvn”/>
<real_time_target_seconds seconds="0.00332"/>
<uptime_seconds time="unknown"/>
<distance_hops hops="unknown’7>
</system_information'>
<port_scan>
<port number="21" protoco l"tcp" service="ftp" version="unknown" extra_info="unknown‘7 s>
<port number="79" protocol="tcp" service="finger" version="unknown" extra_info="un known "/>
<port number="80" protocol="tcp" service="www“ version="unknown" extraJnfo="unknown"/>
<port number="515" protocol="tcp" service^"printer" version="unknown" extra_info="unknown"A 
<port number="631" protocol="tcp" service="ipp" version="unknown" extra_info="unknown"/> 
</port_scan>
</target>
<target name=”Windovvs2" ip="192.168.192.171” mac="00:0C:29:20:E3:5E" lih_hihjd="2">
<os_guess>
<primary> "Microsoft Windows XP SP2” </primary>
K/oi^guess>
<system_information>
<icmp_reply state="closed"/>
<firewall state="no/unknown'7>
<lookup_link state="unknown"/>
<last_reboot seconds="unknown'7>
<real_time_target_seconds seconds="0 00624"/>
<uptime_seconds time="unknown'7>
<distance_hops hops=''unknown'7>
</system_information>
<port_scan>
<port number="80" protocol="tcp" service="wwvv" version="unknown" extraJnfo=''unknown'7>
<port number="135" protocol="tcp" service="loc-srv" version=''unknovvn’ extra_info="unknown'7>
<port number="445" protocol="tcp" service="microsoft-ds” version="unknown'' extra_info="unknown"/> 
<port number="3306" protocol="tcp” service="mysql" version="unknown" extra_info="unknown’7> 
</port_scan>
</target>
</honeypot--
Figure 18, XML file
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3.5.2 Design and Implementation
The XML file is not created with any libraries; the output file is generated using 
specific print commands. The XML file is created with the idea that it will be used to 
configure a real system from a blank VM template. An administrator would be able to 
create a plain VM template utilizing the OS that is used for a specific set of production 
devices. As HIHs are needed, based on those templates, a module would be able to clone 
the VM and configure the high interaction honeypot based on the XML configuration 
file. This type of rapid deployment of VM systems is already being utilized in a higher 
education environment. The Remote Access Virtual Environment (RAVE) project 
through the ASSERT Lab at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, rapidly deploys and 
configures VMs from an XML based file [B. Hay, personal communication, May 30, 
2012],
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Chapter 4: Database System Design
4.1 Database System Overview
A single database design has been implemented to store the information necessary 
for the system’s operation and data gathered during scanning. The database design has 
been broken into four components; 1) Network Scanning -  Operation, 2) Network 
Scanning (Passive and Active) -  Data, 3) Low Interaction Honeypots, and 4) High 
Interaction Honeypot. Multiple tables may be associated with each of these components 
in the database implementation. The database schema and the statements responsible for 
creating and inserting information data into the tables are located in Appendix E. In the 
following chapter, each component and table will be discussed along with the table fields 
to explain their relevance to the system.
4.2 Network Scanning -  Operation
4.2.1 Objectives and Requirements
The purpose of the tables connected with the operation of the system is to provide 
the user a convenient place to store the desired traits and functionality and monitor the 
various modules without additional input from the user. While gathering the user input 
could have been accomplished through a complex command line statement or a 
configuration file, database tables provide the user a view of the required information and
the necessary format. The database also allows the user to change the functionality of the 
system on-the-fly by updating the operational tables.
4.2.2 Design and Implementation
There are three tables specifically dedicated with the operational duties of the 
system: config, threads and honeypot updates.
config
The config table contains all the necessary information for the startup and 
operations of the system and its modules. Some of the database entries are for files which 
Honeyd uses to emulate different OSs, determine how to react to ICMP fingerprinting, 
and create dynamic templates. Though Honeyd is not currently deployed from this 
system, the database entries are in place to add in a small section of code to make it 
possible.
•  eth_interface
-  Ethernet interface that the active and passive will utilize to gather 
information
• mac_addr
-  MAC address of the Ethernet interface which will allow the scanning 
modules to filter out any communication with the system
• dhcpserver
-  Allows the honeypot scanner to request, renew or release IP addresses 
for the low interaction honeypots
• pO fos
-  File location for ps.of for deploying Honeyd
• nm apexe
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-  Application for activescanner to pass to nm apjnysql
• nmap_prints
-  File location for nmap.prints for deploying Honeyd
• nm apassoc
-  File location for nmap.assoc for deploying Honeyd
• nm apxm l
-  Output location for nmap XML file
• xprobe2_conf
-  File location for xprobe2.conf for deploying Honeyd
• xprobe2_xml
-  Output location for xprobe2 XML file
• honeypot_xml
-  Output location for honeypot XML configuration file
• honeydconfig
-  Output location for Honeyd configuration file
• honeyd_ip_binding
-  Enables the user to choose which IP addresses are used in the Honeyd 
configuration file, discussed in section 3.4.2 Design and 
Implementation
• honeyd_ip_range
-  IP range that the user determines to use for the low interaction 
honeypot, used in conjunction with iD and iR of the 
honeyd ipb ind ing .
o iD, the low interaction honeypot will retain the same last octet as 
the system scanned but will use the first three octets of the 
honeyd ip range IP address, 
o iR, will begin configuring the low interaction honeypots with the 
beginning IP address in the range and will terminate if  the range 
has been filled
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• scan_ip_range
-  IP subnet from which the system will be gathering information to 
create configuration files
• initial_deployment
-  Number o f identified devices to generate initial configuration files
• percentchange
-  Change in percent value that needs to occur before subsequent 
generation of the configuration files
• noise
-  Amount o f noise that user deems acceptable to introduce to the 
network with the passive and active scanning modules, discussed in 
section 3.2.2 Design and Implementation activejscanner
• activescanseconds
-  Number of seconds between active scanning sessions which aids in 
regulating the noise introduced to the network
-  Timeframe in which devices need to be identified or updated to be 
included in the configuration files which keeps the honeypots relevant 
to the current network
• datecreated
-  Date that the table was created
threads
The threads table aids in monitoring the passive scanning modules and the 
secondary active scanning management program is. Threads acts as a lookup table for the 
process identification (PID) for pOf jn ysq l, tcpdump jn y sq l  and active scanner. Each of 
the modules updates the threads table upon being deployed. Honeypot scanner can track
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the modules to ensure they are still running, and take necessary actions if a program has 
terminated.
• th read id
-  Unique ID for this thread
• th rnam e
-  Name of the module (tcpdump scan, pOfscan, active scan)
• thr_pid
-  Process identification for the thread, which is polled by 
honeypot scanner to ensure the module has not terminated
• lasttstam p
-  Last timestamp of the thread's creation
honeypot_ updates
The Honeypotjupdates table contains a continuous record o f all the deployments 
of honeypot configuration files. This allows the user to gauge the dynamic nature of the 
network environment and identify patterns which can be linked to certain periods of time 
or situations. Hours o f network traffic from individual computers can be tracked and 
incorporated into an anomaly based IDS, cycles in a school year can be recorded, rogue 
devices on an organization’s network can be traced, and intrusions can be observed by 
identifying new and unusual open ports on a device.
•  updateid
-  Unique ID for this honeypot update
• num jnachines
-  Number of total devices identified since predetermined number of 
seconds (activescanseconds)
• num services
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-  Number of total services gathered since predetermined number of 
seconds (active_scan_seconds)
• dateupdated
-  Time and date of the last update
scanqueue
The scan queue table acts as a queue between the passive scanning modules and 
active scanner. Scan queue provides a place for the passive scanning program to insert 
identified computers and allows the active scanner to remove the information to initiate 
the correct active scanning module. The queue was designed to decrease the need for 
constant communication and interrupts between the two programs. The queue allows the 
modules to insert and remove the information as needed.
• scan jd
-  Unique ID for this device information
• ip a d d r
-  IP address of the identified device
• m acaddr
-  MAC address o f the identified device
• datecreated
-  Time and date of the devices identification
• lastts tam p tim e
-  Last timestamp for seeing the identified device (UNIX time)
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4.3 Network Scanning (Passive and Active) -  Data
4.3.1 Objectives and Requirements
During operation scan results are queried, inserted and updated to eliminate 
duplicate data which ensures relevant information is utilized in the generation of the 
honeypot configuration files. Data collected from each module is stored in a separate 
table(s). Separate tables allow the user to review the information gathered by each of the 
modules and is specially tailored to each type of information.
4.3.2 Design and Implementation
There are seven tables used to store the gathered information from the scanning 
modules: pOf, tcpdump icmp, tcpdump_ports, nmap machines, nmap_ports,
xprobe2 machines and xprobe2_ports. An additional table {nmap services) is included in 
this section because it is used as a lookup table for tcpdump mysql. The data collected by 
the sub-program within each module is well documented; likewise a thorough database 
schema for each table is also presented in Appendix E. The table layout of the data 
pertaining to each scanning module will be discussed along with any supplemental 
information. Though some of the sub-programs within a module might have the ability to 
collect more information, only the data necessary to build complete Honeyd and high 
interaction honeypot configuration files were accumulated.
POf stores the information gathered by the pOf_mysql program. As pOf identifies a 
device, it deduces the OS and collects valuable information about the system’s distance in 
hops, firewall status, system uptime and type of network connection.
Tcpdump mysql stores its data into two different tables, tcpdump icmp and 
tcpdumpjjorts. The types of data collected from the ICMP vs. UDP/TCP packets 
required that separate tables be used. The IP and MAC addresses from the ICMP reply 
packets are stored into the tcpdump Jcm p  table. The tcpdumpjports stores the IP and 
MAC addresses, port number, and records whether the packet was a UDP reply, TCP 
SYN-ACK, or RST-ACK. The additional lookup table (nmap services) is used to 
supplement the information gathered by tcpdump mysql. As tcpdump mysql intercepts 
the specified UDP/TCP packets, nmap services is queried to collect the service and extra 
information about the port number and protocol supplied.
Though Nmap jn y sq l  and xprobe2jnysql gather slightly different information 
about the scanned devices, their data is broken apart in a similar fashion. Information that 
is specific to the device is stored in the nmap machines and xprobe2 machines tables. 
The device’s observed port information is stored in the nmap jjo r ts  and xprobe2jjorts 
tables. Since one device can have multiple ports open (or services running), each device 
in the nmap machines and xprobe2 machines tables has an identification number 
associated. The device’s observed ports are linked to the device through the identification 
number. This schema helps reduce duplicate information.
4.4 Low Interaction Honeypots
4.4.1 Objectives and Requirements
While honeypot scanner is creating the Honeyd configuration files, information 
is being stored into two tables and another table in being queried. These tables keep track
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for information which enable the low interaction honeypot to be used to their fullest 
potential.
4.4.2 Design and Implementation 
dhcp
As the configuration file for the low interaction honeypots are created, the 
Honeypot_scanner requests for IP addresses from the DHCP server. All the necessary 
information is stored in the dhcp database table to keep the low interaction honeypots 
operational without conflicts in the network.
• d h cp id
-  Unique ID for DHCP interaction
• ip a d d r
-  Client IP address from DHCP server
• m acaddr
-  Client MAC address
• lease_time_seconds
-  Time in seconds to renew DHCP lease
• renew altstam ptim e
-  Timestamp of the next DHCP renewal (UNIX time)
• datecreated
-  Time and date of the DHCP request
• lasttstam p
-  Timestamp of the last DHCP renewal
• last_tstamp_time
-  Timestamp of the last DHCP renewal (UNIX time)
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honeydscripts
Honeyd scripts contains a record of all the scripts which enhance Honeyd’s 
interaction with an attacker. Honeypot scanner will query honeyd scripts while creating 
the configuration file and insert a script that matches an open port on the scanned device.
• scrip tid
-  Unique ID for the script
• prim aryos
-  OS for which the script is designed to emulate
•  protocol
-  Network protocol of the service
• po rtnum
-  Port number for the service being emulated
• scrip tlang
-  Language to interpret the script
• pa thandfilenam e
-  Location and name o f the script
lih_hih_link
The l ih j i ih j in k  database table is used to associate a LIH with a HIH. This table 
is populated with the LIH information as the Honeyd configuration file is being 
generated. The HIH portion is not currently populated but allows for future modules to 
insert the necessary information to facilitate honeyfarm type architecture.
• l inkid
-  Unique ID for the LIH and HIH link
• lih_os_platform
-  OS platform for the LIH
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• l i h i p a d d r
-  IP address for the LIH
• l i h m a c a d d r
-  MAC address for the LIH
• hih_os_platform
-  OS platform for the HIH
• hih_ip_addr
-  IP address for the HIH
• h i h m a c a d d r
-  MAC address for the HIH
• hihlocation
-  Location o f the HIH template file; the statement starts with the 
[datastore] that is used for the VMware Server
• hihstate
-  State of the HIH VM (ON, OFF, SUSPENED)
• date_created
-  Time and date for creating LIH and HIH link
• lasttstam p
-  Last timestamp for deploying LIH
4.5 High Interaction Honeypots
4.5.1 Objectives and Requirements
Though the high interaction honeypot table is not currently used in this system, 
the tables allow for an expanded design which incorporates and deploys both low and 
high interaction honeypots.
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4.5.2 Design and Implementation 
vmwaretemplate
Vmware-template was created to store information about VM templates. These 
templates will be used in future modules to deploy high interaction honeypots with the 
criteria specified in the XML configuration files. As the low interaction honeypots 
interaction with an attacker, the vmware-template table will be queried to find a suitable 
match to the OS platform of low interaction honeypot. As the new high interaction 
honeypot VM is dynamically deployed, the association is made in the lih hih link table.
• h i h i d
-  Unique ID for the high interaction honeypot template
• os_platform
-  OS platform for the high interaction honeypot
• location
-  Location o f the high interaction honeypot template file; the statement 
starts with the [datastore] that is used for the VMware Server
• datecreated
-  Time and date for creating the high interaction honeypot template
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Chapter 5: Testing
5.1 Testing Overview
Tests were conducted with the five different noise levels and two types of 
scanning with the nmap sub-program. The network was arranged similarly for each test to 
assess the ability o f the sub-programs to identify the devices and measure the time needed 
to deploy the initial and subsequent honeypot configuration files. Different distributions 
and variations o f Linux and Windows operating systems were used to evaluate the ability 
to identify the distinct variations and determine which sub-program worked best for each 
of the various operating systems. Figure 19 shows the topology of the network.
C Host Vmware ESXi 4.1
OS: Windows XP  0 S: Windows 7 SP1 
IP: 192.168.1.80
OS: Ubuntu
OS: CentOS 6.0 
IP: 192.168.1.40
Virtual Switch
SP1
IP: 192.168.1.50
8.04.4
IP: 192.168.1.10 Port spanning 
w/ promiscuous mode
SP2
IP: 192.168.1.60
10.04.4
IP: 192.168.1.20
SP3
IP: 192.168.1.70
12.04
IP: 192.168.1.30
SP3w / BOF 
IP: 192.168.1.79
10.04.4 w/Apache 
IP: 192.168.1.100
SP3 w/ IIS 
IP: 192.168.1.110 honeypot_scanner
V .
Figure 19, Testing - Network topology
The operating systems were installed as virtual machines (VMs) on a VMware 
ESXi 4.1 server. The VMs were connected via a virtual switch that was set to enable 
promiscuous mode so the honeypot scanner could observe the network traffic. Traffic 
was generated by browsing with internet Explorer or Firefox from each of the different 
devices to one of the two webservers: Windows XP VM running the internet Information 
Services (IIS) application or Ubuntu 10.04.4 running the Apache Webserver application. 
In each test, the honeypot scanner program would be started on an Ubuntu 10.04.4 VM 
then the “production” VMs would browse to one o f the webservers. In between each test 
the honeypot scanner program would be stopped, the web browsers would be closed on 
each “production” VM, the data from the previous test was collected from the database, 
the database tables would be cleared of all information pertaining to the previous run, and 
the noise level in the config table on the database would be changed to reflect the next 
test.
The config table, shown in Figure 20 and discussed in previous chapters, allows 
the user to setup the system prior to scanning an organization’s network. The ethO 
Ethernet interface was set to observe the traffic for the testing phase. As the honeypot 
configuration files were being generated, the “iD” Honeyd IP binding would deploy the 
honeypots with the same IP address as the scanned computers. This was done for testing 
purposes to quickly determine the devices identified by the system. The initial honeypot 
deployment threshold was set to require five devices to be identified and a 30% change in 
the devices or ports observed for each subsequent deployment. The active scan or rescan
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seconds were set to 86400, which would require the system to operate 24 hours before
rescanning a device.
ethernet interface ethO
MAC Address aa:00:Q4:00:0a:04
DHCP Server 192.168.1.1
pOf OS file /usr/local/share/honeyd/pf.os
Nmap executeable PATH /usr/local/share/nmap
Nmap Prints PATH /usr/local/share/honeyd/nmap.prints
Nmap Associates PATH /usr/local/share/honeyd/nmap.assoc
Nmap Output PATH /home/<user>/Output_files/nmap_output xml
Xprobe2 Configuration PATH /usr/local/share/honeyd/xprobe2.conf
Xprobe2 Output PATH /home/<user>/Output_files/xprobe2_output.xml
Honeypot XML PATH /home/<user>/Output_files/honeypot.xml
Honeyd Config PATH /home/<user>/Output_files/honeyd.conf
Honeyd IP Binding iD
Honeyd IP Range 192.168.1
Scan IP Range 192 168.1
Honeypot Initial Deployment 5
Percent change - redeployment 30
Noise Level passive
Active Scan (sec) - rescan 86400
Date Created 06/16/12 10:05 AM
Figure 20, Testing - config table settings
Before the tests were initiated, “netstat -an ” or “netstat -a l” was executed using 
the command line on each VM to determine which ports were listening. “Uname - r ” was 
executed on each Linux VM to ascertain the kernel version. To determine the IP and 
MAC address for each computer, the “ipconfig/all” or “ifconfig” commands were 
utilized. The configuration for each VM is found in Figure 21. Back Officer Friendly 
(BOF) was installed on a Windows XP service pack (SP) 3 VM. BOF was enabled to 
respond to TCP traffic on port 21 (FTP), port 25 (SMTP), port 80 (HTTP), port 110 
(POP3), and port 143 (IMAP). BOF was installed on one of the computers to assess the 
ability of the scanners.
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OS iP address MAC address TCP ports UDP ports
Ubuntu - honeypot scanner,
2.6.32-41-generic ~ 192.168.1.200 AA:OQ:O4:0O:OA:O4
Linux
Ubuntu 8.04.2, 
2.6.24-41-generic 192.168.1.10
00:50:56:B1:00:17 5353, 58021
Ubuntu 10.04.4, 
2.6.32-41-generic 192.168.1.20 O0:50:56:B1:OG:15 5353,43256
Ubuntu 12.04, 
3.2.0-24-generic-pae 192.168.1.30 00:50:5681:00:11 5353, 42728
CentOS 6,
2.6.32-220.17. l.e!6.i&86 192.168.1.40 O0:5O:56:B1OO:1C 22, 111, 5672, 42800
111, 605, 631, 686, 
5353, 37927, 41743
Ubuntu 10.04.4-Apache, 
2.6.32-41-generic 192.168.1.100
00:50:56:B100:13 22,80 5353, 55189
WMKtOWS
XP SP1 192.168.1.50 00:50:56:B1:00:OB
135, 139,445, 1025, 
5000
123. 137, 138, 445, 500, 
1026, 1027, 1900
XP SP2 192.168.1.60 00:50:56:B1:00:0D 135,139, 445
123,137,138, 445. 500, 
1900, 4500
XP SP3 192.168.1.70 00:50:56:B1:00:0E 135,139,445
123, 137, 138, 445,500. 
1900, 4500
XP SP3
w/ Back Officer Friendly 192.158.1.79
00:50:56:B1:00:03 21, 23, 25, 80.110, 
135, 139, 143, 445
123,137,138, 445, 500, 
1900,4500
W indows 7 SP1 192.168.1.80 00:5056:B1:(X):18
135,139, 445, 5357, 
49152-6
123,137,138, 1900, 
3702, 5355, 61582
Windows XP SP3 - IIS 192.168.1.110 00:50:56:61:00:16 25. 80,135,139,443, 445,1025
123,137,138, 445, 500. 
190D, 3456, 4500
Figure 21, Testing - Scanned network
5.1.1 Passive Scanning
During the passive scanning test, additional traffic was not generated from the 
honeypot scanner. Due to the passive method of acquiring information, this test was 
allowed to run for the longest period of time, 41 hours and 42 minutes. As seen in Figure 
22, the initial honeypot configuration file was deployed in 2 minutes and 47 seconds. 
Five computers were identified but none o f the open ports were identified by that point in
time. The subsequent configuration file deployment would take an additional 24 minutes 
when another computer and the first port were observed. Then demonstrating the 
dynamic nature of the system, another configuration file was deployed after the 24 hour 
rescan threshold was reached. Devices which were not identified by pOf in the past 24 
hours were removed from the third honeypot configuration file. Tcpdump was able to 
observe the HTTP ports on the webservers and a majority of the NetBIOS ports on the 
Windows computers. POf correctly identify 5 o f the 6 computers as having Windows 
operating systems but could only recognize one o f the Linux computers.
Passive
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IP address MAC address State OS TCP ports UDP ports
lim n
192.168.1.10 00:50:56:81:00:17 Linux 2.6
192.168.1.20 00:50:56:B1:00:1S
192.168.1.30 00.50:56:81:00:11
UNKNOWN
[S10:64:l:60:M146Q.S/r.N.W3'
192.168.1.40 00:50:56:81:00:10
192.168.1.100 00:50:56:81:00:13 80
Window!
192.168.1.50 00:50:56:B1:Q0:QB 139 137,138
192.168.1.60 00:50:56:B1:QC:OD Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1+ 137,138
192.168.1.70 00:50:56:B1:00:OE Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1+ 137,138
192.168.1.79 00:50:56:B1:00:03 Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP1* 137,138
192.168.1.80 00:50:56:81:00:18 Windows XP/200D 137
192.168.1.110 00:50:56:81:00:16 Windows 2000 SP4, XPSP1* 80 137,138
Timestamp Numeric Time
Time to deploy 
honeypot files
Deployed 
Machines Services
START 2012-6-1611:46:55 41076.49091
HP 1 2012-6-1611:49:42 41076.49285 0:02:47 5 0
HP 2 2012-6-16 12:14:21 41076.50997 0:27:26 6 1
HP 3 2012-6-1711:48:19 41077.49189 24:01:24 3 1
STOP 2012-6-18 5:29:30 41078.22882
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 41:42:35
Figure 22, Testing - Passive scanning
5.1.2 Passive and Active Scanning
Noise Level -  Low
The low noise level is the first test in which active scanning was utilized in 
determining the devices on the network. Xprobe2 was used to actively scan the IP 
addresses that were stored in the scanjqueue database table by the tcpdump jn y sq l  
module. Since active scanning requires less time to discover the devices on the network, 
the test was allowed to run for 21 hours and 44 minutes and the results are shown in 
Figure 23.
Low
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IP address MAC address State OS TCP ports UDP ports
nux
192.168.1.10 00:50:56:81:00:17 U Linux Kernel 2.4.30
192.158.1.20 00:50:56:31:00:15 u Linux Kernel 2.4.30
192.158.1.30 0Q:50:56:B1:00:11 u Linux Kernel 2.4.30
192.158.1.40 00:50:56:81:00:1C u Linux Kernel 2.6.6
192.168.1.100 00:SQ:56:B1:00:13 u Linux Kernel 2.4.30 80
Windows
192.158.1.50 00:50:56: Bl:O0:OB u Microsoft Windows XP 139 137,138
192.168.1.60 08:50:56:31:00:00 D W i ndows 2000 SP4. XPSP1+ 137.138
192.168.1.70 00:50:56:B1:00:OE D Windows 2000SP4, XPSP1* 137,138
192.168.1.79 00:50:56:B1:00:03 D 137,138
192.168.1.80 00:50:56:61:00:18 D Windows XP/200D 137
192.168.1.110 00:50:56:B1:00:16 D SC 137.138
Time to deploy Deployed
Timestamp Numeric Time honeypot files Machines Services
START 2012-6-18 6:11:5 41078.2577
HP 1 2012-6-1806:12:09 41078.25844 0:01:04 5 5
HP 2 2012-6-18 06:12:39 41078.25878 0:01:34 7 5
HP 3 2012-6-1806:14:40 41078.26019 0:03:35 10 5
STOP 2012-6-19 3:55:16 41079.16338
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 21:44:11
Figure 23, Testing - Active scanning (Low noise level)
The time required to deploy three different honeypot configuration files was just three 
minutes and 35 seconds. Ten devices and five services were observed during that 
timeframe. Xprobe2 utilizes ICMP packets to determine the operating system of a device. 
This allowed the system to record that several computers replied to ICMP request 
packets. Xprobe2 was able to recognize one of the Windows computers and all o f the 
Linux computers though the Linux kernel version was incorrect. POf recognized several 
of the other Windows operating systems. Again, tcpdump was able to record the same 
UDP and TCP traffic as in the passive test plus the ICMP traffic. Though additional ports 
were observed, they did not meet the 30% threshold to deploy a fourth set of 
configuration files.
Noise Level -  Medium
Xprobe2 with port scanning was used during the medium noise level test. The 
port scanning feature allowed the system to identify a few new open ports but hindered 
pOf from recognizing any of the Windows operating systems. The test was allowed to run 
for 9 hours and 18 minutes but only required 3 minutes and 50 seconds to deploy its one 
and only set of confirmation files. Figure 24 displays the devices and ports identified 
during the test. Due to the web browser caching the web pages and not sending a GET 
request to the Webserver, the device with IP address 192.168.1.20 was not identified. By 
identifying this additional device, an additional deployment of configuration files may 
have been completed.
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Medium
IP address MAC address State OS TCP ports UDP ports
ICMP
Linux
192.168.1.10
192.168.1.20
192.168.1.30
192.168.1.40
192.168.1.100
O0:SO:56:Bl:OC:17 
00:50:56:81:03:15 
00:50:56:B1:0Q:11 
00:50:56:B1:00:1C 
00:50:56:81:00:13
U Linux Kernel 2.4.30
Linux Kernel 2.4.30 
Linux Kernel 2.4.22 
Linux Kernel 2.4.30
22
22 ,80
62402
Windows
192.168.1.50 00:50:56:B1:0Q:OB U MicrosottWindowiXP 139, 445 137,138
192.168.1.60 03:5O:56:B1:OO:OD D 137,138
192.168.1.70 00:50:56:81:00:05 D 137,138
192.168.1.79 00:50:56:B1:00:03 D 137,138
192.168.1.80 00:50:56:B1:00:18 D 137
192.168.1.110 1X1:50:56:81:00:16 D 80 137,138
Timestamp Numeric Time
Time to  deploy 
honeypot files
Deployed 
Machines Services
START 2012-6-19 5:2:26 41079.21002
HP 1 2012-6-19 5:6:16 41079.21269 0:03:50 7 8
STOP 2012-6-19 14:21:23 41079.59818
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 9:18:57
Figure 24, Testing - Active scanning (Medium noise level)
Noise Level -  Medium-High 
Nmap: -sS (TCPSYN scan)
Two medium-high noise level tests were run to examine which nmap scan was 
more effective on this network environment. The -sS  flag was set during the execution of 
the nmap sub-program which initiates a TCP SYN scan on each device. As seen in Figure 
25, all of the devices were identified with a state of being UP but none of the Linux 
operating systems were recognized. POf and nmap were only able to recognize one 
Windows operating system each. Nmap was able to observe a few more open ports than 
previous tests, especially on the Windows SP1 computer. Two deployments of
configurations files were completed though they did take longer to complete due to the 
extensive scanning that nmap performs.
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Medium-High-sS
IP address MAC address State OS TCP ports UDP ports
ICMP
reply
Linux
192.168.1.10 00:50:S6:B1:00:17 U
192.168.1.20 OO:50:56:B1:OO:15 U
192.168.1.30 00:5C:56:B1:00:11 U
192.168.1.40 OQ:5G:56:B1:0O:1C U 22
192.168.1.100 00:50:56:B1:QC:13 U 22
Windows
123,137,135,
192.16S.1.S0 Q0:50:56:B1:Q0:CB U SP0/5P1/SP2 or Windows XP SPO/SP1 1025, 5000 445. 500.1026. 
1027,1900
192.168.1.60 00:50:56:B1:00:00 U 137.138
192.168.1.70 00:S0:56:B1:00:0E u Windows 2000 SP4. XP SP1* 137,138
192.168.1.79 00:50:56:B1:00:03 u 21 ,23 .25 .80 .
143
137,138
192.168.1.80 00:50:56:B1:00:18 u 137
192.168.1.110 00:50:56:B1:<»:16 u 80 137,138
Time to  deploy Deployed
Timestamp Numeric Time honeypot files Machines Services
START 2012-6-1914:51:23 41079.61902
HP 1 2012-6-1915:8:13 41079.63071 0:16:50 5 7
HP 2 2012-6-1915:9:43 41079.63175 0:18:20 6 21
STOP 2012-6-20 4:27:31 41080.18578
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 13:36:08
Figure 25, Testing - Active scanning (Medium-High-sS noise level)
Nmap: -sT (TCP connect scan)
A TCP connect scan was utilized by nmap for this test. Similar results were 
observed even though a different type o f nmap scan was used, though it appears that a 
few more ports were identified with the SYN scan. POf was not able to recognize any of 
the operating systems during this test which might have been affected by the TCP 
connect scans. The deployment of configuration files was again a little slower than with
the xprobe2 scanning as seen in Figure 26. A third set of configuration files were 
deployed during this test due to the number of devices and the open ports that were 
initially identified. Configuration files with 10 devices and 20 open ports were produced 
during the final deployment.
Medium-High-sT
ICMP
IP address MAC address State OS TCP ports UDP ports ,___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ reply
lim n
192.168.1.:
192.168.1.;
192.168.1.:
192.168.1.'
192.168.1.1
Windows
192.168.1.!
192.168.1.1
192.168.1.'
192.168.1.:
192.16S .li
192.168.1.1
START 
HP 1 
HP 2 
HP 3 
STOP
Figure 26, Testing - Active scanning (Medium-High-sT noise level)
Noise Level -  High
The high noise level utilizes both nmap and xprobe2 to actively scan the network. 
The combination of the two scanners produced a more complete picture of the network
OQ:5C:56:B1:03:17 U
00:50:56:81:05:15 U
00:50:56:81:00:11 U
00:50:56:B1:00:1C u
00:50:56:81:00:13 u so
00:50:56:Bl:00OB U
Microsoft Windows 2000 
SPO/SP1/SP2 or Windows XP 5P0/SP1
135.139,445, 
1025,5000
123,137,138, 
445, 500,1026. 
1027,1900
00:50:56:81:00:00 U 137,138
00:50:56:B1:00:OE u 137,138
00:50:56:B1:00«3 u 2 1 ,2 3 ,8 0 ,1 4 3 137,138
00:50:56:B100:18 u 137
00:50:56:81:00:16 u 80 137,138
Time to deploy Deployed
Timestamp_________ NumericTime honeypot files Machines Services
2012-6-20 4:59:22 41080.20789
2012-6-20 5:15:48 41080.21931 0:16:26 5 1
2012-6-205:17:18 41080.22035 0:17:56 6 15
2012-6-205:30:54 41080.22979 0:31:32 10 20
2012-6-20 13:22:16 41080.55713
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 8:22:54
when compared with any other previous test. Xprobe2 was able to identify all the Linux 
operating systems, but pOf was able to ascertain a better match for one o f the Linux 
systems. Nmap identified one of the Windows operating systems and was able to 
determine a majority of the open ports on the devices. As seen in Figure 27, the time to 
initially deploy the configurations files was again affected be the speed at which nmap 
scans each computer.
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Hifh
IP address M A C x H rts State OS TCP ports UDP ports
ICMP
reply
Linux
192.168.1.10 00:50:56:B1:00 17 U Linux Kernel 2.4.30
192.168.1.20 00:5C:56:B1:00 IS U L in u x 2 .6
192.168.1.30 00:50:S6:B1:<X3 11 U Linux Kernel 2.4.30
192.168.1.40 00:50:56:B1:00 1C u Linux K erne l 2 .4 .22 ~>2
192.168.1.100 00:50:S6:B1:00 13 u Linux Kernel 2.4.30 22,80
62402
Windows
192.168.1.5C
192.168.1.60 
192.168.1.70 
192.168 1.79 
192.168.1.80 
192.168.1.11C
00:50:56:B1:00:QB
00:50:S6:B1:00:OD
00:50:56:B1:00:OE
O0:5C:56:Bl:OQ.O3
00:50:56:61:00:18
00:50:56:B1:00:16
Microsoft Windows XP
IBS, 139,445, 
102 S, 5000
2 1 ,23 ,80 ,143
80
123,137,138, 
445, 500,1026, 
1027,1900
137.138
137.138
137.138 
137
137.138
Time to  deploy Deployed
Timestamp Numeric Time honeypot files Machines Services
START 2012-6-2013:43:1 41080.57154
HP 1 2012-6-2014:3:26 41080.58572 0:20:25 5 4
HP 2 2012-6-2014:8:58 41080.58956 0:25:57 7 18
HP 3 2012-5-2014:20:2 41080.59725 0:37:01 10 23
STOP 2012-6-213:20:21 41081.13913
TOTAL (hh:mm:ss) 13:37:20
Figure 27, Testing - Active scanning (High noise level)
5.2 Analysis
The results demonstrate that both passive and active scanning can be used 
simultaneously to gather an accurate picture of the network environment. Extensive 
information can be gathered to create a honeynet which is representative of the 
production environment. POf was able to recognize the Windows operating systems 
although the ability was degraded when active scanning was included. Xprobe2 had great 
success at identifying the Linux operating systems. Nmap and tcpdump were able to 
observe a majority of the ports which were open and communicating. The combination of 
all the scanners allowed for a more complete picture to be obtained.
More tests may be completed to determine the optimal percent change needed to 
re-deploy a new honeynet while taking into consideration that stability is required to 
gather information about intruders. A larger network would require a smaller percent 
change to deploy additional honeypots as new machines are added to the network. 
Additional tweaking to the system could be made by adjusting the weight given to 
devices being identified compared to open ports being found. This would deploy more 
honeypots as devices are recognized but wait additional time when open ports are 
recorded.
Being able to deploy this research effort on a real production network with all the 
user generated traffic would aid in determining which noise level is necessary to map a 
network. With more traffic potentially generated from each device the aggressiveness of 
the active scanners could be scaled back to limit the traffic introduced by the system. 
Nmap has so many features and types of scans available that testing could be done to
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determine the best configuration that works with the other system modules. As updates to 
the scanning programs are released, a fine-tuning period may be required to maximize the 
system if fine granularity in the honeynet is needed. Due to the nature o f the system, 
organizations are hesitant to allow the installation of a device by a researcher which 
captures packets on their corporate network. However, when the system is deployed by 
the organization then tests can be conducted to determine the optimal noise level for their 
environment.
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Chapter 6: Summary
6.1 Conclusions
Honeypot technology is continuing to expand and be updated as different areas of 
technology are explored for vulnerabilities by attackers. Honeypot research has expanded 
to client honeypots to gather malware from malicious websites [Seifert, Komisarczuk & 
Welch, 2009], monitoring for attackers in supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems which control our country’s critical infrastructure [Krutz, 2006], anti­
phishing frameworks to combat the exponential growth of phishing campaigns [Li & 
Schmitz, 2009], and collecting malware for analysis and reverse engineering [Dionaea, 
2012],
Common misconceptions and not recognizing that a problem exists has delayed 
the spread of such a powerful technology in the corporate environment. Richard Bejtlich, 
chief security officer at Mandiant, a computer-security company, said that in cases 
handled by his firm  where intrusions were traced back to Chinese hackers, 94% o f  the 
targeted companies didn't realize they had been breached until someone else told them. 
The median number o f  days between the start o f  an intrusion and its detection was 416, 
or more than a year [Barrett, 2012]. Organizations are not realizing that a problem exists 
until a breach has occurred and by the time they discover the compromise the 
organization’s data has already been exfiltrated.
Honeypots can be deployed in a wide variety of shapes and sizes depending on 
the information that the individual is trying to collect. It would not be prudent for an
organization to deploy an unpatched system onto their network due to the legal liabilities 
and the unnecessary risk. But deploying honeypots that are relevant to the company 
would do no more harm than deploying a new production system. The benefit to an 
organization to collect valuable intelligence about how an attacker can compromise a 
system similar to their production environment is indispensable. Organizations can also 
shield themselves from more unnecessary risk by only deploying honeypots inside their 
network environments.
With the increasing volume of data that passes through an organization’s network, 
it is becoming more burdensome to adequately monitor an organization’s IDS logs and 
alerts. It also requires skilled individuals to create IDS signatures that maintain the 
balance between not alerting and alerting too much. And unfortunately, administrators 
are being asked to do more with fewer people, less time and resources. So normally it 
would be ridiculous to pile on more responsibly and duties to an already overworked 
administrator. But if  the short-term burden o f learning a new system results in securing 
the network with an increased efficiency and effectiveness, then sometimes it is a 
necessary evil. Yet, because the honeypot is a resource with no production value, "it's a 
great alarm system — there are no false positives with honeypots. If a packet touches it, 
something is suspect" said Ralph Logan, principal with the Logan Group [Higgins, 2006]. 
While a honeypot might generate the same information that an IDS generates, it narrows 
down the data requiring analysis by eliminating all the additional noise that is collected. 
To help decrease the steep learning curve associated with using honeypot technology on 
the job, it is suggested that such skills should be taught in collaboration with other
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information security material at the higher education level [Ahmad, Ali & Mustafa, 
2011].
Knowing that someone is attempting to break into an organization’s network isn’t 
necessarily alarming but being alerted that someone is in the network might be valuable 
information. By properly placing a honeypot in vital areas of an organization’s network, 
the alerts generated indicate that a potential intrusion has occurred. Many organizations 
are so consumed with watching their outer defenses that they are not watching for lateral 
movement inside their network by insiders or attackers that have already infiltrated their 
defenses. FBI executive assistant director Shawn Henry added that companies need to do 
more than just react to intrusions. "In many cases, the skills o f  the adversaries are so 
substantial that they just leap right over the fence, and you don't ever hear an alarm go 
off," he said. Companies "need to be hunting inside the perimeter o f  their network," he 
added [Barrett, 2012], By deploying and monitoring a honeynet inside the organization’s 
network, sustained access and reconnaissance by an attacker could be mitigated and 
studied.
This project creates a methodology for an organization to gather tremendous 
information about its network either passively or with the assistance of active scanners. 
Capturing data about the devices that are utilizing the network infrastructure can alert the 
administrators to rogue devices, unpatched or vulnerable systems, devices which are 
attempting to probe sensitive systems, and create a continuous network topology of the 
scanned network. By evaluating the benefits, organizations would realize that honeypots
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would fulfill the compliance requirements in their risk and security framework that they 
already have in place [Nunes & Correia, 2010].
6.2 Future Work
There are a few areas o f this system which could be expanded or explored to 
increase the ability to actively engage attackers and gather “valuable” intelligence. As the 
scanning sub-programs are updated, they need to be incorporated to increase the 
proficiency to gather data about the devices on the network. Deploying the low and high 
interaction honeypots from the honeypot scanner module would decrease the need for 
user intervention. To establish the capabilities of this system at all noise levels, tests must 
be conducted in a live network which will allow fine tuning o f the active scanning 
modules and demonstrate the ability to handle large volumes of network traffic.
Many honeypot technologies have become available over the past 15 years and 
even more security tools have been created since the 1970s. Many of these tools have not 
been kept up to date so their effectiveness is diminished as computer and network 
technology continues to race forward. Yet there are a handful of tools that are continuing 
to be updated and expanded as technology changes. Several o f the sub-programs used by 
this system have been updated within the past six months. Nmap v6, pOf v3 and tcpdump 
v4.2.1 have recently become available which will offer an improved method of gathering 
information about the network devices. The enhancements made to these modules will 
allow more information to be gathered about devices with increased efficiency. More
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information will be gathered about the devices which will allow a more complete 
topology to be obtained by the administrator.
Deploying the LIH high interaction honeypots with Honeyd through the 
management program, honeypot scanner, requires very little customization. The more 
difficult task is deploying the high interaction honeypots with speed and efficiency. Work 
is currently being done to deploy the high interaction honeypot utilizing the VMware 
Virtual Infrastructure extension (VIX) API. The primary OS is read from the XML 
configuration file then compared against the vmwaretemplate  database table to see if a 
match is available. The information pertaining to the match is stored in the lih hih j i n k  
table which associates the low and high interaction honeypot. The high interaction 
honeypot is deployed and a script is run on the VM to gather the IP and MAC addresses 
which is then stored in the l ih j i ih j in k  table. Work needs to be done to start services and 
open ports on the VM so they reflect the production devices accurately. Integrating a 
program such as HoneyMole, which bridges the low interaction honeypot to the high 
interaction honeypot, would allow for more actionable intelligence to be collected as the 
attacker probes the low interaction honeypot beyond its capabilities and is then redirected 
to the high interaction honeypot. As discussed in the hybrid honeypots / honeyfarms 
section in Chapter 2, systems are currently being deployed which redirect low interaction 
honeypot attacks to a high interaction honeypot. Yet these systems do not dynamically 
adjust to a production environment and the high interaction honeypots are deployed on a 
completely separate system from the low interaction honeypots. A fully integrated system 
would give the administrator the ability to deploy the honeypots in any network
90
environment with minimal network configuration, e.g. giving the honeypot scanning 
system access to a spanning port to gather information passively.
To determine the capabilities of the system to process large amounts of traffic, 
tests need to be done on varying size networks in different configurations. Creating 
closed loop networks utilizing VMware ESXi servers has allowed limited testing due to 
the complications of setting up dynamic networks and reproducing human activity. 
Testing the system on a live network would assess the responsiveness of the passive 
scanning modules and the ability to accurately map an organization’s infrastructure. Fine 
tuning the active scanning modules to gather the greatest information without becoming 
detrimental to the bandwidth of the network could also be tested in a full scale 
environment.
This work represents an important step forward in honeynet technologies, but 
much work remains to be done to mitigate the threats facing our digital assets.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
LIH(s) Low Interaction Honeypot(s) or Honeynet(s)
HIH(s) High Interaction Honeypot(s) or Honeynet(s)
ID(S) Intrusion Detection (System)
VM(s) Virtual Machine(s)
TTL Time to live
Appendix B: Glossary
Dynamic - Marked by continuous usually productive activity or change [1]; not necessarily with 
respect to time but adapting to the environment.
Honeypot - A security resource, whose value is in being probed, attacked or compromised. [2]
Noise (level) - Network activity generated by the research effort or any other device.
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[1] "dynamic." Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary. Merriam-Webster, Inc. 22 Apr. 2007.
<Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dynamic>.
[2] Spitzner, Lance. "Honeypots: Definitions and Value of Honeypots." 23 Apr. 2007.
<http:// www.spitzner.net/honeypots. html>.
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Appendix C: Module Commands and Flags
Table 3, Module commands and flags
M odule Command and N ags
Modules ’ ' /  ;  V v- '/J // /v  Commands and N ags
honeypot_scanner peri honeypot_scanner.pl
tcpdump_mysql peri tcpdump_mysql.pl -ip {ip} -i {interface}
-ip # IP address(es) from which to gather information #
-i # Ethernet interface utilized to capture packets #
p0f_mysql peri pOf_mysql.pl -i {interface}
-i # Ethernet interface utilized to capture packets #
nmap_mysql perlnmap_mysql.pl -mip {ip} -mac {mac} -t {time} -o {file} -nmap {exe} -ip {ip}
-mip # IP address passed from active scanner (scan_queue) #
-mac # MAC address passed from active scanner (scanqueue) #
-t # Time between active re-scans o f known devices (seconds) #
-o # Nmap output XML path #
-nmap # Nmap.exe path #
-ip # IP address that Nmap will be scanning #
xprobe2_mysql peri xprobe2_mysql.pl -mip {ip} -mac {mac} -t {time} -o {file} -p {level} -ip {ip}
-mip # IP address passed from active scanner (scan queue) #
-mac # MAC address passed from active scanner (scan queue) #
-t # Time between active re-scans o f known devices (seconds) #
-o # Nmap output XML path #
-p # Increased scanning flag (1 = enabled) #
-ip # IP address that Nmap will be scanning #
**active_scanner - Not able to be run independently because it needs the passive scanners to identify 
devices on the network and populate scan queue
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Appendix D: Source Code
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Honeypot_scanner.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl
#honeypot_scanner.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007
use strict;
use threads;
use DBI;
use File::Copy;
use 10:: Socket: :INET;
use Net::DHCP::Packet;
use Net::DHCP::Constants;
# Config table variables
my $eth_interfaee, my $my_mac, my Sdhcp server, my SpOfos, my $nmap_exe, my 
Snmapassoc, my $nmap_prints, my Snm apxm l, my$xprobe2_xml, 
my $xprobe2_conf, my $honeypot_xml, my Shoneyd config, my $honeyd_ip_binding, 
my $honeyd_ip_range, my Sscan ip range, my Sinitialdeployment, 
my $percent_change, my Snoise, my $active_scan_seconds,
# Thread variables
my $tcp_pid, my $pOf_pid, my $act_pid, my $tcp_run, my SpOfrun, my Sactrun, 
my Stcp name = "tcpdump_scan", my $p0f_name = "pOf scan", my Sact name = 
"activescan",
# Global variables
my $pc_threshold_high, my $pc_threshold_low, my $honeypot_deploy = "N", 
my Scount = 0, my $honeyd_count, my Shoneyd max, my $honeyd_ip_temp;
system "killall pOf'; # Kill all instances of pOf running before our
program starts
system "killall tcpdump"; # Kill all instances of tcpdump running before our
program starts
system "/etc/init.d/dhcdbd stop"; # Stop DHCP client from running
system "killall dhclient"; # Kill all instances of dhclient running before our
program starts
# Calls connect_to_db() function to connect to honeypot scanner MySQL database 
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
# Calls db_query_config() function to retrieve all the config database variables
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db_query_config($dbh);
# Inserts information returned from DHCP server into the database
# Prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later
my $insert_dhcp_register = $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO dhcp (dhcp id , ip ad d r, 
m acaddr, lease_time_seconds, renew altstam ptim e, datecreated, lasttstam p, 
last tstamp time) VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);"); 
my $insert_updates = $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO honeypot updates 
(num_machines, num_services, date updated) VALUES (?, ?, ?);"); 
my S in se rtlih in fo  = $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO lih hih link (lih_os_platform, 
l ih ip a d d r , lih m a c ad d r , hih_os_platform, h ih ip a d d r , h ih m a c a d d r , hihlocation, 
hih_state, date_created, last_tstamp) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);");
# Creates tcpdump mysql thread and detaches it 
my $tcp_thr = threads->new(\&tcpdump_scan);
$tcp_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more
# Creates pOf mysql thread and detaches it 
my SpOf thr = threads->new(\&pOf_scan);
$pOf_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more
# Checks the noise level for the config table and creates active_scan thread if necessary 
then detaches it
my Sactthr;
if($noise eq 'low' || Snoise eq 'medium' || Snoise eq 'medium-high' || Snoise eq 'high')
{ S actth r = threads->new(\&active_scan);
$act_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more 
}elsif (Snoise eq "passive"))
}else {print "Please choose a correct noise level for this scanner in the config table!\n"; 
exit;}
# Sleep for 2 seconds to ensure threads are created before next step 
sleep 2;
# Obtains the process id for each of the created threads to watch for early termination 
$tcp_pid = db_query_threads($tcp_name, Sdbh);
open (PSIN, "ps -p $tcp_pid -o comm= |");
$tcp_run=<PSIN>;
Sp0f_pid = db_query_threads($pOf_name, Sdbh); 
open (PSIN, "ps -p Sp0f_pid -o comm= |");
$pOf_run=<PSIN>;
$act_pid = db_query_threads($act_name, Sdbh); 
open (PSIN, "ps -p Sact pid -o comm= |");
$act_run=<PSIN>;
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eval {
# Install signal handlers
$SIG{INT} = sub { die "Caught interrupt" };
while (1){
# Sleeps for 10 seconds 
sleep 10;
# Increment count, mentioned below 
$count++;
# Retrieve all the config database variables again to make sure use has 
changed information
dbqueryconfig(Sdbh);
# Checks to see if any honeyd IP addresses need to be renewed (only 
necessary if -il honeyd ip binding used)
db_query_renew_dhcp($dbh);
thread if not
not
# Looks to see if tcpdump jm ysql is still running and spins off a new
open (PSIN, "ps -p $tcp_pid -o comm= |"); 
my $tcp_still_run = <PSIN>; 
if ($tcp_still_run ne S tcprun) {
my Stcp thr = threads->new(\&tcpdump_scan); 
$tcp_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more 
sleep 2;
$tcp_pid = db_query_threads($tcp_name, $dbh); 
open (PSIN, "ps -p $tcp_pid -o comm= |");
$tcp_run = <PSIN>;
}
# Looks to see if pOfmysql is still running and spins off a new thread if
open (PSIN, "ps -p $p0f_pid -o comm= |"); 
my $pOf_still_run = <PSIN>; 
if (S pO fstillrun  ne $p0f_run){
my $p0f_thr = threads->new(\&pOf_scan);
$pOf_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more 
sleep 2;
$p0f_pid = db_query_threads($pOf_name, $dbh); 
open (PSIN, "ps -p $p0f_pid -o comm= [");
$p0f_run = <PSIN>;
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# Looks to see if active scan is still running and spins off a new thread if
not
open (PSIN, "ps -p $act_pid -o comm= |"); 
my $act_still_ran = <PSIN>; 
if  (S a c ts tillru n  ne Sactrun) {
if (Snoise eq 'low' || $noise eq 'medium' || $noise eq 'medium-high'
|| Snoise eq 'high')
{ $act_thr = threads->new(\&active_scan);
$act_thr->detach; # Now we officially don't care any more 
sleep 2;
$act_pid = db_query_threads($act_name, Sdbh); 
open (PSIN, "ps -p $act_pid -o comm= |");
$act_run = <PSIN>;
}
}
# Since we don't need to check every 10 secondsfor honeypot 
redeployment, I created this counter to extend time to 30 seconds
if (Scount >= 3){
# Check to see if  threshold has been reached to create honeyd
config
db_query_honeypot_deployment($dbh);
Scount = 0;
}
}
};
# Close down and clean up if ctl-c or interrupt occurred 
if ($@) {
# Disconnect from Database 
$dbh->disconnect();
print "Honeypot Scanner disconnected from Database.\n";
# Print exit message
print "\nExiting with: $@\n";
system "killall pOf'; 
system "killall tcpdump"; 
system "killall nmap"; 
system "killall xprobe2"; 
system "kill $p0f_pid"; 
system "kill $tcp__pid"; 
system "kill $act_pid";
}
I l l
sleep 1; 
exit;
# Connect to the database 
sub connect_to_db
{ # Database Information
my $db="honeypot_scanner"; 
my $userid="root"; 
my Spasswd-'rootpass"; 
my $connectionInfo="dbi:mysql:$db";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBI->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,$passwd, {
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
}
# Retrieve information then check integrity o f information from config table in database 
sub d b q u ery co n fig
{ my Sdbh = shift;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query 
my Squery = "select * from config;";
my $select_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(Vmy Sein, \my $mc, Vmy Sdhcp, \my SpOf, \my Sne, 
\my $np, \my $na, \my $nx, \my $xc, \my $xx,
\my Shx, \my She, \my Shib, \my Shir, \my Ssir, \my Sid, Vmy Spc, \my $n, Vmy 
Sas, Vmy Sdc);
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sethinterface = Sein;
Sm ym ac = Smc;
Sdhcpserver = Sdhcp;
SpOfos = SpOf;
Snm apexe = Sne;
$nmap_prints = Snp;
Snm apassoc = Sna;
Snm apxm l = Snx;
Sxprobe2_conf = Sxc;
Sxprobe2_xml = Sxx;
Shoneypotxml = Shx;
}
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$honeyd_config = $hc;
Shoneyd ip binding -  $hib;
$honeyd_ip_range = Shir;
S scan ip ran g e  = Ssir;
Sinitialdeployment = Sid;
Spercentchange = Spc;
Snoise = $n;
$active_scan_seconds = Sas;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
# Make sure there are no spaces or ; in file path names for security 
if($nmap_exe =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) {print "nm apexe in the config table
contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($pOf_os =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "pOf os database in the config table 
contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($nmap_prints =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "nmap_prints in the config table 
contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($nmap_assoc =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "nmap_assoc in the config table 
contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($xprobe2_conf =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "xprobe2_conf in the config 
table contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($xprobe2_xml =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "xprobe2_xml in the config 
table database contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
elsif($honeyd_config =~ /[Aa-zA-Z0-9_V.\-]/) (print "honeyd_config in the config 
table contains a bad character!\n"; exit;}
# Check to see if the correct honeyd_ip_binding was input into the config table 
if($honeyd_ip_binding =~ m/A(iS|iD|iR|iI)$/i)(} else (print "Please choose a
correct honeyd ip binding for this scanner in the config table!\n"; exit;}
# Check to see if the MAC address entered into the config table is in the correct
format
my $my_mac_temp = $my_mac;
my $mac_rgx = ,A\w(2}\:\w(2}\:\w{2}\:\w(2}\:\w(2}\:\w{2}$'; 
my $my_mac = mac_chkmac($my_mac_temp,$mac_rgx); 
if (Smy mac eq "") (print "A correct MAC address must be entered in the config 
table!\n"; exit(l);}
# Check to see if the dhcp server IP entered into the config table is in the correct
format
my $dhcp_server_temp = $dhcp_server;
my $ip_rgx = ,A\d (1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d (1,3} \.\d {1,3} $';
my $dhcp_server = ipv4_chkip($dhcp_server_temp,$ip_rgx);
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if (Sdhcp server == "") {print "Single & correct IP address must be entered for the 
DHCP server in the config table!\n"; exit(l);}
# Check to see if the correct honeyd ip range was input into the config table 
honeyd_ip_manipulation();
}
# Query the threads tables for PID information 
sub dbquery th reads
{ my Sthrnam e = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift; 
my $thr_pid;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select thread id, thr_pid from threads where thr_name = 
'Sthrname';";
my Sselect stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(Vmy St id, Vmy $t_pid); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
$thr_pid = Stjpid;
}
$select_stmt->finish; 
return $thr_pid;
}
# Insert information about new honeypot deployment 
sub d b in sertupdates
{ my Snummachines = shift; 
my Snum services = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
# Finalize the insert statement
$insert_updates->bind_param( 1, Snum machines); # refers to the first ? in the
query
$insert_updates->bind_param( 2, $num_services); # refers to the second ? in the
query
my Sdateupdated = date_time();
$insert_updates->bind_param( 3, Sdate updated); # refers to the third ? in the
query
$ insert_updates->execute();
}
# excute the SQL statement
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# Check to see if threshold has been reached to create honeyd config 
sub dbqueryhoneypotdeploym ent 
{ my $dbh= shift;
my Scurrentcount = 0;
my $num_machines = 0;
my Snum services = 0;
my Sscantim e = time() - Sactive scan seconds;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "(select ip_addr, mac_addr, primary_os from pOf where 
la stts tam p tim e  > '$scan_time' AND ip addr NOT IN (select ip_addr from 
nm apm achines where prim aryos != 'unknown' AND lastts tam p tim e  > 'Sscantim e') 
AND ip_addr NOT IN (select ip_addr from xprobe2_machines where primary os != 
'unknown' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time')) union (select ip addr, m acaddr, 
primary os from xprobe2_machines where primary_os != 'unknown' AND 
last tstamp time > 'Sscan time' AND ip addr NOT IN (select ip addr from 
nmap_machines where primary_os != 'unknown' AND last_tstamp_time > 'Sscan time')) 
union (select ip_addr, mac addr, primary_os from nmap machines where primary os != 
'unknown' AND last_tstamp_time > 'Sscan time') order by ip addr;";
my $select_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
Snumm achines = $select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sip, Vmy Smac, Vmy Sos);
# LOOP THROUGH RESULTS
while($select_stmt->fetch()) {
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "(select ip_addr, mac_addr, port_num, protocol from 
tcpdump_ports where syn ack = 'Y' AND ip_addr = 'Sip' AND mac addr = 'Smac' AND 
last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') union (select nm apm achines.ipaddr, 
nm apm achines.m acaddr, nmap_ports.port_num, nmap_ports.protocol from 
nmap machines, nmapjports where nm apm achines.m achineid = 
nmap_ports.machine_id AND nmap machines.ip addr = 'Sip' AND 
nmap machines.mac addr = 'Smac' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') union (select 
xprobe2_machines.ip_addr, xprobe2_machines.mac_addr, xprobe2_ports.port_num, 
xprobe2 jports.protocol from xprobe2_machines, xprobe2_ports where 
xprobe2_machines.machine_id = xprobe2_ports.machine_id AND 
xprobe2_machines.ip_addr = 'Sip' AND xprobe2_machines.mac_addr = 'Smac' AND 
last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') order by ip addr, port num, protocol;";
my $select_stmt2 = $dbh->prepare($query2);
Snum services = $select_stmt2->execute() + Snumservices;
$select_stmt2->fmish;
}
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$select_stmt->finish;
Scurrentcount = $num machines + Snumservices;
if (Shoneypotdeploy eq "N")
{
# Check to see if threshold has been reached to create honeyd config 
(initial deployment)
if (Snummachines >= Sinitialdeployment)
{
db_insert_updates($num_machines, Snum services, Sdbh);
honeyd_ip_manipulation();
output_honeyd_config_xml($dbh);
$honeypot_deploy = "Y";
my Stemp = ($current_count * ($percent_change / 100)); 
S pcthresho ld low  = $current_count - Stemp; 
$pc_threshold_high = Scurrentcount + Stemp;
}
} else {
# Check to see if threshold has been reached to re-create honeyd config 
(re-deployment)
if ($current_count >= Spc threshold high || Scurrent count <= 
$pc_threshold_low)
{
db_insert_updates($num_machines, $num_services, Sdbh); 
honeyd_ip_manipulation(); 
output_honeyd_config_xml(Sdbh); 
my Stemp = (Scurrent count * ($percent_change /100));
Spc threshold low = Scurrent count - Stemp; 
$pc_threshold_high = Scurrentcount + Stemp;
}
}
}
# Check for a valid MAC address, 
sub mac_chkmac($$)
{ my (Smac) = $ [0] =~ m/($_[l])/;
return undef unless Smac;
# Check that bytes are in range 
for (split A:/, Smac ) {
return undef if $_ !~ m/(0|l|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9|a|b|c|d|e|f)/i;
}
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return Smac;
# Check for a valid IPv4 address, 
sub ipv4_chkip($$)
{ my (Sip) = $_[0] =~ m/($_[l])/;
return undef unless Sip;
# Check that bytes are in range 
for (split A.|-/, S ip) {
return undef if  $_ < 0 or $_ > 255;
}
return Sip;
}
# Subroutine to manipulate IPV4 address to the correct format for scan_ip_range 
sub scan ip manipulation
{ my Sip_rgx2 -  'A\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}$';
my Sip_rgx3 = ,A\d [1,3} \-\d {1,3} \-Nd {1,3} S'; 
my Sip_rgx4 = ’A\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} S’; 
my $ip_range_rgx = ,A\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}-\d{l,3}$'; 
my Spattem = ,A\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} V; 
my Spattem2 = '\d {1,3} $';
my Spattem3 = ,A\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \Ad {1,3}-'; 
my Spattem4 = *-\d {1,3} S’;
my Sip = ipv4_chkip($scan_ip_range,$ip_rgx2); 
if (Sip e q ""){
my Sip = ipv4_chkip($scan_ip_range,$ip_rgx3); 
if (Sip eq ""){
my Sip = ipv4_chkip($scan_ip_range,$ip_rgx4); 
if  (Sip eq ""){
my Sip = ipv4_chkip($scan_ip_range,$ip_range_rgx); 
if  (Sip e q ""){
print "The scan ip address format in the config table
is not correct.\n"; exit;
} else {
my $ip_tcp = S scan ip ran g e ;
$ip_tcp =~ s/$pattem4//s;
S ip tcp  =~ s/$pattem2//s; chop Sip tcp; 
return Sip tcp;
}
} else { return my Sip tcp = Sscan ip range;}
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} else { return my $ip_tcp = $scan_ip_range;}
} else { return my S ip tcp  = S scan iprange;}
# Subroutine to manipulate IPV4 address to the correct format for h o n ey d ip ran g e  
sub honeydipm anipulation
{ my S iprgx = ,A\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} $';
my $ip_range_rgx = rA\d{ 1,3 }V\d{ 1,3 }\.\d {1,3 }\.\d{ 1,3 }-\d{ 1,3} $';
my Spattem = IA\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}\.\d{l,3}\.';
my $pattem2 = '\d {1,3} $';
my $pattem3 = 'A\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3}
my $pattem4 = '-\d {1,3}$';
$honeyd_ip_temp = Shoneydiprange;
if (S honeydipbinding eq "iD")
{
my Shoneydip = ipv4_chkip($honeyd_ip_temp,$ip_rgx); 
if (Shoneydip == "") {print "Single IP address must be entered with the - 
iD command.Vn"; exit(l);}
}
elsif ($honeyd_ip_binding eq "iR")
{
my Shoneyd ip = ipv4_chkip($honeyd_ip_temp,$ip_range_rgx); 
if  (Shoneyd ip == "") {print "IP range must be entered with the -iR 
command.\n"; exit(l);}
$honeyd_count = S honeydip tem p;
Shoneydcount =~ s/$pattem//s;
$honeyd_count =~ s/$pattem4//s;
Shoneydm ax = S honeydip tem p;
$honeyd_max =~ s/$pattem3//s;
$honeyd_ip_temp =~ s/$pattem4//s;
}
x
# Start tcpdump_mysql.pl 
sub tcpdump scan
{ my S ip tcp  = scan_ip_manipulation();
system "peri tcpdump_mysql.pl -ip Sip tcp -i Seth interface";
}
# Start pOf_mysql.pl 
sub pOfscan
{ system "peri pOf_mysql.pl -i $eth_interface";
}
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# Start active_scan.pl 
sub activescan
{ system "peri active_scanner.pl -n Snoise -nexe Snmap exe -nxml Snmap xml -
xxml Sxprobe2_xml -t Sactivescanseconds";
}
# Write honeyd config & XML file 
sub ou tpu thoneydconfigxm l
{ my Sdbh= shift;
my Snum = 0, my Sfamily, my Spattem6 = ,A\w+', 
my Sscan time = time() - Sactive scan seconds;
if (Shoneydipbinding eq "il") {db_query_release_dhcp($dbh);}
# Looks for past_honeyd_files directory specified in the config table or creates the 
directory
my Spast honeyd config = Shoneyd config;
$past_honeyd_config =~ s/(honeyd.conf)$//s; 
if  (-d
"".$past_honeyd_config.7past_honeyd_files"){}else{mkdir($past_honeyd_config.7past 
honeyd files") || die "Unable to create past_honeyd directory <$!>\n";} 
$past_honeyd_config =~ s/$/past_honeyd_filesV/s;
# Looks for past xml files directory specified in the config table or creates the 
directory
my S pastxm lconfig  = Shoneypotxml;
$past_xml_config =~ s/(honeypot.xml)$//s; 
if  (-d
"".$past_xml_config."/past_xml_files"){}else{mkdir($past_xml_config."/past_xml_files 
") || die "Unable to create past xml directory <$!>\n";}
Spastxm l config =~ s/$/past_xml_filesV/s;
print "Starting to write the XML and honeyd config files.\n";
# Open file to be overwritten using the single greater than character 
open(HONEYDFILE, ">$honeyd_config");
print HONEYDFILE "\##### Honeyd Configuration File ######\n"; 
print HONEYDFILE "\##### " ,localtime()." #####\n\n\n"; 
print HONEYDFILE
"\####################################################################";
# Open file to be overwritten using the single greater than character
}
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open(XMLFILE, ">$honeypot_xml"); 
print XMLFILE "<?xml veision=\"1.0\"?>\n"; 
print XMLFILE "<honeypot>\n";
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "(select ip_addr, mac addr, primary os from pOf where 
last tstamp time > '$scan_time' AND ip_addr NOT IN (select ip_addr from 
nmap_machines where primary_os != 'unknown' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') 
AND ip addr NOT IN (select ip addr from xprobe2_machines where primary os != 
'unknown' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time')) union (select ip addr, mac addr, 
primary os from xprobe2_machines where primary os != 'unknown' AND 
last tstamp time > 'Sscan time' AND ip addr NOT IN (select ip_addr from 
nmap machines where primary os != 'unknown' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time')) 
union (select ip addr, mac addr, primary_os from nmap machines where primary os != 
'unknown' AND last_tstamp_time > 'Sscan time') order by ip_addr;"; 
my $select_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sip, \my Smac, \my Sos);
# LOOP THROUGH RESULTS 
while($select_stmt->fetch()) {
my @family_arguments = split (As+/, Sos); 
if (@family_arguments[0] eq "Microsoft") {Sfamily = 
@family_arguments[ 1 ];
}else{$family = @family_arguments[0];}
print HONEYDFILE "\n\ncreate ",Sfamily,++$num."\n";
print HONEYDFILE "set ".$family."$num personality \"".$os."\"\n";
db_insert_lih_hih_link($insert_lih_info, Sos, Sip, Smac, Sdbh);
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "Select link id, l ih ip a d d r  from lih hih link where 
l ih ip a d d r  = 'Sip' AND lih mac addr = 'Smac' AND lih_os_platform = 'Sos' AND 
h ih ip a d d r  = 'unknown';";
my $select_stmt2 = Sdbh->prepare($query2);
$select_stmt2->execute();
Sselect_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stid, \my Stip);
my Slih hih id = 0;
while ($select_stmt2->fetch()) {
$lih_hih_id = Stid;
}
$select_stmt2->finish;
print XMLFILE " <target name=\"".Sfamily."$num\" ip=\"$ip\" 
mac=\"$mac\" lih_hih_id=\"$lih_hih_id\">\n";
print XMLFILE " <os_guess>\n";
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print XMLFILE " <primary> \"$os\" </primary>\n";
print XM LFILE" </os_guess>\n";
print XM LFILE" <system_information>\n";
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my $query2 = "Select ip ad d r, m acaddr, Count(*) AS Num Rst Ack 
from tcpdumpjports where rst_ack = 'Y' AND ip_addr = '$ip' AND mac addr = 'Smac' 
AND lastts tam p tim e  > '$scan_time' group by ip_addr, mac addr;"; 
my Sselect_stmt2 = $dbh->prepare($query2);
$select_stmt2->execute(); 
my S tcpreset = 0;
$select_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac, \my Srsta); 
while ($select_stmt2->fetch()) {
$tcp_reset = Srsta;
}
Sselect_stmt2->fmish; 
if($tcp_reset > 25) {
print HONEYDFILE "set ",$family."$num default tcp action
reset\n";
} else {
print HONEYDFILE "set ".$family."$num default tcp action
closed\n";
}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "Select ip ad d r, m acaddr, Count(*) AS Num UDP Reply 
from tcpdump_ports where udp_reply = 'Y' AND ip addr = 'Sip' AND mac addr = 'Smac' 
AND last tstamp time > 'Sscantim e' group by ip_addr, mac_addr;"; 
my Sselect_stmt2 = Sdbh->prepare($query2);
$select_stmt2->execute(); 
my Sudpreply = 0;
Sselect_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac, \my Sudpr); 
while (Sselect_stmt2->fetch()) {
Sudpreply  = Sudpr;
}
$ select_stmt2 ->finish; 
if($udp_reply > 25) {
print HONEYDFILE "set ",$family."$num default udp action
reset\n";
} else {
print HONEYDFILE "set ",$family."$num default udp action
closed\n";
}
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# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my $query2 = "Select ip addr, mac addr, icmp reply from tcpdump icmp 
where ip_addr = '$ip' AND mac addr = '$mac' AND last_tstamp_time > 'Sscan time' 
limit 1;";
my $select_stmt2 = $dbh->prepare($query2);
Sselect_stmt2->execute(); 
my $icmp_reply = 0;
$select_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, Vmy Stmac, Vmy Sicmp); 
while ($select_stmt2->fetch()) {
Sicm preply = Sicmp;
}
Sselect_stmt2->finish; 
if($icmp_reply eq 'Y'){
print HONEYDFILE "set ".$family."$num default icmp action
openVn";
print XMLFILE " <icmp_reply state=V"openV"/>Vn";
}else{
print HONEYDFILE "set ".Sfamily."Snum default icmp action
closedVn";
print XMLFILE " <icmp_reply state=\"closedV"/>Vn";
}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "Select ip addr, mac addr, firewall, lookup link from pOf 
where ip_addr = 'Sip' AND mac_addr = 'Smac' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time' 
limit 1;";
my $select_stmt2 = $dbh->prepare($query2); 
my Snum row s = Sselect_stmt2->execute();
Sselect_stmt2->bind_columns(Vmy Stip, Vmy Stmac, Vmy Sfire, Vmy Slook); 
while (Sselect_stmt2->fetch()) {
print XMLFILE " <firewall state=\"".$fire."\"/>\n"; 
print XMLFILE " <lookup_link state=V"".$look."V"/>Vn";
}
Sselect_stmt2->fmish; 
if (Snum rows ==0) {
print XMLFILE " <firewall state=\"no/unknown\"/>\n"; 
print XMLFILE " <lookup_link state=V"unknownV"/>Vn";
}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "Select ip_addr, mac addr, re a lt im e ta rg e ts e c  from 
xprobe2_machines where ip addr = 'Sip' AND mac addr = 'Smac' AND last_tstamp_time 
> 'Sscan time' limit 1;";
my Sselect_stmt2 = $dbh->prepare($query2);
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my Snum row s = Sselect_stmt2->execute(); 
Sselect_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac, \my Srtts); 
while (Sselect_stmt2->fetch()) {
print XM LFILE" <real_time_target_seconds 
seconds=\"Srtts. "\"/>\n";
}
Sselect_stmt2->finish; 
if ($num_rows = 0 )  {
print XM LFILE" <real_time_target_seconds 
seconds=\"unknown\7>\n";
}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 -  "Select ip addr, mac addr, uptime seconds from pOf where 
uptime_seconds != 'unknown' AND ip addr = 'Sip' AND mac addr = 'Smac' AND 
la sttstam p tim e  > 'Sscantim e' limit 1;";
my Sselect_stmt2 = Sdbh->prepare($query2); 
my Stemp = $select_stmt2->execute(); 
if (Stemp == 1) {
$select_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac, \my Supt); 
while ($select_stmt2->fetch()) {
print HONEYDFILE "set ".$family."$num uptime
".$upt."\n";
print XM LFILE" <uptime_seconds
time=\"".$upt."\"/>\n";
}
}else {
print XMLFILE " <uptime_seconds time-\"unknown\"/>\n";
}
Sselect_stmt2->finish;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery2 = "(select ip addr, mac addr, distance J io p s  from pOf where 
distance_hops != 'unknown' AND ip_addr = 'Sip' AND mac_addr = 'Smac' AND 
last tstamp time > '$scan_time') union (select ip addr, mac addr, distancehops from 
nmapmachines where distance hops != 'unknown' AND ip addr = 'Sip' AND mac addr 
= 'Smac' AND last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') limit 1;";
my Sselect_stmt2 = Sdbh->prepare($query2); 
my Stemp = $seleet_stmt2->execute(); 
if (Stemp -=  1){
$select_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac, \my Sdho); 
while (Sselect_stmt2->fetch()) {
print XM LFILE" <distance_hops
hops=\"".$dho."\"/>\n";
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}else {
print XMLFILE " <distance_hops hops=\"unknown\"/>\n";
}
$ select_stmt2 ->fmi sh;
print XM LFILE" </system_information>\n";
print XMLFILE " <port_scan>\n";
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my $query2 = "(select ip_addr, mac addr, portnum , protocol, service 
from tcpdump_ports where syn_ack = 'Y' AND ip addr = '$ip' AND mac_addr = '$mac' 
AND last_tstamp_time > '$scan_time' AND port num NOT IN (select 
nmap_ports.port_num from nmap machines, nmap_ports where 
nm apm achines.m achineid = nmap_ports.machine_id AND nmap machines.ip addr = 
'$ip' AND nmap machines.mac addr = '$mac' AND nm apm achines.lasttstam ptim e > 
'$scan_time') AND port_num NOT IN (select xprobe2_ports.port_num from 
xprobe2_machines, xprobe2_ports where xprobe2_machines.machine_id = 
xprobe2_ports.machine id AND xprobe2_machines.ip_addr = 'Sip' AND 
xprobe2_machines.mac_addr = 'Smac' AND xprobe2_machines.last_tstamp_time > 
'Sscan time')) union (select xprobe2_machines.ip_addr, xprobe2_machines.mac_addr, 
xprobe2_ports.port_num, xprobe2_ports.protocol, xprobe2_ports.service from 
xprobe2_machines, xprobe2_ports where xprobe2_machines.machine_id = 
xprobe2_ports.machine_id AND xprobe2_machines.ip_addr = 'Sip' AND 
xprobe2_machines.mac_addr = 'Smac' AND xprobe2_machines.last_tstamp_time > 
'Sscan time' AND port num NOT IN (select nmapjports.port num from 
nmap machines, nmapjports where nmap machines.machine id = 
nmap_ports.machine_id AND nmap machines.ip addr = 'Sip' AND 
nmap_machines.mac_addr = 'Smac' AND nmap_machines.last_tstamp_time >
'Sscan time')) union (select nmap_machines.ip_addr, nmap machines.mac addr, 
nmapjports.port num, nmap_ports.protocol, nmap_ports.service from nmap machines, 
nmap_ports where nmap machines.machine id = nmap_ports.machine_id AND 
nmap machines.ip addr = 'Sip' AND nmap machines.mac addr = 'Smac' AND 
nmap machines.last tstamp time > 'Sscan time') order by ip_addr, port num, protocol, 
service;";
my Sselect_stmt2 = Sdbh->prepare($query2);
my Stemp = Sselect_stmt2->execute();
if (Stemp >= 1){
Sselect_stmt2->bind_columns(\my Sip, \my Smac, \my Spn, \my
$p, \my Sser);
# LOOP THROUGH RESULTS 
while($select_stmt2->fetch()) {
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
}
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my $query3 = "select scrip tjang, path_and_filename from 
honeydscripts where primary os LIKE '$family%' AND portnum  = '$pn' AND 
protocol = '$p';";
my Sselect_stmt3 = $dbh->prepare($query3); 
Sselect_stmt3->execute();
# Assign fields to variables 
$select_stmt3->bind_columns(\my Sscriptlang, \my
Spathandfilenam e);
while ($select_stmt3->fetch()) { 
if  ($script_lang == $pattem6) {
print HONEYDFILE "add ".$family."$num ",$p." 
port ".$pn." \"$script_lang $path_and_filename\"\n";
$script_lang = 1;
}
}
if (Sscriptlang == 0) {
print HONEYDFILE "add ".$family."$num ",$p." port
".$pn." open\n";
}
$select_stmt3->finish;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my $query3 = "Select ip addr, mac addr from 
nmap machines, nmap_ports where nm apm achines.m achineid = 
nmap_ports.machine_id AND nmap machines.ip addr = '$ip' AND 
nmap machines.mac addr = '$mac' AND nmap_ports.port_num = '$pn' AND 
nmap_ports.protocol = '$p' AND nm apm achines.lasttstam ptim e > 'Sscantime';";
my $select_stmt3 = $dbh->prepare($query3); 
my $num_rows = $select_stmt3->execute(); 
Sselect_stmt3->bind_columns(\my Stip, \my Stmac); 
while (Sselect_stmt3->fetch()) {
print XMLFILE " <port number=\"".$pn."\" 
protocol=\"".$p."\" service=\"".Sser."\"/>\n";
}
$select_stmt3 ->fini sh;
}
}
Sselect_stmt2->finish;
my Spattem = ,A\d {1,3 }\.\d {1,3} \.\d {1,3} \.'; 
my Spattem2 = '\d {1,3} S';
if (Shoneyd ip binding eq "iS") {
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print HONEYDFILE "bind Sip ".$family."$num";
elsif (Shoneydipbinding  eq "iD") {
Sip =~ s/$pattem//s;
S honeyd ip tem p  =~ s/$pattem2/$ip/s;
print HONEYDFILE "bind $honeyd_ip_temp ".$family."$num";
}
elsif (Shoneyd ip binding eq "iR") {
if  (Shoneydcount >= 0 && Shoneydcount < Shoneydm ax) { 
S honeyd ip tem p  =~ s/$pattem2/$honeyd_count/s;
}
if (Shoneyd count >= $honeyd_max) {
$honeyd_ip_temp =~ s/$pattem2/$honeyd_count/s; 
print HONEYDFILE "bind Shoneyd ip temp
".$family."$num";
print HONEYDFILE
"\n\n#################################################################### 
\n";
close(HONEYDFILE);
print "The honeyd config file is complete !\n";
print XM LFILE" </port_scan>\n"; 
print XM LFILE" </target>\n"; 
print XMLFILE "</honeypot>\n"; 
close(XMLFILE);
print "The xml honeypot file is complete !\n";
#This copies the current honeyd.conf file and places the 
copy in a p asth o n ey d files  folder
#located in the same folder as the config file. The copy is 
named honeyd_<currenttime>.conf.
my Scurrentconfig -  Spasthoneydconfig; 
$current_config =~ s/$/honeyd/s;
$current_config = join ('_', $current_config, time()); 
$current_config =~ s/$A.conf/s; 
copy("$honeyd_config","$current_config") or die 
"Copying honeyd.conf failed: $!";
#This copies the current honeypot.xml file and places the 
copy in a past xml files folder
#located in the same folder as the xml file. The copy is 
named honeypot_<currenttime>.xml.
my Scurrent config = $past_xml_config;
Scurrentconfig =~ s/$/honeypot/s;
}
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$current_config = join Scurrentconfig, time()); 
$current_config =~ s/$A.xml/s;
copy("$honeypot_xml","$current_config") or die "Copying
honeypot.xml failed: $!";
#Retum from output_honeyd_config since IP range is full 
return;
}
$honeyd_count++;
print HONEYDFILE "bind $honeyd_ip_temp ".$family."$num";
}
elsif (Shoneydipbinding  eq "il") {
my $first_ip, my Ssecondm ac;
(Sfirstip , Ssecond mac) = register_dhcp($mac, Sdbh);
print HONEYDFILE "set ".$family."$num ethemet
\"$second_mac\"\n";
print HONEYDFILE "bind Sfirst ip ".Sfamily."$num";
}
print XMLFILE " </port_scan>\n"; 
print XM LFILE" </target>\n";
}
$select_stmt->fmish; 
print HONEYDFILE
"\n\n #################################################################### 
\n";
close(HONEYDFILE);
print "The honeyd config file is complete !\n";
print XMLFILE "</honeypot>\n"; 
close(XMLFILE);
print "The xml honeypot file is complete!\n";
#This copies the current honeyd. conf file and places the copy in a 
past_honeyd_files folder
#located in the same folder as the config file. The copy is named 
honeyd_<currenttime>.conf.
my Scurrent config = Spasthoneydconfig;
Scurrentconfig =~ s/$/honeyd/s;
Scurrent config = join $current_config, time());
$current_config =~ s/$A.conf/s;
127
copy("$honeyd_config","$current_config") or die "Copying honeyd.conf failed: 
#This copies the current honeypot.xml file and places the copy in a p a s tx m lfile s
folder
#located in the same folder as the xml file. The copy is named 
honeypot_<currenttime>.xml.
my Scurrent config = $past_xml_config;
$current_config =~ s/$/honeypot/s;
Scurrent config = join $current_config, time());
Scurrentconfig =~ s/$A.xml/s;
copy("$honeypot_xml","$current_config") or die "Copying honeypot.xml failed:
$!";
}
sub db_query_dhcp_register 
{ my Sm actarget = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my $mac_pattem = 'A\w{2}\:\w{2}\:\w{2}\:\w{2}\:\w{2}\:'; 
my Smac_pattem2 = ’\w{2}$';
my $new_mac = $mac_target, my $last_mac, my $mac_check = 0, my 
$ran_num2 = int(rand(0xFFF));
while (Sm accheck 0)
{
$last_mac = $new_mac;
$last_mac =~ s/$mac_pattem//s; 
my Sran_num2 = int(rand(0xFFF)); 
if (hex($ran_num2) % 2) {
if ($last_mac eq '00') {
Slastm ac = 'f f ;
}else {
Slastm ac = hex(Slastm ac) -1 ;
$last_mac = sprintf("%x", Slast mac);
if (hex(Slast mac) < 16){ Slast mac = ’O'.Slastmac;}
}
} else {
if (Slast mac eq 'ff){
Slastm ac = '00';
}else {
Slast mac -  hex(Slast mac) + 1;
Slast mac = sprintf("%x", Slast mac);
if (hex(Slast mac) < 16){ Slast mac = ’O'.Slast mac;}
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}
Snewjmac = $mac_target;
Snew m ac =~ s/$mac_pattera2/$last_mac/s;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my $query -  "select d h cp id , mac addr from dhcp where mac addr = 
'Snew m ac' limit 1;";
my $select_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute(); 
my $new_mac_temp = 0;
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my $did, \my Smac); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
S n ew m actem p  = Smac;
}
$select_stmt->fmish;
if ($new_mac_temp eq 0) {$mac_check =1;}
}
return Snew mac;
I
# Register IP address through DHCP 
sub registerdhcp 
{ my Sm actarget = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my $ran_num = int(rand(OxFFFFFFFF));
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select dhcp id, ip addr from dhcp ORDER BY dhcp id DESC 
limit 1;";
my Sselect stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute(); 
my S dhcpid  = 0;
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sdid, \my Sip); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
S dhcpjd  = Sdid + 1;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
my Smac addr dhcp = db_query_dhcp_register($mac_target, Sdbh); 
my Smac addr short = Smac addr dhcp;
# Remove : from MAC address 
for (split A:/, Smac addr short) {
}
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S m acaddrsho rt =~ s/[\:]//;
# Change MAC address o f ethemet interface to new MAC for honeypots 
system 'ifconfig Sethinterface hw ether Smac addr dhcp';
#print "Opening socket\n";
my Shandle = IO::Socket::INET->new(Proto => 'udp', 
timeout => "5",
Broadcast => 0,
PeerAddr => Sdhcpserver,
PeerPort => '67',
LocalPort => '68') 
or die "Socket creation error: $@\n"; # yes, it uses $@ here
# create DHCP Packet DISCOVER
my Sdiscover = Net::DHCP::Packet->new(
Chaddr => Smac addr short,
Xid => Sran num, # random xid
DHO_DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE() => DHCPD1SC0VER());
# Send DISCOVER packet
#print "\nSending DISCOVER to ".$dhcp_server.":67\n";
#print Sdiscover->toString();
$handle->send($discover->serialize())
or die "Error sending broadcast inform:$!\n";
my Snewmsg, my Spacket; 
eval {
local $SIG{ALRM} = sub { die "alarm\n" }; # NB: \n required 
alarm 10;
# Receive response
#print "\nWaiting for response from server\n";
$handle->recv($newmsg, 4096) or die("recv:$!");
alarm 0;
};
if ($@) {
print "The DHCP discover process could not finish.\n";
print "Please check DHCP settings in config table and restart program.\n";
system "killall pOf';
system "killall tcpdump";
system "killall nmap";
}
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system "killall xprobe2"; 
system "kill $p0f_pid"; 
system "kill $tcp_pid"; 
system "kill $act_pid"; 
sleep 1; 
exit;
# timed out
}else {
Spacket = Net::DHCP::Packet->new($newmsg);
#print "Got response\n";
#print $packet->toString();
# didn't
}
# Create DHCP Packet REQUEST
my Srequest = Net:: DHCP ::Packet->new(
Chaddr => Smac addr short,
Xid => $ran_num, # random xid
DHO_DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE() => DHCPREQUEST(),
DHO_DHCP_SERVER_IDENTIFIER()=> Sdhcp server,
DHO DHCP_REQUESTED_ADDRESS() => $packet->yiaddr());
# Send REQUEST packet
#print "\nSending REQUEST to ".$dhcp_server.":67\n";
#print $request->toString();
$handle->send($request->serialize()) 
or die "Error sending:$!\n";
eval {
local $SIG{ALRM} = sub { die "alarm\n" }; # NB: \n required 
alarm 10;
# Receive response
#print "\nWaiting for response from server\n";
$handle->recv($newmsg, 4096) or die("recv:$!");
alarm 0;
};
if ($@) {
print "The DHCP discover process could not finish.\n";
print "Please check DHCP settings in config table and restart program.\n";
system "killall pOf';
system "killall tcpdump";
system "killall nmap";
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system "killall xprobe2"; 
system "kill $pOf_pid"; 
system "kill $tcp_pid"; 
system "kill $act_pid"; 
sleep 1; 
exit;
# timed out
}else {
Spacket = Net::DHCP::Packet->new($newmsg);
#print "Got response\n";
#print $packet->toString();
# didn't
}
my $ip_addr_dhcp = $packet->yiaddr(); 
my Sleasetim e = Spacket- 
>getOptionValue(DHO_DHCP_R£NEWAL_TIME());
# Close IO::Socket::INET connection 
close Shandle;
# Change MAC address of ethemet interface to original MAC address 
system 'ifconfig $eth_interface hw ether $my_mac';
db_insert_dhcp_register($insert_dhcp_register, S ip ad d rd h cp , S m acaddrdhcp , 
Slease time, $dhcp_id, Sdbh);
my @n;
$n[0] = $ip_addr_dhcp;
$n[l] — S m acaddrdhcp ; 
return @n;
}
# Insert information from registering IP address through DHCP 
sub db_insert_dhcp_register 
{ my S insertdhcpregister = shift; 
my Sip addr dhcp = shift; 
my $mac_addr_dhcp = shift; 
my Slease time = shift; 
my $dhcp_id = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my Stime = time();
my $renewal_time = Stime + Sleasetim e;
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# finalize the insert statement
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 1, $dhcp_id); # refers to the first ? in the
query
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 2, S ip ad d rd h cp ); # refers to the second ? 
in the query
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 3, uc($mac_addr_dhcp)); # refers to the third 
? in the query
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 4, Sleasetim e); 
in the query
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 5, $renewal_time); 
in the query
my Sdatecreated = date_time();
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 6, Sdate created); 
in the query
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 7, $date_created);
? in the query
my Stime = time();
$insert_dhcp_register->bind_param( 8, Stime); 
in the query
$insert_dhcp_register->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
# Find IP address to renew through DHCP 
sub db query renew dhcp
{ my Sdbh = shift; 
my Stime = time();
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select ip addr, mac addr, leasetim eseconds, 
renewal tstamp time from dhcp where renewal_tstamp_time < Stime limit 1;"; 
my Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$ select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sdip, \my Sdmac, \my Sits, \my Srett); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
if ((Sits + Srett) > Stime) {renew_dhcp($dip, Sdmac, Sdbh);}
}
$select_stmt->finish;
}
# Renew IP address through DHCP 
sub renew dhcp
{ my S ip ad d rd h cp  = shift;
# refers to the fourth ?
# refers to the fifth ?
# refers to the sixth ?
# refers to the seventh
# refers to the eighth ?
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my Smac addr dhcp = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my Srannum  = int(rand(OxFFFFFFFF));
my S m acaddrsho rt = S m acaddrdhcp ;
# Remove : from MAC address 
for (split A:/, $mac_addr_short) {
S m acaddrsho rt =~ s/[\:]//;
}
# Change MAC address o f ethemet interface to new MAC for honeypots 
system 'ifconfig Seth interface hw ether S m acad d rd h cp ';
#print "Opening socket\n";
my Shandle = IO::Socket::INET->new(Proto => ’udp’,
Broadcast => 0,
PeerAddr => Sdhcpserver,
PeerPort => '67',
LocalPort => ’68’) 
or die "Socket creation error: $@\n"; # yes, it uses $@ here
# Create DHCP Packet RENEW
my Srenew = Net::DHCP::Packet->new(
Ciaddr => S ip ad d rd h cp ,
Chaddr => $mac_addr_short,
Xid => Sran num, # random xid
DHO_DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE() => DHCPREQUEST(),
DHO_DHCP_SERVER_IDENTIFIER()=> $dhcp_server, 
DHO_DHCP_REQUESTED_ADDRESS() => $ip_addr_dhcp);
# Send RENEW packet
#print "\nSending RENEW to ",$dhcp_server.":67\n";
#print Srenew->toString();
$handle->send($renew->serialize()) 
or die "Error sending: $!\n";
my Snewmsg, my Spacket; 
eval {
local $SIG{ALRM} = sub { die "alarm\n" }; # NB: \n required 
alarm 10;
# Receive response
#print "\nWaiting for response from serverVn";
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$handle->recv($newmsg, 4096) or die("recv:$!"); 
alarm 0;
};
if ($@) {
print "The DHCP discover process could not fmish.\n";
print "Please check DHCP settings in config table and restart program.\n";
system "killall pOf
system "killall tcpdump";
system "killall nmap";
system "killall xprobe2";
system "kill $p0f_pid";
system "kill $tcp_pid";
system "kill $act_pid";
sleep 1;
exit;
# timed out
}else {
Spacket = Net::DHCP::Packet->new($newmsg);
#print "Got response\n";
#print $packet->toString();
# didn't
}
my S ipaddr = $packet->yiaddr(); 
my Slease time = Spacket- 
>getOptionValue(DHO_DHCP_RENEWAL_TIME());
# Close IO::Socket::INET connection 
close Shandle;
# Change MAC address of ethemet interface to original MAC address 
system 'ifconfig Seth interface hw ether Sm ym ac ';
db_update_dhcp_renew($ip_addr_dhcp, Smac addr dhcp, Slease time, Sdbh);
}
# Update information from renewing IP address through DHCP 
sub d b u p d a ted h cp ren ew  
{ my Sip addr dhcp = shift; 
my Smac addr dhcp = shift; 
my Slease time = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
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my Slasttstam p = datetim eQ ; 
my Stime = time();
my Srenewaltime = Stime + $lease_time;
my Squery = "update dhcp set lease tim eseconds = 'Slease time', 
renewal tstamp time = '$renewal_time', last_tstamp = 'Slasttstam p', last tstamp time = 
'Stime' where ip addr = 'Sip addr dhcp' AND mac addr = '$mac_addr_dhcp';"; 
my $update_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$update_stmt->execute();
it
# Find IP address to release through DHCP 
sub d b q u e ry re leased h cp
{ my Sdbh = shift; 
my Snum rows;
do
{
# Prepare and Execute DB Query 
my Squery = "select * from dhcp;";
my Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$num_rows = $select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->fmish;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select ip addr, mac addr from dhcp limit 1;"; 
my Sselect stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sdip, \my Sdmac); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
release_dhcp($dip, Sdmac, Sdbh);
}
$select_stmt->fmish;
}while($num_rows > 0);
}
# Release IP address through DHCP 
sub releasedhcp
{ my Sip_addr_dhcp = shift; 
my Smac addr dhcp = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my Sran num = int(rand(OxFFFFFFFF));
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my Smac addr short = Smac addr dhcp;
# Remove : from MAC address 
for (split A:/, $mac_addr_short) {
$mac_addr_short =~ s/[\:]//;
}
# Change MAC address of ethemet interface to new MAC for honeypots 
system 'ifconfig Sethinterface hw ether Smac addr dhcp';
#print "Opening socket\n";
my Shandle = 10:: Socket ::INET->new(Proto => 'udp',
Broadcast => 0,
PeerAddr => Sdhcpserver,
PeerPort => '67',
LocalPort => '68') 
or die "Socket creation error: $@\n"; # yes, it uses $@ here
# Create DHCP Packet RELEASE
my Srelease = Net::DHCP::Packet->new(
Ciaddr => Sip addr dhcp,
Chaddr => Smac addr short,
Xid — $ran num, H random xid
Flags => 0x8000, # ask for broadcast answer 
DHO_DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE() => DHCPRELEASEQ,
DHO_DHCP_SERVER_IDENTIFIER()=> Sdhcp server);
# Send RELEASE packet
#print "\nSending RELEASE to ".$dhcp_server.":67\n";
#print $release->toString();
$handle->send($release->serialize()) 
or die "Error sending:$!\n";
# Close IO::Socket::INET connection 
close Shandle;
# Change MAC address of ethemet interface to original MAC address 
system 'ifconfig Seth interface hw ether Smy mac';
db_delete_dhcp_release($ip_addr_dhcp, Smac addr dhcp, Sdbh);
# Delete information from releasing IP address through DHCP 
sub d b d e le ted h cp re lease  
{ my $ip_addr_dhcp = shift;
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my $mac_addr_dhcp = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my Squery = "delete from dhcp where ip addr = 'Sip addr dhcp' AND mac addr 
= 'Sm acaddrdhcp ';";
my Sdeletestm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$delete_stmt->execute();
}
# Insert information for the LIHoneypot 
sub db_insert_lih_hih_link 
{ my S in se rtlih in fo  = shift; 
my $os_lih shift; 
my $ip_addr_lih = shift; 
my S m acad d rlih  = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
my Sosh ih  = "unknown"; 
my S ip a d d rh ih  = "unknown"; 
my $mac_addr_hih = "unknown"; 
my Slocationhih = "unknown"; 
my Sstatehih = "unknown";
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 1, $os_lih); # refers to the first ? in the query 
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 2, Sip addr lih); # refers to the second ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 3, uc(Smac addr lih)); # refers to the third ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 4, Sos hih); # refers to the fourth ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 5, Sip addr hih); # refers to the fifth ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 6, Smac addr hih); # refers to the sixth ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->bindjparam( 7, Slocation hih); # refers to the seventh ? in 
the query
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 8, Sstate hih); # refers to the eighth ? in the
query
my $date_created = date_time();
$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 9, Sdate created); # refers to the ninth ? in the
query
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$insert_lih_info->bind_param( 10, Sdate created); # refers to the tenth ? in the
query
$insert_lih_info->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
}
sub date time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec); 
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my Shour, my SdayOfMonth, my Smonth, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfYear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtime(); 
my Syear = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my Sfixedm onth = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "SweekDays[$dayOfWeek] $months[$month] SdayOfMonth 
$hour:$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-Sfixed month-SdayOfMonth Shour:Sminute:Ssecond";
}
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POf_mysql.pl
#! /usr/bin/perl
#pOf_mysql.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007
#This version currently works with pOf v2.0.8
use strict; 
use Getopt::Long; 
use vars qw(%G); 
use DBI;
#Global Variables
my $my_ip, my $machine_id, my $mac_addr, my $ firewall, my Slookuplink, 
my $distance_hops, my $uptime_hours, my $uptime_seconds, my $primary_os;
GetOptions('i=s' =>\$G{i}); # Ethernet interface utilized to capture packets
#
if($G{i} e q ") {print "Please use the following option \"-i ethemet interface\"\n"; exit(0);}
# Find ip address of ethemet interface
$my_ip = Vsbin/ifconfig $G{i} |grep inet |cut -d " -f 12|cut -d V -f  2 '; chomp $my_ip; 
chomp $my_ip;
# Connect to Database
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
# prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later
my $insert_pOf = $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO pOf (ip addr, mac addr, primary os, 
firewall, lookup link, uptime seconds, distance hops, date created, last tstamp, 
last tstamp time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);");
db_threads($dbh);
open(P0FIN, "pOf -i $G{i} -p -11") || die "pOf could not be opened"; 
while (<P0FIN>) {
my Smachine id = 0;
my $input_p0f = <P0FIN>;
my ©arguments = split (As+/, $input_p0f);
my $ip_addr = @arguments[0];
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my Spattem = '\:\d {1,5} S';
S ipadd r =~ s/$pattem//s;
my $mac_pattem = '(([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]:){5}([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]))';
my @arping = 'arping -f $ip_addr>&l'; 
my Sline = @arping[l];
Sline =~ /$mac_pattem/; chop Sline; my Sm acaddr = $1;
if($input_pOf =~m/(firewall!)/i){$firewall = ’yes1;} else {Sfirewall = 
’no/unknown’;}
if($input_pOf =~ m/link: (.*)\)/i){$lookup_link = $1;} else {$lookup_link = 
’unknown’;}
if($input_pOf =~ m/up: (.*)hrs/i && Sfirewall eq ’no/unknown’)
{
Suptimejhours = $1; chop Suptimehours;
$uptime_seconds = Suptime hours * 3600;
$input_p0f =~ mA- (.*) \(up:/i;
Sprim aryos = $ 1;
}elsif (Sinput_pOf =~ m/up: (.*)hrs/i)
{
$uptime_hours = $1; chop $uptime_hours;
$uptime_seconds = Suptime hours * 3600;
$input_p0f =~ m/V (.*) \(firewall/i;
$primary_os = $ 1;
}else{
$uptime_seconds = ’unknown’;
$input_p0f =~ m/V (.*) \-\>/i;
Sprim aryos = $1;
}
if($input_p0f =~ m/distance (.*)\,/i){$distance_hops = $1;} else {$distance_hops 
= ’unknown’;}
$machine_id = db_query_p0f($ip_addr, Smac addr, Sprimary os, Sdbh);
if (Sip addr eq Smy ip) {
}else{
if (Sm achineid ==0){
db_insert_p0f($insert_p0f, Sip addr, Smac addr, Sprimary os, 
Sfirewall, $lookup_link, $uptime_seconds, $distance_hops, Sdbh);
}else{
my Slast tstamp = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Squery = "update pOf set last tstamp = ’Slast tstamp’, 
la s tts tam p tim e  = ’Stime’ where m achineid  = ’Sm achineid’;";
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
141
$update_stmt->execute();
}
}
}
# Disconnect from Database 
$dbh->disconnect();
print "POf disconnected from Database.\n"; 
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect to db
{ # Database Information
my $db="honeypot_seanner"; 
my $userid="root"; 
my Spasswd-'rootpass"; 
my $connectionInfo="dbi :mysql: $db";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBl->connect($connectionlnfo,$userid,Spasswd, { 
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
sub db_threads 
{ my Sdbh = shift;
my Sthrnam e = "pOfscan";
my $thr_pid = $$;
my Slast tstamp = date_time();
my Squery = "update threads set thr_pid = '$thr_pid', last tstamp = '$last_tstamp' 
where thr_name = 'Sthr name';";
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$update_stmt->execute();
sub db_query_pOf 
{ my $ip_addr = shift; 
my Sm acaddr = shift; 
my Sprimary os = shift;
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my Sdbh = shift;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select machine id, last tstamp from pOf where ip_addr = 'S ipaddr' 
AND mac addr = 'Sm acaddr' AND primary os = 'Sprim aryos';"; 
my Sselect stmt = $dbh->prepare(Squery);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my S m id , \my Sits); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sm achineid = S m id ;
}
$select_stmt->fmish; 
return Smachine id;
}
sub db_insert_pOf 
{ my $insert_pOf= shift; 
my Sip addr = shift; 
my Smac addr = shift; 
my Sprimary os = shift; 
my Sfirewall = shift; 
my Slookuplink = shift; 
my Suptimeseconds = shift; 
my $distance_hops = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift;
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 1, Sip addr); # refers to the first ? in the query 
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 2, $mac_addr); # refers to the second ? in the query 
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 3, Sprimary os); # refers to the third ? in the query 
$insert_pOf->bind__param( 4, Sfirewall); # refers to the fourth ? in the
query
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 5, $lookup_link); # refers to the fifth ? in the
query
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 6, Suptime seconds); # refers to the sixth ? in the
query
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 7, Sdistance hops); # refers to the seventh ? in
the query
my $date_created = date_time();
Sinsert_pOf->bind_param( 8, Sdate created); # refers to the eighth ? in the
query
$insert_pOf->bind_param( 9, Sdate created); # refers to the ninth ? in the
query
143
my Stime = time();
Sinsert_pOf->bind_param( 10, Stime); # refers to the tenth ? in the
query
SinsertjpOf->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
}
sub date time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec); 
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my Shour, my SdayOfMonth, my Smonth, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfYear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtimeQ; 
my Syear = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my Sfixedm onth = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "SweekDays[$dayOfWeek] $months[$month] SdayOfMonth 
$hour:$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-Sfixed month-SdayOfMonth $hour:$minute:$second";
}
144
Tcpdump_mysql.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl
#tcpdump_mysql.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007-2011
use strict; 
use Getopt::Long; 
use vars qw(%G); 
use DBI;
#Global Variables
my $machine_id, my Sport, my Sreply, my Sselect stmt, my Snoise, my $nmap_exe, my 
Sxprobe2_xml,
my Sprotocol, my Sport num, my Ssyn ack, my Srst ack, my $udp_reply;
GetOptions('ip=s' =>\$G{ip}, # IP address(es) from which to gather
infomration #
'i=s' =>\$G{i}); # Ethemet interface utilized to capture packets
#
if($G{ip} eq " || $G{i} eq ") {print "Please use the following option \"-ip 
XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX (see Y'man tcpdump\" for more information) -i ethemet 
interface\"\n"; exit(O);}
# Find ip address of ethemet interface
my Smy_ip = Vsbin/ifconfig $G{i} |grep inet |cut - d ' '  -f 12|cut -d -f 2 '; chomp 
Sm yip; chomp Sm yip ;
# Connect to Database
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
# prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later
my Sinsert_tcpdump_ports= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO tcpdump_ports (ip addr, 
mac addr, port num, protocol, service, extra info, syn ack, rst ack, udp reply, 
datecreated, last_tstamp, last tstamp time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);"); 
my Sinsert_tcpdump_icmp= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO tcpdum picm p (ip addr, 
mac addr, icmp reply, date_created, last tstamp, last tstamp time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 
?, ?);");
my $insert_queue= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO scan queue (ip addr, mac addr, 
date created, last_tstamp_time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?);");
dbthreads(Sdbh);
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select ((select (my $input_tcp), $|=1) [0]); 
select ((select (my Stcpfile), $|=1) [0]);
open (Stcpfile, ">/home/user/Documents/phasel_hs/tcpdump_".time().M" || die "The
TCPDUMP file could not be opened");
print Stcpfile "\##### tcpdump File ######\n";
print Stcpfile "\##### " .localtime()." #####\n\n\n";
print Stcpfile
"\####################################################################\n"
open(TCPIN, "tcpdump -nne -i $G{i} src net $G{ip} and not src S m y ip  |") || die 
"TCPDUMP could not be opened"; 
while (<TCPIN>) {
Sm achineid = 0;
Sinputtcp = <TCPIN>;
my ©arguments = split (/\s+/, Sinput tcp);
if (@arguments[5] eq "IPv4"){
my $mac_addr = @arguments[lj; 
my @array = split (A./, @arguments[9]);
my Sip addr = join ('.', @array[0], @array[l], @array[2], @array[3]); 
if ($ip_addr ne Smy ip) {
db_active_scan_queue($insert_queue, $ip_addr, Smac addr,
Sdbh);
if($input_tcp =~ mAs+(ICMP)\s+(echo)\s+(reply,)\s+/){ 
my $icmp_reply = "Y";
db_insert_tcpdump_icmp($insert_tcpdump_icmp,
Sip addr, Smac addr, $icmp_reply, Sdbh, Stcpfile, Sinput tcp);
}else{
if($input_tcp =~ mAs+(UDP)\s+/) {
Sprotocol = 'udp';
$port_num = @array[4];
Ssynack  = "N"; Srst ack = "N";$udp_reply = "Y"; 
db_query_services(Sinsert_tcpdump_ports,
Sip addr, Smac addr, $port_num, Sprotocol, Ssyn ack, Srst ack, Sudp reply, Sdbh, 
Stcpfile, Sinput tcp);
}elsif($input_tcp =~ mA[(S|R)\.\]/){
if($input_tcp =~ mAs+(ack)\s+/) {
Sprotocol = 'tcp';
Sport_num -  @array[4]; 
if($input_tcp =~ mA[R\.\]/){
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Ssynack  = "N"; S rstack  = "Y";
$udp_reply = "N";
}else{
Ssyn ack = "Y"; Srst ack = "N";
$udp_reply -  "N";
}
db_query_services($insert_tcpdump_ports, 
$ip_addr, $mac_addr, $port_num, Sprotocol, $syn_ack, $rst_ack, Sudp reply, Sdbh, 
Stcpfile, Sinput tcp);
}
}
}
}
}
print Stcpfile
"\n\n####################################################################  
\n";
close(Stcpfile);
# Disconnect from Database 
$dbh->disconnect();
print "TCPdump disconnected from Database.\n"; 
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect to db
{ # Database Information
my $db-'honeypot_scanner"; 
my Suserid-'root"; 
my $passwd="rootpass"; 
my Sconnecti on lnfo-'db i: mysq 1: Sdb";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBI->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,Spasswd, {
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
}
sub db threads
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{ my Sdbh = shift;
my Sthr name = "tcpdumpscan";
my $thr_pid = $$;
my Slast tstamp = date_time();
my Squery = "update threads set thr_pid -  '$thr_pid', lasttstam p = 'Slast tstamp' 
where th rnam e = 'Sthrnam e';";
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare(Squery);
$update_stmt->execute();
}
sub d b in serttcp d u m p icm p  
{ my $di_insert_tcpdump_icmp = shift;
my $di_ip_addr = shift; 
my S d im ac a d d r = shift; 
my S d iicm p rep ly  = shift; 
my Sdidbh  = shift; 
my Sditcpfile = shift; 
my S d iin p u ttcp  = shift;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query to see if  information has already been added 
my Squery = "select date created, icmp_reply from tcpdump_icmp where ip addr 
= 'S d iip a d d r ' AND mac addr = '$di_mac_addr' AND icm preply  = 'Sdi icmp reply';"; 
$select_stmt = $di_dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sdc, \my $r); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sreply = $r;
}
$select_stmt->finish; 
if  (Sreply eq $di_icmp_reply)
{
my Slast tstamp = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Squery = "update tcpdump icmp set last tstamp = 'Slast tstamp', 
last tstamp time = 'Stime' where ip_addr = 'Sdi ip addr' AND mac addr =
'Sdi mac addr' AND icmp reply = 'Sdi icmp reply';";
my $update_stmt = $di_dbh->prepare($query);
$update_stmt->execute();
}else{
print Sdi input tcp;
print Sdi tcpfile "Sdi input tcp";
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# finalize the insert statement
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 1, S d iip a d d r) ; # refers to the 
first ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 2, uc($di_mac_addr)); # refers to 
the second ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 3, $di_icmp_reply); # refers to 
the third ? in the query
my Sdate created = date_time();
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 4, Sdate created); # refers to the 
fourth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 5, Sdate created); # refers to the 
fifth ? in the query
my Stime = time();
Sdi_insert_tcpdump_icmp->bind_param( 6, Stime); # refers to the
sixth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_icmp->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
}
}
sub db query services 
{ my $di_insert_tcpdump_ports = shift; 
my S d iip a d d r  = shift; 
my S d im a c a d d r = shift; 
my $di_port_num = shift; 
my $di_protocol = shift; 
my S d is y n a c k  = shift; 
my $di_rst_ack = shift; 
my S d iu d p rep ly  = shift; 
my $di_dbh = shift; 
my $di_tcpfile = shift; 
my Sdi input tcp = shift;
my $service="; 
my $extra_info=";
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select service, extra info from nmap_services where port num = 
'$di_port_num' AND protocol = 'Sdijrotocol';";
$select_stmt -  $di_dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my $s, \my Sei); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
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Sservice = $s;
$extra_info = $ei;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
if (Sservice n e "){
if (Sextrainfo eq "){$extra_info = 'unknown';}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query to see if information has already been
added
my Squery = "select date_created, port_num from tcpdump_ports where 
ip addr = 'Sdi ip addr' AND mac addr = 'Sdi mac addr' AND p o rtn u m  = 
'$di_port_num' AND syn_ack = '$di_syn_ack' AND rst_ack = 'Sdi rst ack' AND 
udprep ly  = '$di_udp_reply';";
$select_stmt = $di_dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sdc, \my $p); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sport - $p;
}
$select_stmt->fmish; 
if (Sport == $di_port_num)
{
my Slast tstamp = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Squery = "update tcpdump_ports set last tstamp =
'Slast tstamp', last_tstamp_time = 'Stime' where ip addr = 'Sdi ip addr' AND mac addr 
= 'Sdi mac addr' AND port_num = '$di_port_num' AND syn ack = 'Sdi syn ack' AND 
rst_ack = '$di_rst_ack' AND udp_reply = '$di_udp_reply';";
my Supdatestm t = $di_dbh->prepare($query); 
$update_stmt->execute();
}else{ 
print Sdi input tcp;
print "The ip addr: Sdi ip addr, protocol: $di_protocol, port num: $di_port_num,
service: $service\n";
print $di_tcpfile $di_input_tcp;
print $di_tcpfile "The ip addr: Sdi ip addr, protocol: Sdijprotocol, port_num: 
$di_port_num, service: $service\n";
# finalize the insert statement
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 1, Sdi ip addr); # refers 
to the first ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 2, uc(Sdi mac addr)); # 
refers to the second ? in the query
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$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 3, $di_port_num); # 
refers to the third ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump__ports->bind_param( 4, $di_protocol); # refers 
to the fourth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 5, Sservice); # 
refers to the fifth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump__ports->bind_param( 6, Sextra info); # 
refers to the sixth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 7, $di_syn_ack); # 
refers to the seventh ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 8, Sdi rst ack); # 
refers to the eighth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 9, Sdi udp reply); # 
refers to the ninth ? in the query
my $date_created = date_time();
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 10, Sdate created); # 
refers to the tenth ? in the query
Sdi insert tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 11, Sdate created); # 
refers to the eleventh ? in the query
my Stime = time();
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->bind_param( 12, Stime);
# refers to the twelfth ? in the query
$di_insert_tcpdump_ports->execute(); # excute the SQL
statement
}
}
}
sub d b a c tiv e sca n q u e u e  
{ my $da_insert_queue = shift; 
my $da_ip_addr = shift; 
my S d a m a ca d d r = shift; 
my $da_dbh = shift;
my Sscanid;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select scan_id, ip addr from scan_queue where ip addr = 
'$da_ip_addr' AND mac addr = 'Sda mac addr';";
$select_stmt = $da_dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my $s id, \my Sip); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
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S scanid  = $s_id;
}
$select_stmt->fmish;
if (Sscan_id !=") {return;} 
else{
# finalize the insert statement
$da_insert_queue->bind_param( 1, Sda ip addr); # refers to the first ?
in the query
$da_insert_queue->bind_param( 2, S d am acad d r); # refers to the
second ? in the query
my Sdate created = date_time();
$da_insert_queue->bind_param( 3, $date_created); # refers to the
third ? in the query
my Stime = time();
$da_insert_queue->bind_param( 4, Stime); # refers to the
fourth ? in the query
$da_insert_queue->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
}
}
sub date time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec); 
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my Shour, my SdayOfMonth, my Smonth, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfYear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtime(); 
my Syear = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my Sfixedm onth = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "SweekDays[$dayOfWeek] Smonths[Smonth] SdayOfMonth 
$hour:$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-$fixed_month-$dayOfMonth $hour:$minute:$second";
}
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Active_scanner.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl
#active_scanner.pl by Chris Hecker, 2008
use strict; 
use Getopt::Long; 
use vars qw(%G); 
use DBI;
#Global Variables
my Sip addr, my Smac addr, my $select_stmt, my Snoise, my Shs time, my Snm apexe, 
my Snm apxm l, my Sxprobe2_xml, my $scan_id;
#n, nexe, xxml and t are coming from honeypot_scanner.pl 
GetOptions('n=s' =>\$G{n}, # Noise Level selector
#
'nexe=s' => \$G{nexe},# Nmap.exepath
#
'nxml=s' => \$G{nxml}, # Nmap output XML path
#
'xxml=s' => \$G{xxml}, # Xprobe2 output XML path
#
't=s' =>\$G{t}); # Time between active re-scans of known machines
(seconds) #
if($G{n} eq 'low' || $G{n} eq 'medium' || $G{n} eq 'medium-high' || $G{n} eq 'high')
{
Snoise = $G{n};
}else {print "A noise level must be selected, please use the following options \"-n (low || 
medium || medium-high || high)\"\n"; exit;}
if($G{nexe} eq " || $G{nxml} e q " || $G{xxml} e q ")
{ print "Please use the following options \"-nexe /nmap.exe path -nxml /nmap
output.xml path -xxml /xprobe2 output.xml path for active scanning programs\"\n"; 
exitQ;
}else {Snmap exe = $G{nexe}; $nmap_xml = $G{nxml}; Sxprobe2_xml = $G{xxml};} 
if($G{t} eq ")
{ print "Please use the following option \"-t (time in seconds between re-scanning
machines)\"\n"; 
exitQ;
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}else {$hs_time = $G{t};}
print "ActiveScanner - active scanning utility\n";
# Connect to Database
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
dbthreads(Sdbh); 
while (1){
db_active_scan_queue($dbh);
if (Sip addr !=")
{
if (Snoise eq 'low') {
xprobe2_scanl ($ip_addr, $mac_addr);
}
elsif (Snoise eq 'medium')!
xprobe2_scan2($ip_addr, $mac_addr);
}
elsif (Snoise eq 'medium-high') {
nmap_scan($ip_addr, Smac addr);
}
elsif (Snoise eq 'high') {
nmap_scan($ip_addr, $mac_addr); 
xprobe2_scan2($ip_addr, $mac_addr);
}
}
}
# Disconnect from Database 
$dbh->disconnect();
print "Active_scan disconnected from Database.\n"; 
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect to db
{ # Database Information
my $db="honeypot_scanner"; 
my $userid="root"; 
my $passwd="rootpass"; 
my $connection!nfo="dbi :mysql: Sdb";
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# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBI->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,Spasswd, { 
RaiseError=> 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
sub db_threads 
{ my Sdbh = shift;
my Sthr name = "active scan";
my $thr_pid = $$;
my Slast tstamp = date_time();
my Squery = "update threads set thrjpid = '$thr_pid', last_tstamp = 'Slast tstamp' 
where th rnam e = 'Sthrnam e';";
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$update_stmt->execute();
}
sub d b a c tiv e sc a n q u e u e  
{ my Sdbh = shift;
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select scan id, ip addr, mac addr from scan queue limit 1;"; 
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Ss id, \my Sip, \my Smac); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
S scan id  = S s id ;
S ipadd r = Sip;
$mac_addr = Smac;
}
$select_stmt->fmish;
my Squery = "delete from scan_queue where scan_id = '$scan_id';"; 
my Sdelete stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$delete_stmt->execute();
}
sub xprobe2_scanl 
{ my Sip addr = shift;
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my $mac_addr = shift;
system "peri xprobe2_mysql.pl -mip Sip addr -mac Smac addr -t S hstim e -o 
$xprobe2_xml -ip Sip addr";
}
sub xprobe2_scan2 
{ my $ip_addr = shift; 
my Smac addr = shift;
system "peri xprobe2_mysql.pl -mip $ip_addr -mac Smac addr -t Shs time -o 
$xprobe2_xml -p 1 -ip Sip addr";
}
sub nm apscan 
{ my $ip_addr = shift;
my Smac addr = shift;
system "peri nmap_mysql.pl -mip Sip addr -mac Smac addr -t Shs time -o 
Snmap xml -nmap Snmap exe -ip Sip addr";
}
sub date_time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec);
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my Shour, my SdayOfMonth, my Smonth, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfYear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtime(); 
my Syear = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my $fixed_month = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "SweekDays[$dayOfWeek] Smonths[Smonth] SdayOfMonth 
$hour:$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-Sfixed month-SdayOfMonth $hour:$minute:$second";
}
156
Nmap_mysql.pl
#! /usr/bin/perl
#nmap_mysql.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007 
#modified scan.pl written by Anthony G. Persaud
#This version currently works with nmap v5.51
use strict;
use Getopt::Long;
use vars qw(%G);
use DB1;
use XML::Twig;
#Global Variables
my Sselectstm t, my $state, my $machine_id=0, my $as_ip_addr, my $as_mac_addr, my 
Shstim e;
#t, mip and mac are coming from active_scanner.pl but are not necessary 
GetOptions( 'nmap=s' => \$G{nmap}, # Nmap.exe path
#
'o=s' =>\$G{o}, # Nmap output XML path
#
'ip=s' => \$G {ip}, # IP address that Nmap will be
scanning #
't—s’ =>\$G{t}, # Time between active re-scans of
known machines (seconds) #
'mip=s' => \$G{mip}, # IP address passed from active
scanner (scan queue) #
'm ac=s'->  \$G{mac}); # MAC address passed from
active scanner (scan queue) #
if($G{nmap} eq " || $G{o} eq " || SG{ip} eq ")
{print "Please use the following options \"-nmap /nmap.exe path -o /nmap.xml 
(path) -ip XXX.XXX.XXX.XXXYV'; exit(0);}
if($G{mip} e q " || $G{mac} e q " || $G{t} eq "){$as_ip_addr = "unknown";} 
else {$as_ip_addr = $G{mip}; $as_mac_addr = $G{mac}; Shs time = $G{t};}
my $dbh= connect_to_db(); # Connect to
Database
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if ($as_ip_addr ne 'unknown') {db_query_machines($as_ip_addr, $as_mac_addr, 
Shstim e, Sdbh);}
print "\nNmap_mysql.pl - (Nmap active scanner)\n",('-'x80),"\n\n";
print "UsingNmap exe (".$G{nmap}.") for TCP/UDP scans on ".$G{ip}." then inserts
data into mysql database.\n\n";
# prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later 
my $insert_machines= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO nmap machines (ip_addr, state, 
mac addr, mac vendor, prim aryos, distance hops, date created, last tstamp, 
last_tstamp_time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);");
my $insert_machines_down= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO nmap machines (ip addr,
state, mac_addr, date_created, last_tstamp, last tstamp time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?,
?);");
my $insert_ports= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO nmap_ports (machine_id, port num, 
protocol, service, product) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?);");
system "nmap -sT -sU -T4 -sV -O -oX $G{o} --host-timeout 180 $G{ip}"; 
print "\n";
my Stwig 0= new XML::Twig( twig_handlers => { nmaprun =>
\&insert_row_machinesl});
$twig_0->parsefile($G{o});
$twig_0->purge; # delete the
twig so far
my $twig_l= new XML::Twig( tw ighandlers => { host => \&insert_row_machines2}); 
$twig_ 1 ->parsefile($G {o});
$twig_l->purge; # delete the
twig so far
my $twig_2= new XML::Twig( twig handlers => { port => \&insert_row_ports}); 
$twig_2->parsefile($G{o});
$twig_2->purge; # delete the
twig so far
$dbh->disconnect(); # Disconnect
from Database
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect_to_db 
{ # Database Information
my $db="honeypot_scanner";
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my $userid="root"; 
my Spasswd-'rootpass"; 
my $connectionInfo="dbi :mysql: $db";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBI->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,$passwd, { 
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
sub insert_row_machinesl 
{ my ($twig_0, $ename)=
if ($ename->descendants('host') == 0)
{
my $ip_addr= $ename->first_child('address')->att('addr');
$state= $ename->first_child('status')->att('state');
my $mac_addr= $ename->first_child('address')->next_sibling('address')-
>att('addr');
if  ($mac_addr =  0) {
my $mac_pattem = '(([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F];){5}([0-9a-fA-F][0-
9a-fA-F]))';
my @arping = 'arping -f $ip_addr>&l'; 
my Sline = @arping[l];
Sline =~ /$mac_pattem/; chop Sline;
Sm acaddr = $ 1;
}
my Sdate created = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
if($state eq ’up’) {
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_machines_down->bind__param( l,$ip_addr); #
refers to the first ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 2, Sstate); #
refers to the second ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 3, Smac addr); #
refers to the third ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 4, $date_created); # 
refers to the fourth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 5, Sdate created); #
refers to the fifth ? in the query
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$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 6, Stime); #
refers to the sixth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->execute(); # excute the SQL
statement
$twig_0->purge; # will not delete the
parent
$dbh->disconnect();
# Disconnect from Database 
exit;
}
}
}
sub insert_row_machines2 
{ my ($twig_l, $ename)=
my $ip_addr= $ename->first_child('status')->next_sibling('address')->att('addr'); 
$state= $ename->first_child('status')->att('state'); 
my $mac_addr= $ename->first_child('address')->next_sibling('address')- 
>att('addr');
if (Smac addr == 0){
my $mac_pattem = '(([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]:){5}([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-
F]))';
my @arping = 'arping -f $ip_addr>& r; 
my Sline = @arping[l];
Sline =~ /$mac_pattem/; chop Sline;
Sm acaddr = $1;
}
my Sdate created = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Smac vendor, my Sdistance, my Sprimary os; 
if($state eq 'up') {
if ($ename->descendants('address') —  0){$primary_os = 'unknown';} 
else {Smac vendor = $ename->first_child('address')- 
>next_sibling('address')->att('vendor');}
if ($ename->descendants('osmatch') == 0){$primary_os = 'unknown';} 
else {Sprimary os = $ename->first_child('os')->first_child('osmatch')-
>att('name');}
if ($ename->descendants('distance') =  0){ Sdistance = 'unknown';} 
else {Sdistance = $ename->first_child('distance')->att('value');}
Sm achineid = 0;
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# finalize the insert statement
$insert_machines->bind_param( 1, Sip addr); # refers to the
first ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 2, Sstate); # refers to the second
? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 3, Smac addr); 
third ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 4, $mac_vendor); 
fourth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 5, $primary_os); 
fifth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 6, Sdistance); 
refers to the sixth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 7, Sdate created); 
seventh ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 8, Sdate created); 
eigth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 9, Stime); 
ninth ? in the query
$insert_machines->execute(); # excute the SQL
statement
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select machine id, state from nmap machines where 
ip addr = 'Sip addr' AND mac_addr = '$mac_addr' AND last tstamp time = 'Stime';"; 
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sm id, \my Sst); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
$machine_id = S m id ;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
} else {
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 1, Sip addr); # refers to the
first ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 2, Sstate); # refers to the
second ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bindjparam( 3, Smac addr); # refers to the
third ? in the query
# refers to the
# refers to the
# refers to the
#
# refers to the
# refers to the
# refers to the
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$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 4, Sdate created); # refers to the 
fourth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down~>bindjparam( 5, Sdate created); # refers to the 
fifth ? in the query
Sinsert machines_down->bind_param( 6, Stime); # refers to the
sixth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
$twig_l ->purge; # will not delete the parent
$dbh->disconnect();
# Disconnect from Database
exit;
}
}
sub insert_row_ports 
{ my( $twig_2, $ename)= @_;
my $protocol= $ename->att('protocor); 
my $port_num= $ename->att('portid'); 
my $service= $ename->first_child('service')->att('name'); 
my Sproduct^ $ename->first_child('service')->att('product'); 
if (Sproduct eq "){$product = 'unknown';}
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select port num from nmap_ports where machine_id = 
'$machine_id' AND port_num = 'Sportnum ' AND protocol = 'Sprotocol';";
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute(); 
my $p_n = $select_stmt->fetch(); 
if  ($p_n == 0){
# finalize the insert statement
Sinsert_ports->bind_param( 1, Smachine id); #
refers to the first ? in the query
$insert_ports->bind_param( 2, Sport num); # refers to the
second ? in the query
$insert_ports->bind_param( 3, Sprotocol); # refers to the
third ? in the query
$insert_ports->bind_param( 4, Sservice); # refers to the
fourth ? in the query
$insert_ports->bind_param( 5, Sproduct); # refers to the
fifth ? in the query
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$insert_ports->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
my $last_t stamp = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Squery = "update nmap machines set last_tstamp = 'Slast tstamp', 
last_tstamp_time = 'Stime' where m achineid  = 'Smachineid';"; 
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$update_stmt->execute();
}
$select_stmt->fmish;
}
sub db query machines 
{ my $as_ip_addr = shift; 
my $as_mac_addr = shift; 
my S hstim e = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift; 
my S lasttstam ptim e; 
my Scurrenttim e = time();
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select machine id, la stts tam p tim e  from nmap machines where 
ip addr = 'S a s ip a d d r ' AND mac addr = 'Sas mac addr' order by last tstamp time desc 
limit 1;";
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my S m id , \my Sts); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sm achineid = S m id ;
$last_tstamp_time = Sts;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
my Sdifference = Scurrent time - Slast tstamp time;
if (Smachine id == 0){return;} 
else {
if (Sdifference < Shs time){exit;}
} “
sub date time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec); 
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
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(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my Shour, my SdayOfMonth, my Smonth, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfYear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtime(); 
my Syear = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my $fixed_month = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "SweekDays[$dayOfWeek] $months[$month] SdayOfMonth 
$hour:$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-Sfixed month-SdayOfMonth Shour:Sminute:$second";
}
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Xprobe2_mysql.pl
#! /usr/bin/perl
#xprobe2_mysql.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007
#This version currently works with Xprobe2 v.0.3
use strict;
use Getopt::Long;
use vars qw(%G);
use DBI;
use XML::Twig;
#Global Variables
my Sselect stmt, my $machine_id=0, my Sstate, my $as_ip_addr, my S a sm ac a d d r, my 
Shstim e;
#p, t, mip and mac are coming from active_scanner.pl but are not necessary 
GetOptions('ip=s' =>\$G{ip}, # IP address that Xprobe2 will be scanning
. #
'o=s' =>\$G{o}, # Xprobe2 output XML path
#
Increased scanning flag (1 = enabled)
Time between active re-scans of known 
IP address passed from active scanner 
# MAC address passed from active
if($G{ip} e q " || $G{o} eq "){print "Please use the following options \"-o /xprobe2.xml 
(path) -ip XXX.XXX.XXX.XXXYV; exit(0);}
if($G{mip) eq " || SGjmac} eq " || $G{t} eq "){Sas_ip_addr = "unknown";} 
else {$as_ip_addr = $G{mip}; $as_mac_addr = $G{mac}; Shs time = $G{t};}
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
# Connect to Database
if (Sas ip addr ne 'unknown') {db_query_machines($as_ip_addr, Sas mac addr,
Shs time, Sdbh);}
’p=s' => \$G{p}, #
#
't=s'
%CToAII
machines (seconds) #
'mip=s' => \$G{mip}, #
(scan_queue) #
'mac=s' => \$G{mac});
scanner (scan queue) #
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if($G{p} =  1){
system "xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o $G{o} -X -T 1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 $G{ip}";
# with port scannning
}else{
system "xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o $G{o} -X $G{ip}";
# without port scannning
}
print "\nXprobe2_mysql.pl - (Xprobe2 active scanner)\n",('-'x80),"\n\n";
print "Using Xprobe2 exe for actively scanning ".$G{ip}." then inserts data into mysql
database.\n\n";
# prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later
my $insert_machines= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO xprobe2_machines (ip_addr, 
state, mac addr, real_time_target_sec, primary_os, secondary os, datecreated, 
last_tstamp, last_tstamp_time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);"); 
my Sinsertjnaehines down^ $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO xprobe2_machines 
(ip addr, state, mac addr, date created, last_tstamp, last_tstamp_time) VALUES (?, ?, ?, 
?, ?, ?);”);
my $insert_ports= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO xprobe2__ports (machine id, 
port num, protocol, service, port_state) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?);");
my $twig_l= new XML::Twig( tw ighandlers => { Xprobe2 =>
\&insert_row_machines});
$twig_ 1 ->parsefile($G {o});
$twig_l->purge;
# delete the twig so far
if($G{p} =  1){
my $twig_2= new XML::Twig( twig handlers => { port =>
\&insert_row_ports});
$twig_2->parsefile($G{o});
$twig_2->purge;
# delete the twig so far
}
$dbh->disconnect();
# Disconnect from Database
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect_to_db
{ # Database Information
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my $db="honeypot_scanner"; 
my Suserid-'root"; 
my Spasswd-'rootpass"; 
my Sconnectionlnfo-'dbi :mysql: $db";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBl->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,Spasswd, {
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
}
sub insert row machines 
{ my( $twig_l, $ename)=
my $ip_addr= $ename->first_child('target')->att('ip');
$state= $ename->first_child('target')->first_child('reachability')- 
>first_child('state')->att('state');
my $mac_pattem = ’(([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]:){5}([0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]))'; 
my @arping = 'arping -f $ip_addr>& r; 
my Sline = @arping[l];
Sline =~ /$mac_pattem/; chop Sline; 
my $mac_addr = $ 1; 
my Sdate created = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Srtt, my Sprimary os, my Ssecondary os; 
if  (Sstate eq "up")
{
$rtt= $ename->first_child('target')->first_child('reachability')- 
>first_child('state')->next_sibling('rtt')->att('rear); 
chop Srtt; $rtt= substr($rtt, 1);
$primary_os= $ename->first_child('target')->first_child('reachability')- 
>next_sibling('os_guess')->first_child('primary')->text;
chop Sprimary os; chop Sprimary os; $primary_os= substr($primary_os, 2); 
if ($primary_os eq "){$primary_os = 'unknown';}
$secondary_os= $ename->first_child('target')->first_child('reachability') 
->next_sibling('os_guess')->first_child('primary')- 
>next_sibling('secondary')->text;
chop Ssecondary os; chop Ssecondary os; $secondary_os= 
substr($secondary_os, 2);
if ($secondary_os eq "){$secondary_os = 'unknown';}
$machine_id = 0;
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# finalize the insert statement
$insert_machines->bind_param( 1, Sip addr); # refers to the
first ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 2, Sstate); # refers to the
second ? in the query'
$insert_machines->bind_param( 3, Smac addr); # refers to the
third ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 4, Srtt); # refers to the
fourth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 5, Sprimary os); # refers to the
fifth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 6, $secondary_os); #
refers to the sixth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 7, Sdate created); # refers to the
seventh ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 8, Sdate created); # refers to the
eighth ? in the query
$insert_machines->bind_param( 9, Stime); # refers to the
ninth ? in the query
$insert_machines->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
$twig_l ->purge; # will not delete the parent
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select machine id, state from xprobe2_machines where 
ip addr = 'Sip addr' AND mac addr = 'Sm acaddr' AND last tstamp time = 'Stime';"; 
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Srn id, \my $s); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sm achineid = S m id ;
} _
$select_stmt->finish;
} else {
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 1, Sip addr); # refers to the
first ? in the query
Sinsert_machines_down->bind_param( 2, Sstate); # refers to the
second ? in the query'
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$insert_machines_down->bindjparam( 3, $mac_addr); # refers to the
third ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 4, Sdate created); # refers to the 
fourth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bindjparam( 5, $date_created); # refers to the 
fifth ? in the query
$insert_machines_down->bind_param( 6, Stime); # refers to the
sixth ? in the query
Sinsert_machines_down->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
$twig_l->purge; # will not delete the parent
$dbh->disconnect();
# Disconnect from Database 
exit;
}
sub insert_row_ports 
{ my( $twig_2, $ename)=
my $port_num= $ename->att('number'); 
my $protocol= $ename->att('proto');
my $service= $ename->att('service'); 
my $port_state= $ename->att('state');
if (Sportstate eq 'open')
{
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select port_num, port_state from xprobe2 jjo r ts  where 
machine_id = 'Smachine id' AND port num = '$port_num' AND protocol = 'Sprotocol';"; 
Sselectstm t = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my $p_n, \my Sp st);
$select_stmt->fetch(); 
if ($p_n == 0){
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_ports->bind_param( 1, $machine_id); # refers to the
first ? in the query 
? in the query 
in the query 
in the query
$insert_ports->bind_param( 2, Sport num); # refers to the second 
$insert_ports->bind_param( 3, Sprotocol); # refers to the third ? 
$insert_ports->bind_param( 4, Sservice); # refers to the fourth ?
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$insert_ports->bind_param( 5, $port_state); # refers to the fifth ?
in the query
$insert_ports->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
$twig_2->purge; # will not delete the parent
my Slast tstamp = date_time(); 
my Stime = time();
my Squery = "update xprobe2_machines set last tstamp = 
'$last_tstamp', la s tts tam p tim e  = 'Stime' where machine id = 'Smachine id';";
my Supdatestm t = $dbh->prepare($query); 
$update_stmt->execute();
}
$select_stmt->finish;
}
}
sub db query machines 
{ my $as_ip_addr = shift; 
my Sas mac addr = shift; 
my $hs_time = shift; 
my Sdbh = shift; 
my Slast tstamp time; 
my $current_time = time();
# Prepare and Execute DB Query
my Squery = "select machine id, last tstamp time from xprobe2_machines where 
ip addr = 'Sas ip addr' AND mac addr = '$as_mac_addr' order by last_tstamp_time desc 
limit 1;";
$select_stmt = $dbh->prepare($query);
$select_stmt->execute();
$select_stmt->bind_columns(\my Sm id, \my Sts); 
while ($select_stmt->fetch()) {
Sm achineid = S m id ;
S lastts tam ptim e = Sts;
}
$select_stmt->finish;
my Sdifference = Scurrent time - Slast tstamp time;
if (Smachine id == 0){return;} 
else {
if (Sdifference < $hs_time){exit;}
170
}
}
sub date time
{ my @months = qw(Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec); 
my @weekDays = qw(Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun);
(my Ssecond, my Sminute, my $hour, my SdayOfMonth, my $month, my 
SyearOffset, my SdayOfWeek, my SdayOfY ear, my SdaylightSavings) = localtime(); 
my $year = 1900 + SyearOffset; 
my Sfixedm onth = 1 + Smonth;
#my StheTime = "$weekDays[$dayOfWeek] $months[$month] SdayOfMonth 
$hour;$minute:$second Syear";
my StheTime = "Syear-$fixed_month-$dayOfMonth Shour: Sminute: Ssecond";
}
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Nmap-services_mysql.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl
#nmap-services_mysql.pl by Chris Hecker, 2007
use strict; 
use DBI;
# Connect to Database
my $dbh= connect_to_db();
# prepare the insert statement just once, the actual values will replace the ? later
my $insert_nmap_services= $dbh->prepare( "INSERT INTO nmap_services (port num, 
protocol, service, extra info) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?);");
#open the employeesfile
open (my $file,"nmap-services.txt") || die "Can't find file\n";
#assigns lines to array 
my @lines = <$file>;
#go through each line in file 
foreach my $line (@lines) {
#remove the carriage return 
chomp Sline;
#split the line between whitespace and get the different elements 
my @info = split (As+/, Sline, 4);
my Sservice = @info[0]; 
my Sport num = @info[l]; 
my @temp = split (A//, $port_num);
Sportnum  = @temp[0]; 
my Sprotocol = @temp[l]; 
my Sextrainfo = @info[3];
insert_row($port_num, Sprotocol, Sservice, Sextra info);
}
close (Sfile);
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# Disconnect from Database 
$dbh->disconnect();
exit;
# connect to the database 
sub connect to db
{ # Database Information
my $db="honeypot_scanner"; 
my Suserid-'root"; 
my $passwd="rootpass"; 
my Sconnectionlnfo-'dbi :mysql: $db";
# Make Connection to Database
my Sdbh = DBI->connect($connectionInfo,$userid,Spasswd, { 
RaiseError => 1,
AutoCommit => 0
} ) || die "Database connection not made: $DBI::errstr"; 
retum( Sdbh);
}
sub insert row
{
my Sportnum  = shift; 
my Sprotocol = shift; 
my Sservice = shift; 
my $extra_info = shift;
# finalize the insert statement
$insert_nmap_services->bind_param( 1, Sport num); # refers to the first ? in the
query
$insert_nmap_services->bind_param( 2, Sprotocol); # refers to the second ? in 
the query
$msert_nmap_services->bind_param( 3, Sservice); # refers to the third ? in the
query
$insert_nmap_services->bind_param( 4, $extra_info); # refers to the fourth ? 
in the query
$insert_nmap_services->execute(); # excute the SQL statement
}
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Appendix E: Database Statements and Schema
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Database Statements
Database
II Create Database
CREATE DATABASE honeypot scanner;
// Database control Statement
USE honeypot scanner;
Operational Tables
H Create Table: config
CREATE TABLE config (eth jn terface blob NOT NULL, mac_addr varchar(17) NOT NULL, dhcp_server 
blob NOT NULL, pOf_os blob NOT NULL, nmap_exe blob NOT NULL, nmap_prints blob NOT NULL, 
nm apassoc blob NOT NULL, xprobe2_conf blob NOT NULL, xprobe2_xml blob NOT NULL, 
honeypot xml blob NOT NULL, honeyd config blob NOT NULL, honeyd_ip_binding varchar(2) NOT 
NULL, h o n e y d ip ra n g e  blob, s c a n ip ra n g e  blob NOT NULL, initial_deployment int NOT NULL, 
percent_change int NOT NULL, noise blob NOT NULL, ac tiv escan seco n d s int NOT NULL, 
date created blob NOT NULL);
// Insert Information: config
INSERT into config (eth_interface, mac addr, dhcpserver, pO fos, nmap exe, nmap_prints, nmap assoc, 
xprobe2_conf, xprobe2_xml, honeypot_xml, honeyd_config, honeyd ip binding, h o n e y d ip ra n g e , 
s c a n ip ra n g e , initial deployment, percent_change, noise, active scan seconds, date created) values 
("ethO", "00:11:22:33:44:55", "1.2.3.4", "/usr/share/honeyd/pf.os", "/root/Downloads/Honeypot/nmap- 
4.60/nmap", "/usr/share/honeyd/nmap.prints", "/usr/share/honeyd/nmap.assoc", 
"/usr/share/honeyd/xprobe2.conf', "/root/Output_files/xprobe2_output.xml",
"/root/Output files/honeypot.xml", "/root/Output_files/honeyd.conf', "il", NULL, "1.2.3.4-5", 5, 30, "low", 
86400, "2008-4-16 16:04:05");
// Create Table: threads
CREATE TABLE threads (thread id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, thr name varchar(20) 
NOT NULL, thr__pid int NOT NULL, last tstamp blob NOT NULL);
// Insert Information: threads
INSERT into threads (thr name, thr_pid, last tstamp) values ("tcpdump scan", "0", "2008-1-9 16:04:05");
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INSERT into threads (th rnam e, thr_pid, last_tstamp) values ("pOf scan", "0", "2008-1-9 16:04:05"); 
INSERT into threads (thr_name, thr_pid, last_tstamp) values ("activescan", "0", "2008-1-9 16:04:05");
// Create Table: honeypotupdates
CREATE TABLE honeypot updates (update id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, 
num_machines int NOT NULL, num services int NOT NULL, date updated blob NOT NULL);
// Create Table: scan queue
CREATE TABLE scan_queue (scan id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, ip_addr varchar(15) 
NOT NULL, mac addr varchar( 17), date created blob NOT NULL, last tstamp time int NOT NULL);
Network Scanning Tables
II Create Table: pOf
CREATE TABLE pOf (machine_id int NOT NULL auto_increment primary key, ip addr varchar(15) NOT 
NULL, mac addr varchar( 17), primary_os blob, firewall varchar(64) NOT NULL, lookup_link 
VARCHAR(128) NOT NULL, uptim eseconds blob NOT NULL, distance_hops blob NOT NULL, 
date created blob NOT NULL, last tstamp blob NOT NULL, last tstamp time int NOT NULL);
// Create Table: tcpdump_ports
CREATE TABLE tcpdump_ports (tep id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, ip addr 
varchar(15) NOT NULL, mac addr varchar(17), port num int NOT NULL, protocol varchar(15) NOT 
NULL, service blob NOT NULL, extra info blob, syn ack varchar(l), rst ack varchar(l), udp_reply 
varchar(l), date created blob NOT NULL, last tstamp blob NOT NULL, lastts tam p time int NOT 
NULL)
// Create Table: tcpdum picm p
CREATE TABLE tcpdump icmp (tep id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, ip addr 
varchar(15) NOT NULL, mac addr varchar(17), icmp_reply varchar(l), date created blob NOT NULL, 
last tstamp blob NOT NULL, last tstamp time int NOT NULL);
// Create Table: nm apservices
CREATE TABLE nmap services (s id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, port num int NOT 
NULL, protocol varchar(15) NOT NULL, service blob NOT NULL, extra info blob);
// Create Table: nmap machines
CREATE TABLE nmap machines (machine id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, ip addr 
varchar(15) NOT NULL, state varchar(5) NOT NULL, mac addr varchar(17), mac vendor blob, 
primary os blob NOT NULL, uptime seconds blob NOT NULL, last reboot blob NOT NULL,
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distance_hops blob NOT NULL, date created blob NOT NULL, last tstamp blob NOT NULL, 
last_tstamp_time int NOT NULL);
// Create Table: nmap_ports
CREATE TABLE nmap_ports (machine_id int NOT NULL, port_num int NOT NULL, protocol 
varchar( 15) NOT NULL, service blob NOT NULL, version blob, product blob, extra info blob);
// Create Table: xprobe2_machines
CREATE TABLE xprobe2_machines (m achineid  int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, ip addr 
varchar( 15) NOT NULL, state varchar(5) NOT NULL, mac addr varchar( 17), real time target sec blob 
NOT NULL, primary_os blob NOT NULL, secondary_os blob NOT NULL, date created blob NOT 
NULL, last_tstamp blob NOT NULL, last_tstamp_time int NOT NULL);
// Create Table: xprobe2_ports
CREATE TABLE xprobe2_ports (machine id int NOT NULL, port num int NOT NULL, protocol 
varchar(15) NOT NULL, service blob NOT NULL, port state blob NOT NULL);
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// Create Table: dhcp
CREATE TABLE dhcp (d h c p jd  int NOT NULL, ip_addr varchar(15) NOT NULL, mac_addr varchar(17) 
NOT NULL, lease_time_seconds blob NOT NULL, renewal_tstamp_time blob NOT NULL, date_created 
blob NOT NULL, last tstamp blob NOT NULL, last_tstamp_time int NOT NULL);
// Create Table: honeyd_scripts
CREATE TABLE honeydscripts (script id int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, primary os 
varchar(20) NOT NULL, protocol varchar(5) NOT NULL, port num int NOT NULL, scrip tjang  
varchar(20) NOT NULL, path_and_filename blob NOT NULL);
// Insert Information: honeyd scripts
INSERT into honeyd scripts (primary os, protocol, port_num, script lang, path and filename) values 
("windows 2000", "tcp", 23, "peri", "/home/Honeyd Scripts/telnet-emul/telnet/faketelnet.pl");
//Create Table: l i h h i h l i n k
CREATE TABLE lih hih link (link_id int NOT NULL auto_increment primary key, lih_os_platform blob 
NOT NULL, lih ip addr varchar(15) NOT NULL, lih_mac_addr varchar(17) NOT NULL, 
hih_os_platform blob NOT NULL, hih ip addr varchar(15) NOT NULL, hih mac addr varchar(17) NOT 
NULL, h ih jocation blob NOT NULL, hih_state blob NOT NULL, date_created blob NOT NULL, 
last_tstamp blob NOT NULL);
High Interaction Honeypot Configuration Tables
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//Create Table: vm w aretem plate
CREATE TABLE vmware template (h ih id  int NOT NULL auto increment primary key, os platform text 
NOT NULL, location blob NOT NULL, date_created blob NOT NULL, FULLTEXT (os_platform));
//Insert Information: vmware_template
//Location starts with the datastore that is used for the VMware Server; in this case a data store called 
[standard]
//Linux Example
INSERT into vmware template (os_platform, location, date created) values ("Linux Kernel 2.6.24-19- 
generic", "[standard] Ubuntu8/Ubuntu8.vmx", "2008-11-07 16:04:05");
//Windows Example
INSERT into vmware template (osjplatform, location, date_created) values ("Microsoft Windows XP 
SP3", "[standard] Windows_XP/Windows_XP.vmx", "2008-11-09 17:04:05");
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Database Schema 
Operational Tables
Table 4, Operational Tables -  config
Field ra m e s  ■ ' < . < . - ^   ^ ; E xam ple D ata  '
ethinterface The name of the network interface that will be 
used to gather the information
ethO
mac addr MAC address o f eth interface 00:01:02:03:04:05
dhcpserver IP address o f the network DHCP server 1.2.3.4
pO fos Location of the POf fingerprinting file /honeyd/pf.os
nm apexe Location of the Nmap executable /nmap-4.60/nmap
nmap_prints Location of the Nmap fingerprinting file /honeyd/nmap.prints
nmap_assoc Location of the Nmap-Xprobe2 association file /honeyd/nmap. assoc
xprobe2_conf Location of the Xprobe2 fingerprinting file /honeyd/xprobe2.conf
xprobe2_xml Location for the output o f Xprobe2 /Output_files/xprobe2.xml
honeypotxm l Location for the resulting honey.conf file /Outputfiles/honeypot.xml
honeydconfig Location for the resulting honeypot.xml file /Outputfiles/honeyd.conf
honeyd_ip_binding Indicates the resulting IP address scheme of the 
honeyd.conf file
iS, iD, iR, or il
h o n ey d ip ran g e Used if  the honeyd_ip_binding is iD or iR and 
indicates alternate IP subnet or range
1.2.3.0 or 1.2.3.4-7
sc a n ip ra n g e IP address subnet that the user wishes to scan 1.0.0.0, 1.2.0.0, 1.2.3.0, or 
1.2.3.4
initial_deployment Threshold for the initial deployment o f  the 
configuration files
5
percentchange Threshold in percent change for the re-deployment 
o f  the configuration files
30
noise Indicates the amount o f noise introduced by the 
network scanner
passive, low, medium, 
medium-high or high
active_scan_seconds Time delay before re-scanning an identified 
machine (seconds)
86400
datecreated Date created the config table 
(format; yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
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Table 5, Operational Tables -  threads
Field nam es W k fflO e m ip lfo n
th read id Unique ID for this thread i
th rn am e Name of the thread tcpdum pscan
thr_pid Process ID (PID) for the thread 5517
lasttstam p Last timestamp o f the thread's creation (format: 
yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
Table 6, Operational Tables -  honeypot updates
ffeM eaSM S Field D escription E ia rap le  D ata
update_id Unique ID for the update 1
num machines Number of total machines identified 5
num services Number of total services gathered 5517
dateupdated Time and Date o f the last update 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
Table 7, Operational Tables -  scan queue
, , , . , x /' < ,
FMdttMBeS ' ' 1 F teldD escrip tion  -  V  ;  , ' < E u u o $ te l!a t»
scan id Unique ID for this device information 1
ip addr IP address o f the identified machine 1.2.3.4
mac_addr MAC address o f the identified machine 00:01:02:03:04:05
datecreated Time and date o f the machines identification 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
las tts tam p tim e Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
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Network Scanning Tables
Table 8, Network Scanning Tables -  pOf
Table: pOf
F ie ldnam es . F ie ld lte sc rip tio n  ■ Exam ple D a ta  /
m achineid Unique ID for this identified machine 1
ip a d d r IP address o f the identified machine 1.2.3.4
m acad d r MAC address o f the identified machine 00:01:02:03:04:05
prim aryos Operating system guess o f the identified machine Linux Kernel 2.4.0
firewall Firewall on the identified machine Yes or unknown
lookupjink Type o f network hookup ethemet
uptim eseconds Number o f seconds that the identified machine has 
been running
12345
distancehops Number o f hops to the identified machine 0
datecreated Time and date of the machines identification 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
last_tstamp_time Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
Table 9, Network Scanning Tables -  tcpdump icmp
' .• v ./V - ;
SMDOeMXifMfoB " ' ' V ' I tx a tn p le  D ata  ,
te p id Unique ID for the identified packet 1
ip a d d r Destination IP address 1.2.3.4
m acad d r Destination MAC address 00:01:02:03:04:05
icm prep ly Was the packet an icmp-reply packet? Y
datecreated Time and date of the first ICMP reply packet 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for seeing an ICMP reply packet 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
last_tstamp_time Last timestamp for seeing an ICMP reply packet 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
Table 10, Network Scanning Tables -  nmap services
T n M etm n a ir services
Field nam es H eM iieser^a tfen
s i d Unique ID for the service 1
p o rtn u m Port number for the service 80
protocol Network protocol o f the service TCP
service Service o f  the port number and the protocol HTTP
ex tra in fo Extra information for the service World Wide Web HTTP
181
Table 11, Network Scanning Tables -  tcpdump ports
Tabte: teptaiapjjorts ........
Fieldnames m M I H s e tS p t im Example Data
te p id  . Unique ID for the identified packet 1
ip a d d r Destination IP address 1.2.3.4
m acaddr Destination MAC address 00:01:02:03:04:05
portnum Destination port number 80
protocol Network protocol TCP
service Service o f the port number and the protocol HTTP
extrainfo Extra information for the service World Wide Web HTTP
sy n ack Was the packet a syn-ack packet? Y o rN
rs ta c k Was the packet a rst-ack packet? Y o rN
udprep ly Was the packet a udp-reply packet? Y o rN
datecreated Time and date o f the first packet for a particular 
port (format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for a particular port 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
la s tts tam p tim e Last timestamp for a particular port 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
Table 12, Network Scanning Tables -  nmap machines
■ ” .. //.. , ■ / T ' T«M e:iu&«r atacbines.a/: . x ‘y. x  i * r..
m achineid Unique ID for this identified machine 1
ip a d d r IP address o f the identified machine 1.2.3.4
state State o f the identified machine up
m acad d r MAC address o f  the identified machine 00:01:02:03:04:05
mac vendor Vendor for the identified MAC address Intel
primary os Operating system guess o f the identified machine Linux Kernel 2.4.0
uptim eseconds Number o f seconds that the identified machine has 
been running
12345
distancehops Number o f hops to the identified machine 0
datecreated Time and date of the machines identification 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
la s tts tam p tim e Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
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Table 13, Network Scanning Tables -  nmap ports
T a b le rm n a p p o r ts
F ieldnam es 'f i n U i ^ O a t e  . '
m achineid Unique ID for this identified machine 1
portnum Port number for the service 80
protocol Network protocol o f the service TCP
service Service o f  the port number and the protocol HTTP
product Product running the service Apache Web Server
Table 14, Network Scanning Tables -  xprobe2 machines,, , r* » ' - Hftie: spriM l atacbines -
fieldnames Field Description Example Data
m achineid Unique ID for this identified machine 1
ip a d d r IP address o f the identified machine 1.2.3.4
state State o f the identified machine up
m acad d r MAC address o f the identified machine 00:01:02:03:04:05
real_time_target_sec Time in seconds to identified machine 0.05
p rim aryos First operating system guess o f the identified 
machine
Linux Kernel 2.4.0
secondaryos Second operating system guess o f the identified 
machine
Linux Kernel 2.6.0
datecreated Time and date of the machines identification 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
la s tts tam p tim e Last timestamp for seeing the identified machine 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
Table IS, Network Scanning Tables -  xprobe2 ports
■ .... . ....................
CUcUHmmbm '' FleM Oescr^rtian  ^ '  ' Esanuileliat* v
m achineid Unique ID for this identified machine 1
p o rtn u m Port number for the service 80
protocol Network protocol o f the service TCP
service Service o f the port number and the protocol HTTP
p ortsta te Version of the product running the service open
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Low Interaction Honeypot Configuration Tables
Table 16, LIH Configuration Tables -  dhcp
T»ble:dk» ,
Fieldnames Example Oata
d h cp id Unique ID for DHCP interaction 1
ip a d d r Client IP address from DHCP server 1.2.3.4
m acaddr Client MAC address 00:01:02:03:04:05
lease tim eseconds Time in seconds to renew DHCP lease 86400
renew altstam ptim e Timestamp o f the next renewal 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
date_created Time and date o f the DHCP request (format: 
yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
last_tstamp Timestamp o f the last renewal 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
las tts tam p tim e Timestamp o f the last renewal 
UNIX time (seconds since 1-1-1970)
1208361845
Table 17, LIH Configuration Tables -  honeyd scripts
. ' -V ' Table:honeyd scripts •
n M a a a m  . T ikam iile lkaia  '
sc rip tid Unique ID for the script 1
primary os OS for which the script is designed to emulate Linux
protocol Network protocol of the service TCP
p ortn u m Port number for the service 80
script lang Language to interpret the script Perl
path and filename Location of the script /telnet-emul/faketelnet.pl
Table 18, LIH Configuration Tables - lib hih link
Table: &h hih link
Fidd names FiekiSeaciiption ExampleData
l i nk i d Unique ID for the LIH and HIH link 1
lih os platform OS platform for the LIH Microsoft Windows XP SP2
l i h i p a d d r IP address for LIH 1.2.3.4
l i h m a c a d d r MAC address for LIH 00:11:22:33:44:55
hih os platform OS platform for the HIH Microsoft Windows XP SP3
h i h i p a d d r IP address for HIH 1.2.3.5
h i h m a c a d d r MAC address for HIH 00:11:22:33:44:66
hihlocation Location o f HIH template; starts with the 
datastore that is used for the VMware Server
[standard] Windows XP.vmx
hih state State o f the HIH VM ON
date created Time and date for creating LIH and HIH link 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
lasttstam p Last timestamp for deploying LIH 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
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Table 19, HIH Configuration Tables - vmware template
Table:-vmware temgplate
Fieldnames : * Example Data
h i h i d Unique ID for the HIH template 1
os platform OS platform for the HIH Linux Kernel 2.6.24-19-generic
location Location starts with the datastore that is 
used for the VMware Server
[standard] Ubuntu8/Ubuntu8.vmx
datecreated Time and date o f template creation 
(format: yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss)
2008/04/16 16:04:05
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